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
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
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**THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA:
INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION AND THE NEVADA
AIR NATIONAL GUARD (TEAM SPIRIT '82)**

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**LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM A. MITCHELL
TENURE ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF GEOGRAPHY
OFFICE OF INSTRUCTION FOR GEOGRAPHY**

JULY 1982

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
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Editorial Review by Captain James M. Kempf
Department of English
USAF Academy, Colorado 80840

This research report is presented as a competent treatment of the subject, worthy of publication. The United States Air Force Academy vouches for the quality of the research, without necessarily endorsing the opinions and conclusions of the author.

This report has been cleared for open publication and/or public release by the appropriate Office of Information in accordance with AFR 190-17 and AFR 12-30. There is no objection to unlimited distribution of this report to the public at large, or by DDC to the National Technical Information Service.

This research report has been reviewed and is approved for publication.


CLAYTON V. STEWART, Lt Colonel, USAF
Director of Research and Continuing
Education

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This research is based on a program by an interdisciplinary faculty of the USAF Academy. It was conducted in February 1982, and designed to prepare the 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group for its deployment to Taegu, Korea (Team Spirit '82). The program emphasized basic knowledge about the culture of Korea (including geography, history, politics, law, religion and language) and emphasized the importance of developing a positive attitude about our ally by providing accurate knowledge about Korea to increase sensitivity toward its people.		

PREFACE

This report is one of a series ¹ which deals with the intercultural education program provided by the United States Air Force Academy for units of the Air National Guard and tactical units of the United States Air Force in preparation for deployment to Egypt, Greece, Italy, Korea, Norway, and Turkey. The purpose of the program is to

¹Other reports in this series include the following: William A. Mitchell, Colorado Air National Guard Deploys to NATO's Southern Flank: A Case Study in Geographic Education, Air Command and Staff College Student Research Report Number 1660-80, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, May 1980; William A. Mitchell, Carl W. Reddel, and Bryant P. Shaw, The Republic of Turkey: Intercultural Education and the Colorado Air National Guard, USAF Academy Research Report 81-5, USAF Academy, CO: Dean of the Faculty, May 1981; William A. Mitchell, Intercultural Education for the Mississippi Air National Guard (CORONET GYRO), USAF Academy Technical Report 80-18, USAF Academy, CO: Dean of the Faculty, October 1980; William A. Mitchell, Personal Reflections on the Nebraska Air National Guard's Deployment to Turkey (NATO Dawn Patrol - 5-17 May 1980), USAF Academy Technical Note 80-4, USAF Academy, CO: Department of Economics, Geography and Management, October 1980; William A. Mitchell, Personal Reflections on the Georgia Air National Guard's Deployment to Murted, Turkey (NATO Display Determination - 29 September-14 October 1980), USAF Academy Technical Note 81-1, USAF Academy, CO: Department of Economics, Geography and Management, January 1981; William A. Mitchell, Cultural Awareness: The 122nd Tactical Fighter Wing, Indiana Air National Guard, Prepares for Deployment to Turkey (Dawn Patrol), USAF Academy Technical Report 81-10, USAF Academy, CO: Dean of the Faculty, October 1981; and, most recently, William A. Mitchell, Italy Bound: Intercultural Education for the 127th Tactical Fighter Wing, Michigan Air National Guard (CORONET RIG), USAF Academy Technical Note 82-1, USAF Academy CO: Office of Instruction for Geography, February 1982.

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acquaint military units with the culture and language, along with social, economic and political concerns of these countries. The ultimate objective of the education program is to establish good interpersonal relations between people from deploying units and their host nation counterparts.

These reports describe the intercultural education programs prepared by officers assigned to the Dean of the Faculty, USAF Academy for presentation to the deploying Guard units. Additionally, the reports highlight a unique example of regular Air Force support for the "Total Force" concept. On an even more fundamental level, however, these reports demonstrate the critical relationship between intercultural education and successful completion of the Air Force mission in combined operations with our nation's allies. On this level, the entire intercultural education program has a very special significance: it represents official acknowledgment that intercultural education is vital, along with technical and operational expertise, for Air Force mission success.

I am a Tenured Associate Professor of Geography and hold a PhD in Geography from the University of Illinois and an MA from the University of California, Los Angeles. Additionally, I am an Air Force Mediterranean area specialist. I have assisted the Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, and

South Carolina Air National Guard units in preparing their deployments to Greece, Italy, Korea and Turkey. I also have served in the field as a cultural advisor and interpreter for the Colorado, Georgia, and Nebraska Air National Guard units. Additionally, I assisted the 74th Tactical Fighter Squadron (A-10s), Regular Air Force, England Air Force Base, Louisiana, for its deployment to Turkey, and also units from the Rapid Deployment Forces for deployments to Egypt during "Bright Star 81." My current research focuses on intercultural communications and cultural awareness.

Members of the USAF Academy team which prepared and presented this program also included Lt Colonel Earl F. Saunders; Major William E. Berry; and Captains William B. Hammill, James E. Henderson, Kenneth O. Morse, and Marius G. Sorenson.

Lt Colonel Earl F. Saunders is an Associate Professor and Chairman of Geography. He is presently completing his PhD program with the University of Minnesota. Lt Colonel Saunders holds an MA from the University of Illinois with regional concentration on Asia. He is a specialist on the theoretical geography of Asia and is Chairman of the Academy's Asian Studies Group.

Major William E. Berry, Jr., is an Associate Professor in the Political Science department. He holds a PhD from Cornell University and is a specialist in Asian Politics.

He recently represented the Academy at a special conference in Seoul which addressed the role of the military in Korean modernization.

Captain (Major selectee) William B. Hammill is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Law. He holds a JD and a Masters in Business from the University of Southern California. He is course director for the Department of Law's International Law course. Captain Hammill participated in the Indiana Air National Guard program, the Michigan Air National Guard program, the 74th Tactical Fighter Squadron program, England AFB, Louisiana, in addition to our program for "Bright Star 81."

Captain James E. Henderson holds an MA from the University of Washington. He is an Instructor in the Department of History. Captain Henderson is a specialist in East Asian History and has lived in the East Asia theater (including Korea) for over ten years.

Captain Kenneth O. Morse is an Instructor in the Department of Economics. He holds an MA from the University of Nebraska and is a specialist in international trade and economic development of East Asia. Captain Morse was stationed in Korea.

Captain Marius G. Sorenson is an Instructor in the Department of Political Science and holds an MA from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is a specialist on

Asian politics. Captain Sorenson attended the National Taiwan University Law School for two years. He speaks Chinese fluently.

The 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Nevada Air National Guard, was the ninth Air National Guard unit that has received an intercultural communication and language training program from the USAF Academy. As coordinator for the program, I have observed firsthand the effort of our officers in preparing for the presentations. Since the program is strictly secondary to our primary mission of teaching, in most cases the officers have used their weekends and nights for these programs. I am indeed very proud of these officers, each of whom has a deep personal commitment to the importance of this program.

A final note of appreciation to the Air National Guard. Major General John T. Guice, former Director of the Air National Guard, and Major General John B. Conaway, Director, have initiated a policy that all Air National Guard units receive cultural training before they deploy to selected foreign areas. The need for such a program was strongly advocated by Lt Colonel Jack W. Kier and Lt Colonel John R. Butler of the Air National Guard Headquarters. The success of the program has been observed by the regular USAF and, consequently, the Academy program has now assisted the 74th Tactical Fighter Squadron at England Air Force Base and

Rapid Deployment Forces from Shaw Air Force Base, Keesler Air Force Base, and Myrtle Beach Air Force Base. Further, Headquarters Tactical Air Command is now requiring a similar program for all "Checkered Flag" units. Partly because of the foresight of the Air National Guard and of people such as Brigadier General John L. France and Brigadier General James C. Hall, the information presented in this intercultural education program has spread to many far-flung Air Force units and people. In return, the officers from the Academy have acquired important knowledge about Air Command and Control Systems, such as F4, RF4, F-15, F-105, A-7, and A-10 weapon systems, and a first hand understanding of the Air Force's "Total Force Policy."

I thank the men and women of the 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group for their cooperation, enthusiasm and assistance during our visits.

Last, but not least, I thank Brigadier General William A. Orth, Dean of the Faculty, and Maj General Robert E. Kelley, Superintendent, for their support. They recognized the importance of the program and authorized our support. We who have participated in intercultural education appreciate their sensitivity to the importance of this program.

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INTRODUCTION

In early October 1981, 1Lt Vaughn Hanchett, Director of Intelligence, 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group, Cannon International Airport, Reno, Nevada, contacted Lt Colonel John Butler, Tactical Air, ANG Bureau, for assistance in preparing the Group for its Spring involvement with "Team Spirit '82." Colonel Butler informally asked me about possibly providing a program of cultural and language training for the unit. After I surveyed our resources, Brigadier General William A. Orth, Dean of the Faculty, approved faculty support for the Nevada ANG in December 1981 (Attachment 1).

The program was developed by all the team members during several planning meetings. We relied heavily on what had been successful in past educational programs prepared for Air National Guard units. Our intent was to provide useful knowledge about Korea and to help the Nevada Guardspeople develop a positive attitude about their host ally. We focused our program around the objectives of reducing ethnocentrism and cultural arrogance by fostering positive motivation which was to be achieved by increased knowledge about Korean culture and information about how to conduct proper interpersonal relations.

Our assistance for the 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance

Group had historical precedent from earlier educational programs conducted for the Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska and South Carolina Air National Guard overseas deployments. We were aware that American military forces all too often pay minimum attention to foreign cultural values and attitudes. Further, we know that ignorance of other cultures can lead to international misunderstandings and unfavorable behavior. The Guard Bureau also knew that not knowing and appreciating cultural and historical determinants of other societies could be detrimental to mission accomplishments. Poor morale and decreased performance are the most common results from inadequate cultural preparation.

7

THE PROGRAM

While developing this program, we were continually guided by the question "What does a Guardsperson need to know about Korea and him or herself in order to be most effective in that environment?" We decided on knowledge of basic geography, religion, history, language, contemporary political setting, the Korea military, culture, conditions at the deployment location, and law (Attachment 2).

The program explained the contemporary strategic importance of Korea and at the same time provided a relevant historical background of the U.S.-Korean alliance. We started with the geographical environment of Korea, then narrowed our focus to specifics of Korean culture. We addressed current issues, such as rapid industrialization and Korean relations with the US, North Korea, Japan, and other countries. We fully realized the significance of communicating with the Koreans, in their language, but our limited program permitted only minimal exposure to a few useful Korean phrases (Attachment 3).

A goal of our program was to develop an attitude of respect for the people of the Republic of Korea. Throughout the presentations, we underscored the importance of respect and appreciation for their values and attitudes that are different from ours. The unit was thoroughly exposed to the

concept of "culture shock."

Our team presentation was during the weekend of 6-7 February 1982. I began the program with a discussion of the philosophy of the Academy support and intercultural education program (Attachment 4).

The second presentation was devoted to a systematic description of the geography of Korea. Lt Colonel Saunders' goal was to present Korea in its regional setting, stressing its strategic location, then to address the physical characteristics of climate and topography followed by a fairly detailed look at Korea's urban and rural environment. He did this with the aid of a slide presentation. Lt Colonel Saunders described the many problems facing Korea today, along with some solutions to those problems which Korea is actively pursuing (Attachment 5).

Religion has a profound impact on the lives of Koreans and deserves a foreigner's full understanding. Captain Sorenson gave the third presentation and addressed religion, moral and political philosophies of Animism, Shamanism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Christianity. His focus was on where the individual fits in the complicated and numerous systems of religions in Korea (Attachment 6).

Our third presentation described Korea from earliest to contemporary times. Captain Henderson presented a capsule history of significant events and people in Korea's

past. He clearly showed that in order to understand the modern Korean, and Korea's problems of today, one must know and appreciate some of the history of Korea particularly, the Korean War (Attachment 7).

Major Berry gave the fourth presentation. He addressed domestic political issues, and international issues such as US-Korean relations, Japanese-Korean relations, Korean relations with the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Republic of China, and finally Korea's neighbor to the north, North Korea (Attachment 8).

The fifth presentation was by Captain Hammill. He described the legal status of Guardspeople while in Korea. He explained the Status of Forces Agreement with respect to jurisdiction and detailed some unique Korean laws that would be of concern to the Guardspeople. He also mentioned precautions that would be useful for the deploying people. His suggestions were excellent advice for a successful deployment (Attachment 9).

Communicating with a foreign host can be a very frustrating experience unless you study the host's language in advance of arrival. Communicating improperly, through verbal or non-verbal forms, can be detrimental to the mission. We realized that Korean is a difficult language for most Americans, but we firmly believed learning a few phrases and trying to speak those words in Korean would demonstrate the

respect of Guardspeople for their host. Captains Morse and Henderson teamed for the sixth presentation on communicating with the Koreans (Attachment 10).

Knowing your military counterpart is also very important. Major Berry and Captain Morse gave presentation number seven on the Korean military. They gave a background briefing on the Korean military traditions, the roles of the military in Korean society, security concerns of Korea, and the military as a modernizing influence. They also presented specific examples illustrating Korean military attitudes, rank structure, and discipline (Attachments 11 and 12).

Our final formal presentation was a capsule summary of Korean culture. I described specific cultural traits of Korea. My intent was to show specific ways where a Korean's thought process differs from that of an American's, and at the same time, where they are similar to American thought processes. My goal was to provide a basis for more accurate perceptions of Koreans (Attachment 13).

An important part of our program included various information handouts for the deploying people. Since our program was certainly not comprehensive, we suggested further readings to help better appreciate the Koreans (Attachment 14). We also left a list of basic facts on the country, mostly extracted from the US Army Area Handbook

(Attachment 15). We also provided a Department of State pamphlet on the Republic of Korea, as well as their primary enemy, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Attachments 16 and 17). Additionally, we gave the deploying people a handout on the Korean military rank structure, and a map of Korea (Attachments 18 and 19). Our last handout was the most important piece of material. It was an article by a reknown scholar of cultural awareness, Mr. Donald M. Bishop. His article on Americans in overseas environments is a classic (Attachment 20).

COSTS

The program cost about \$2988.65 for per diem and travel expenses. The visits required a total of 14 man-days. Obviously, additional preparation time went into the eight and one-half hours of presentations.

In non-monetary terms, cost to the team members was mostly related to the preparation, traveling, and teaching time involved after their regular duty hours, including weekends. I mention these costs because in evaluating a program of this nature, there are hidden costs that could be easily overlooked. Despite the non-monetary costs, the team members unanimously agreed on the importance of the program. Part of the satisfaction was seeing positive attitudes develop toward our effort and Korea as our presentation progressed. Part of the "payoff" of this program would be in preventing any misunderstandings or negative incidents between American military and their Korean hosts. If the team's per diem and travel costs are distributed to include the 400 Guardspeople who attended the presentations, the average per person cost is about \$12 to \$13 (Attachment 21).

CONCLUSION

In summary, our impressions of the 152nd Tactical Reconnaissance Group members were very positive. The Nevada Guardspeople made many efforts to learn as much as possible about Korea within their many operational constraints. Their attitude was positive. We have noticed again and again that the success of a deployment in terms of intercultural education is a function of one common denominator--the attitude of the commander. If the commander really believes in educating his people about the host environment, his attitude filters down very quickly to the lowest level of personnel. In this case, Colonel Wayne Adams and his staff, particularly 1Lt Vaughn Hanchett, continued the positive tradition of those units previously receiving the Academy's intercultural education program.

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ATTACHMENT 1

STAFF SUMMARY SHEET

TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname), GRADE AND DATE	TO	ACTION	SIGNATURE (Surname), GRADE AND DATE
1 DFH	Coord	John L. Mitchell 30 Nov	6 DF	Appr	Otto
2 DFPS	Coord	COOK, Lt. Colonel 1 Dec 81	7		
3 DFE	Coord	WILLIAM A. MITCHELL 30 Nov 81	8		
4 DFL	Coord	John L. Mitchell 30 Nov 81	9		
5 DFV	Coord		10		
SURNAMES OF ACTION (IF CER AND GRADE)		SYMBOL	PHONE	TYPIST'S INIT	SUSPENSE DATE
Lt Col Mitchell		DFSOG	3067	edr	
SUBJECT				DATE	
Faculty Support of Nevada ANG Deployment to Korea				30 November 1981	

SUMMARY

- Background:** During the past several years, the Faculty has supported Air National Guard and regular Air Force units deploying to foreign environments. The National Guard Bureau has asked our support for the Nevada ANG deployments on Team Spirit 1982 to Korea in March 1982 and for the Massachusetts ANG deployment to Turkey for NATO's Display Determination in August 1982.
- Observations:** The Faculty has officers with specialties and experiences capable of presenting a limited program to each unit. Additionally, we can draw from our extensive experience with previous deployments. These deployments will provide an excellent opportunity for our officers to support operational activities while broadening their professional experiences. This support will be carefully monitored by Lt Col Mitchell and would be presented on the weekend of 6-7 February 1982 for the Nevada unit and during the Spring Break, weekends or at the end of the Spring Semester for the Massachusetts unit. All participants are volunteers who wish to use their off-duty time for this program. All expenses will be funded by the ANG.
- Recommendation:** Approve this program of limited Faculty support for the Air National Guard deployments.

William A. Mitchell
WILLIAM A. MITCHELL, Lt Col, USAF
Tenure Associate Professor
Office of Instruction for Geography

Approved

*Check with Gen Beckel -
if going to Reno-*

ATTACHMENT 2

USAFA CULTURAL AWARENESS PROGRAM
 INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION FOR KOREA
 152 TACTICAL RECON GROUP, NEVADA ANG
 6-7 February 1982

<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPEAKER</u>	<u>START</u>	<u>TIME</u>
INTRODUCTION	Lt Col Mitchell	0800	15
PHYSICAL/HUMAN ENVIRONMENT OF KOREA	Lt Col Saunders		35
* Break *			
THE IMPACT OF CONFUCIANISM AND OTHER RELIGIONS	Capt Sorenson	0900	25
HISTORY CAPSULE	Capt Henderson		25
* Break *			
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS	Maj Berry	1000	25
YOU AND KOREAN LAW	Capt Hammill		25
* Break *			
COMMUNICATING WITH KOREANS	Capt Henderson Capt Morse	1100	20
KOREAN MILITARY	Maj Berry Capt Morse		15
A CULTURE CAPSULE OF KOREA	Lt Col Mitchell	1135	20
PANEL DISCUSSION	Lt Col Saunders, Moderator Lt Col Mitchell, Panelist Maj Berry, Panelist Capt Hammill, Panelist Capt Henderson, Panelist Capt Morse, Panelist Capt Sorenson, Panelist	1155	20
CONCLUSION	Lt Col Mitchell	1220	10

4 1/2 hours

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

LT COL WILLIAM A. MITCHELL, Ph.D., University of Illinois; Tenure Associate Professor, Office of Instruction for Geography; USAFA Program Coordinator for Intercultural Education; area specialist; cultural geographer; intercultural education specialist; participant in the Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Nebraska, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, and South Carolina Air National Guard deployment programs; participant in the 74th Tac Ftr Sqd deployment program; deployed with the 140th Tac Ftr Wg, 116th Tac Ftr Wg, and the 155th Tac Recon Gp; participant in HQ TAC's Checkered Flag Workshop (area familiarization); participant in 1982 Bright Star Intercultural Awareness Program. AV 259-3067

LT COL EARL F. SAUNDERS, M.S., University of Illinois (Ph.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota); Associate Professor and Chairman of USAFA Office of Instruction for Geography; Chairman of Asian Studies Group; specialist in Theoretical Geography of Asia. AV 259-3067

MAJOR WILLIAM E. BERRY, JR., Ph.D., Cornell University; Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science; specialist in Asian Politics; recently participated in a conference in Seoul sponsored by Korean Military Academy, "The Role of the Military in Korean Modernization." AV 259-2270

CAPTAIN WILLIAM B. HAMMILL, J.D., University of Southern California; Assistant Professor, Department of Law; Course Director, International Law; participant in the Indiana and Michigan Air National Guard programs; participant in the 74th Tac Ftr Sqd program; participant in 1982 Bright Star Intercultural Awareness Program. AV 259-2833

CAPTAIN JAMES E. HENDERSON, M.A., University of Washington; Instructor, Department of History; specialist in East Asian History; ten years in East Asia theater. AV 259-3527

CAPTAIN KENNETH O. MORSE, M.S., University of Nebraska; Instructor, Department of Economics; specialist in International Trade and Economic Development of East Asia; stationed in Korea. AV 259-2597

CAPTAIN MARIUS G. SORENSEN (Gus), M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Instructor, Department of Political Science; specialist in Asian Politics. AV 259-2273

ATTACHMENT 3

USAFA CULTURAL AWARENESS PROGRAM
INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION FOR THE 152 TACTICAL RECON GROUP, NEVADA ANG
1982 TEAM SPIRIT DEPLOYMENT TO KOREA

OBJECTIVES

To prepare members of the Nevada Air National Guard for their deployment to Korea by

- providing useful knowledge about Korea, and
- developing a positive attitude about our ally.

I. KNOWLEDGE

Following the course of instruction, Guardspeople will know:

- a. the strategic importance of Korea.
- b. Korea's major geographic features.
- c. fundamental tenets of Confucianism.
- d. relevant historical background.
- e. the current issues in Korean life, including:
 - 1. the crisis of rapid industrialization, with special attention to:
 - (a) rapid increases in movements from the rural to urban sectors.
 - (b) traditional and modern life.
 - (c) changing social values, i.e., role of the family.
 - 2. Korea's relations with the United States
 - (a) role of the military
 - (b) need for correct behavior by American military personnel
 - f. a few useful words in Korean (your knowledge of Korean is dependent on your own efforts after the presentation).
 - g. how to speak basic English for more effective communication with Korean counterparts not completely fluent in our language.

ATTITUDES

Guardspeople should develop:

- a. an attitude of respect for
 - 1. Confucianism, Buddhism, Ch'ondogyo, and Shamanism
 - 2. traditional Korean life
- b. an understanding of culture shock and other factors which often erode effective interaction of Americans and other people.
- c. confidence, through knowledge and basic language.
- d. an eagerness to meet the Korean people and see Korean society.
- e. the willingness to observe correct behavior in Korea.

ATTACHMENT 4

USAFA INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION PROGRAM
FOR THE NEVADA ANG DEPLOYMENT TO KOREA

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

BY

LT COL WILLIAM A. MITCHELL

THANK YOU VERY MUCH, _____. WE ARE VERY PLEASED
TO HAVE BEEN INVITED TO VISIT WITH YOU BEFORE YOUR DEPLOYMENT
TO KOREA. YOUR PARTICIPATION IN TEAM SPIRIT '82 IS VERY
IMPORTANT, AS YOU KNOW, AND WE CONSIDER IT A PRIVILEGE TO
PROVIDE YOU WITH SOME BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON KOREA. WE
BRING BEST WISHES FOR A SAFE AND SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT FROM
GENERAL KELLEY, THE ACADEMY SUPERINTENDENT, AND GENERAL ORTH,
DEAN OF THE FACULTY.

OUR PROGRAM ON THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA EMPHASIZES "INTER-
CULTURAL EDUCATION." WE WANT TO PROVIDE YOU WITH USEFUL
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT KOREA WHICH WILL FURTHER HELP DEVELOP A
POSITIVE ATTITUDE ABOUT OUR IMPORTANT ALLY.

THE PARTICULAR TOPICS WE WILL ADDRESS TODAY ARE GEOGRAPHY,
RELIGION, HISTORY, POLITICS, LAW, COMMUNICATIONS, THE KOREAN

MILITARY, AND CULTURE OF THE PEOPLE. AT THIS VERY MOMENT MANY OF YOU ARE PROBABLY SITTING OUT THERE WONDERING WHY YOU NEED THIS PROGRAM. IF SO, YOU'RE NO DIFFERENT THAN MANY OF THE SOME 3,000 GUARDSPEOPLE AND REGULARS WE'VE ADDRESSED SINCE APRIL OF 1979. NEVERTHELESS, I FEEL THAT BEFORE I BEGIN THIS MORNING, I SHOULD ANSWER THAT QUESTION.

THE PRINCIPAL MEASURE OF ANY DEPLOYMENT IS ITS SUCCESS OPERATIONALLY. WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT DEPLOYMENTS CAN BE MARRED BY AMERICANS MAKING INNOCENT AND UNINTENTIONAL BUT FREQUENTLY EMBARRASSING MISTAKES IN DEALING WITH THEIR HOSTS. THIS, IN TURN, HAS COMPLICATED AND SOMETIMES DEGRADED OUR ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.

WE HAVE WORKED WITH NUMEROUS DEPLOYING UNITS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS. MANY WERE TO TURKEY, SOME WERE TO GREECE, SOME TO EGYPT, SOME TO THE SUDAN, AND SOME TO ITALY. OUR EXPERIENCE IS THAT THE MORE EACH OF YOU KNOW ABOUT THE PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY TO WHICH YOU DEPLOY, THE QUICKER YOU ARE ABLE TO ESTABLISH RAPID RAPPORT WITH YOUR COUNTERPARTS; YOU ARE

MORE RELAXED AND COMFORTABLE WITH YOUR NEW AND DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT; MANY EMBARRASSING MISTAKES ARE AVOIDED; AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE BETTER CHANCE YOU HAVE FOR A SMOOTH AND SUCCESSFUL OPERATION.

WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF KOREA, YOU ARE RECEIVING THIS PROGRAM FOR TWO VERY SPECIFIC REASONS. FIRST, IN LATE 1979, FOLLOWING THE 140TH TACTICAL FIGHTER WING'S DEPLOYMENT TO TURKEY AND ITS OUTSTANDING SUCCESS, MAJ GEN JOHN T. GUICE, THE ANG DIRECTOR AT THAT TIME, IMPLEMENTED A POLICY THAT ALL ANG UNITS DEPLOYING TO SENSITIVE OVERSEAS AREAS WOULD RECEIVE A THOROUGH INTERCULTURAL EDUCATION PROGRAM. THIS HAS BEEN CONTINUED BY MAJ GEN CONAWAY. SECONDLY, AND VERY IMPORTANTLY, WE HAVE AN AGREEMENT UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA, DATED 9 JULY 1966, WHICH BEHOOVES YOU TO KNOW AND RESPECT THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF KOREA. WE ARE HERE TO HELP YOU DEVELOP A RESPECT FOR THE LAWS, CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS OF KOREA.

YOU ARE GOING INTO A REGION THAT HAS BEEN NAMED BY FOREIGNERS AS THE FAR EAST. TO MOST AMERICANS, IT IS A REGION VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. IT IS A REGION WHERE HISTORY IS MEASURED IN THOUSANDS OF YEARS AND HAS A WELL-ESTABLISHED CULTURE VERY DIFFERENT FROM OURS. ALTHOUGH THE REGION IS COMPOSED OF DIVERSE ELEMENTS, IT IS LOOSELY TIED TOGETHER BY PEOPLE WHO SHARE SOME SIMILARITIES IN RELIGION AND THOUGHT PROCESSES. BUT TO UNDERSTAND THE FAR EAST, ONE MUST UNDERSTAND THE WAYS OF LIFE, THE MOTIVATIONS, AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE. YOU MUST UNDERSTAND ITS GEOGRAPHY, TEMPERAMENT, AND LANGUAGE. THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF KOREA, AS WELL AS MUCH OF THE FAR EAST, SHOULD BE CLEAR TO ALL OF YOU.

KOREA IS A FASCINATING COUNTRY. IT'S A LAND OF VERY KIND, CONSIDERATE AND HOSPITABLE PEOPLE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS MERELY A SPOT ON THE MAP, BUT VIEWED AS A STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT AREA WITH MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WHO ARE

SIMILAR IN MANY WAYS BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, ALSO DIFFERENT FROM US. THEIR LANGUAGE, ARTS, RELIGION, CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS ARE UNIQUE. WE MUST BE CAREFUL TO RECOGNIZE THE RIGHT OF DIFFERENCE AND NOT GET TRAPPED IN THE FALLACY OF EVALUATING THEIR BEHAVIOR IN TERMS OF VALUE JUDGMENTS ACCORDING TO WESTERN NORMS AND STANDARDS.

KOREA IS EXPERIENCING RAPID CHANGE FROM TRADITIONAL TO MODERN. IT'S AN AREA WITH FEW NATURAL RESOURCES, RUGGED TERRAIN, POOR SOILS, AND DEPLETED FORESTS. IT'S A COUNTRY WHERE A HIGH PERCENTAGE OF PEOPLE ARE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, MOSTLY IN VILLAGES. IT ALSO IS A COUNTRY WHOSE POPULATION IS IT'S MAIN RESOURCE. THERE IS A SHIFT IN CHARACTER FROM RURAL TO URBAN. THE STANDARD OF LIVING IS RISING, ALONG WITH HIGHER LEVELS OF EDUCATION, AND THE POPULATION GROWTH RATE IS SLOWLY DECREASING. MATERIAL LIVING CONDITIONS, SUCH AS BETTER HOUSING, FOOD, AND CLOTHING, ALONG WITH HEALTH STANDARDS, ARE IMPROVING. YET THERE EXIST MANY PROBLEMS

AS IN ALL COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING RAPID CHANGE, YOU'LL LEARN
ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS AS WELL AS KOREAN SUCCESSES TODAY.

INTRODUCTION OF PARTICIPANTS

OUR TEAM CONSISTS OF VARIOUS SPECIALISTS WHO WILL TALK
ABOUT MANY ASPECTS OF KOREA IN DETAIL. I'D LIKE TO INTRODUCE
OUR TEAM AT THIS TIME. OUR FIRST SPEAKER WILL BE COLONEL
EARL SAUNDERS. HE'LL PROVIDE A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE
GEOGRAPHY OF KOREA. COL SAUNDERS IS CHAIRMAN OF GEOGRAPHY
AND CHAIRMAN OF THE ASIAN STUDIES GROUP AT THE ACADEMY. HE
WILL BE RECEIVING HIS PH.D. FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
VERY SHORTLY. HE IS A SPECIALIST IN THEORETICAL GEOGRAPHY OF
ASIA. COL SAUNDERS, WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND? THANK YOU.

OUR SECOND SPEAKER IS CAPTAIN GUS SORENSEN. CAPT SORENSEN
HAS A MASTER'S FROM THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
AND TEACHES POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE ACADEMY. HE IS A
SPECIALIST IN ASIAN POLITICS AND ALSO VERY INTERESTED IN KOREAN
RELIGION. HE'LL TALK ABOUT THE MANY DIFFERENT RELIGIONS OF
KOREA AND HOW THEY IMPACT ON SOCIETY. CAPTAIN SORENSEN,

WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND? THANK YOU.

CAPTAIN JIM HENDERSON HOLDS A MASTER'S FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON. HE IS A SPECIALIST ON EAST ASIAN HISTORY AND HAS LIVED IN ASIA FOR ABOUT TEN YEARS. CAPT HENDERSON WILL DO SOMETHING THAT SOUNDS IMPOSSIBLE! HE'LL GIVE YOU A HISTORY OF KOREA, WHICH COVERS OVER 4,000 YEARS, IN JUST ABOUT 20 MINUTES. SOUNDS IMPOSSIBLE, BUT HE PROMISED ME HE'D DO IT! CAPT HENDERSON, WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND? THANK YOU.

OUR FOURTH SPEAKER IS MAJOR BILL BERRY. BILL HAS HIS PH.D. FROM CORNELL UNIVERSITY AND IS A SPECIALIST IN ASIAN POLITICS. BILL RECENTLY RETURNED FROM KOREA AFTER PARTICIPATING IN A CONFERENCE AT THE KOREAN MILITARY ACADEMY. BILL WILL ADDRESS CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN KOREA. BILL WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND? THANK YOU.

CAPTAIN BARRY HAMMILL HOLDS A LAW DEGREE FROM SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA AND IS IN THE ACADEMY'S DEPARTMENT OF LAW. HE'S PARTICIPATED IN OUR PROGRAMS WITH THE INDIANA AND MICHIGAN

AIR NATIONAL GUARD AS WELL AS BRIGHT STAR '82. BARRY WILL COVER KOREAN LAW. CAPTAIN HAMMILL, WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND? THANK YOU.

CAPTAIN KEN MORSE IS ANOTHER MEMBER OF OUR TEAM WHO WAS STATIONED IN KOREA. HE HOLDS AN M.A. FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA IN ECONOMICS. KEN'S A SPECIALIST IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF EAST ASIA. HE WILL JOIN WITH CAPTAIN HENDERSON AND DISCUSS THE ART OF COMMUNICATING IN KOREAN. LATER, HE'LL ALSO PARTICIPATE IN A TALK ABOUT THE KOREAN MILITARY. CAPTAIN MORSE, WOULD YOU PLEASE STAND? THANK YOU.

WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY, COL SAUNDERS WILL NOW ADDRESS THE GEOGRAPHY OF KOREA. COL SAUNDERS . . .

THANK YOU, COL SAUNDERS. WE'LL TAKE A SHORT BREAK NOW, AND PLEASE FEEL FREE TO TALK WITH THE TEAM DURING THE BREAK. WE'RE HERE TO HELP.

CAPTAIN SORENSEN WILL NOW ADDRESS CONFUCIANISM AND OTHER RELIGIONS THAT IMPACT ON KOREAN PEOPLE. HE'LL DEMONSTRATE HOW RELIGION AFFECTS PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND THE GENERAL OUTLOOK ON LIFE. RELIGION IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO A CULTURAL GROUP AND ESPECIALLY HAS A PROFOUND IMPACT ON THE KOREAN. CAPTAIN SORENSEN . . .

TO UNDERSTAND KOREA TODAY, WE MUST VIEW KOREA IN ITS HISTORICAL SETTING. CAPTAIN HENDERSON WILL NOW PRESENT A VERY CONCISE HISTORY CAPSULE OF KOREA. HE ESSENTIALLY WILL HIGHLIGHT KEY EVENTS AND PERIODS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED THE KOREA OF TODAY. CAPTAIN HENDERSON . . .

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS, ALONG WITH HISTORY, RELIGION AND GEOGRAPHY, ARE VERY COMPLICATED IN KOREA. MAJOR BERRY WILL NOW ADDRESS A FEW DOMESTIC ISSUES, THE PRESENT SITUATION IN KOREA, AND TOUCH ON U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS AS WELL AS WITH

JAPAN, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND NORTH KOREA. MAJOR BERRY . . .

CAPTAIN HAMMILL WILL NOW TALK ABOUT YOU AND KOREAN LAW. HE'LL COVER YOUR LEGAL STATUS IN KOREA, AND KOREAN SENSITIVITIES. CAPTAIN HAMMILL . . .

THE KOREAN LANGUAGE HAS BEEN ONE OF THE CHIEF BARRIERS TO OUR UNDERSTANDING KOREANS. KOREAN IS A LANGUAGE VERY DIFFICULT FOR WESTENERS TO MASTER. IT'S COMPLEX, AND SPOKEN AT DIFFERENT LEVELS DEPENDING ON ONE'S SOCIAL STATUS AND INTIMACY OF THE PEOPLE. WE'RE NOT HERE TO TEACH YOU KOREAN. HOWEVER, THERE ARE A FEW WORDS THAT YOU CAN LEARN AND WILL BE VERY USEFUL. MORE IMPORTANTLY, YOUR ATTEMPT TO SPEAK A FEW WORDS WILL SHOW THE KOREANS YOU APPRECIATE THEM AND THEIR SOCIETY. WE ENCOURAGE YOU TO STUDY THE LANGUAGE AND DO TRY TO SPEAK KOREAN ONCE YOU ARE THERE. CAPTAIN HENDERSON AND CAPTAIN MORSE WILL NOW HELP YOU COMMUNICATE A FEW

IMPORTANT GREETINGS AND COURTESIES. GENTLEMEN . . .

MAJOR BERRY AND CAPTAIN MORSE WILL NOW ADDRESS YOUR MILITARY COUNTERPART. THEY'LL COVER THE MILITARY TRADITIONS AND THE CONCERN FOR SECURITY. KOREANS' SENSE OF DISCIPLINE IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM OURS. WHILE THEIR MEANS MAY VARY, THEIR GOALS ARE SIMILAR TO OURS. YOU'LL ALSO FIND THE RANK CHARACTERISTICS USEFUL. GENTLEMEN . . .

I'LL NOW TALK ABOUT THE CULTURE OF KOREA . . .

CONCLUSION

WE HOPE THIS PRESENTATION HAS HELPED YOU INCREASE YOUR UNDERSTANDING AND RESPECT OF OUR ALLY. WE HOPE YOU AVOID SOME OF THE PITFALLS THAT HAVE MADE SOME AMERICANS UNFAIR CRITICS OF KOREA. MOST MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT KOREA ARE USUALLY FROM A LACK OF UNDERSTANDING. AS YOU PREPARE TO DEPLOY AND WHEN YOU ARRIVE IN KOREA, TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE KOREAN

PEOPLE AND DEVELOP YOUR OWN OPINION BASED ON WHAT YOU LEARN OR EXPERIENCE. IT IS OUR HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEE KOREANS THROUGH OBJECTIVE EYES. THEY ARE A DIFFERENT PEOPLE, WITH THEIR OWN IDEOLOGY, THEIR OWN BELIEFS, AND THEIR OWN LIKES AND DISLIKES. THEY HAVE SENIORITY ON US AS PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN AROUND A VERY LONG TIME. YOUR ACTIONS THROUGH UNDERSTANDING CAN ENHANCE U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS. YOU'RE IN FOR AN ENJOYABLE AND REWARDING DEPLOYMENT. IT'S UP TO YOU. WE ALL WISH WE WERE GOING WITH YOU. GOOD LUCK, AND GOD BLESS YOU ALL.

ATTACHMENT 5

INTRODUCTION

IT'S A LONG WAY TO TAEGU! YOUR TRIP WILL TAKE YOU ONE QUARTER OF THE WAY AROUND THE WORLD--ABOUT 5,000 MILES GIVE OR TAKE A FEW HUNDRED MILES, DEPENDING ON THE SKILL AND CUNNING OF YOUR NAVIGATOR. YOUR VOYAGE WILL TERMINATE AT TAEGU, A CITY OF OVER A MILLION PEOPLE SITUATED IN THE SOUTHEASTERN REGION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

LOCATION

THE KOREAN PENINSULA JUTS 600 MILES OUT INTO THE OCEAN AS A GIGANTIC BREAKWATER BETWEEN THE YELLOW SEA--ON THE WEST, AND THE SEA OF JAPAN--ON THE EAST. IT HAS A VERY STRATEGIC POSITION, SANDWICCHED IN BETWEEN TWO ASIAN POWERS--JAPAN AND CHINA. MUCH OF ITS TRAGIC HISTORY IS A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS LOCATIONAL FACTOR. THE ENTIRE PENINSULA, TOGETHER WITH ITS 3,600 ISLANDS--830 OF WHICH ARE INHABITED--STRETCHES FROM 43°N TO 33°N LATITUDE--ABOUT THE SAME AS KLAMATH FALLS TO LOS ANGELES. A TWO-MILE WIDE DEMILITARIZED ZONE LOCATED GENERALLY IN THE VICINITY OF THE 38TH PARALLEL DIVIDES THE PENINSULA INTO TWO INDEPENDENT NATIONS--THE PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (NORTH KOREA) AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH KOREA). THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, YOUR HOST COUNTRY, IS ABOUT $1/3$ THE SIZE OF NEVADA WITH A POPULATION OF NEARLY 40 MILLION. TAEGU, YOUR HOME AWAY FROM HOME, IS ON THE SAME LATITUDE

AS LAS VEGAS. IT IS ABOUT 50 MILES NORTHWEST OF THE LARGE COASTAL CITY OF PUSAN AND 150 MILES SOUTHEAST OF SEOUL, THE CAPITAL CITY.

TOPOGRAPHY

THE COMMONALITY OF LATITUDES BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA AND NEVADA IS WHERE THE SIMILARITY ENDS. KOREA IS IN MANY RESPECTS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM YOUR HOME STATE. THE COUNTRYSIDE IS VERY RUGGED WITH STEEP, NARROW VALLEYS RUNNING PARALLEL TO THE MOUNTAIN RANGES. ONLY 15 PERCENT OF THE LAND IS FLAT WHICH MAKES FARMING QUITE DIFFICULT AND POSES SEVERE TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS. MOST OF THE FLAT LAND IS LOCATED ADJACENT TO THE MANY SHORT, SHALLOW AND RAPID-FLOWING RIVERS OR ALONG COASTAL PLAINS. THERE ARE ALSO MANY PLACES WHERE THE TERRAIN HAS BEEN LEVELED BY TERRACING. THE TAEBAEK MOUNTAINS, THE MAJOR MOUNTAIN RANGE, RUN PARALLEL TO THE COAST FOR ABOUT 160 MILES. OTHER MOUNTAIN RANGES BRANCH OFF OF THIS RANGE TO FORM THE UNDULATING TERRAIN THROUGHOUT THE PENINSULA. THE AVERAGE ELEVATION OF THESE MOUNTAINS IS ONLY ABOUT 1,500 FEET. THE HIGHEST ELEVATION IS AT MOUNT PAEKTU AT ABOUT 9,000 FEET. THE EAST COAST IS FAIRLY SMOOTH WITH A FEW HARBORS. THE COAST LINE IS MARKED WITH STEEP CLIFFS AND RUGGED COVES. THE OFFSHORE SEA OF JAPAN IS A VERY DEEP BODY OF WATER REACHING TO DEPTHS OF 12,000 FEET. IN CONTRAST, THE WEST COAST HAS MANY SMALL INDENTATIONS

RUNNING ITS ENTIRE LENGTH. THE ACTUAL LENGTH OF THE COAST IS EIGHT TIMES THAT OF A SMOOTH OUTLINE OF THE COAST. THE YELLOW SEA IS A FAIRLY SHALLOW BODY OF WATER WITH A MAXIMUM DEPTH OF 270 FEET. THE WATER IS MUDDY YEAR ROUND, AND THERE ARE MANY MUDFLATS AND SAND BARS THAT REACH FAR OUT INTO THE SEA. THE TIDAL ACTION ON THE WEST COAST IS QUITE DRAMATIC WITH TIDES UP TO THIRTY FEET.

CLIMATE

THE GENERAL CLIMATIC CONDITION OF KOREA IS ONE OF LONG, COLD WINTERS WITH SHORT, HOT SUMMERS. THERE IS SOMEWHAT OF A NORTH-SOUTH VARIATION WITH THE CLIMATE BECOMING MILDERS AS ONE MOVES FROM NORTH TO SOUTH. SUMMER TEMPERATURES ARE AROUND 80°F ON THE AVERAGE; SOME DAYS THE TEMPERATURE MAY CLIMB INTO THE 90s. WINTER TEMPERATURES ARE GENERALLY NEAR FREEZING, BUT SUBZERO TEMPERATURES ARE NOT UNCOMMON. IN THE EARLY SPRING, TEMPERATURES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE ON THE "CHILLY SIDE," WITH COLD NIGHTS AND COOL DAYS. TAKE WARM CLOTHES! MANY LOCAL WEATHER VARIATIONS ARE APPARENT THROUGHOUT THE REGION. THERE ARE SLIGHT SNOWFALLS DURING THE WINTER MONTHS AND PERIODIC RAINS MAY FALL IN THE SPRING OVER MOST OF THE COUNTRY. PRECIPITATION AVERAGES BETWEEN 20 AND 25 INCHES A YEAR WITH 2/3 OF THE RAIN FALLING IN THE SUMMER MONTHS. THIS RAINFALL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT BASIC AGRICULTURAL NEEDS WITH A FAIRLY SOPHISTICATED WATER MANAGEMENT PROGRAM.

VEGETATION

KOREA WAS ONCE A HEAVILY WOODED REGION WITH MOUNTAINS COVERED WITH FIRS, SPRUCE, ELMS, BEECH AND POPLARS SIMILAR TO MID-LATITUDE FORESTS IN THE U.S. HOWEVER, EXCESSIVE TIMBER HARVESTING FOR CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS AND FUEL HAVE PRACTICALLY DENUDED MUCH OF THE FORESTED AREAS. AN EXTENSIVE REFORESTATION PROGRAM HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE THE HILLSIDES TO THEIR FORMER STATE. THE PROGRAM HAS BEEN MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE PRIVATE ENTERPRISE HOLDS CLAIM TO ALMOST THREE-FOURTHS OF THE FORESTED LANDS. IN THE SOUTHERN, WARMER REGIONS THERE ARE LARGE STANDS OF GRASSES, PARTICULARLY BAMBOO, WHICH ALSO HAS A COMMERCIAL VALUE.

SOILS

THE SOILS ARE GENERALLY POOR IN QUALITY. TORRENTIAL RAINS IN THE SUMMER MONTHS CARRY OFF MUCH OF THE TOPSOIL. THEY ARE ALSO LOW IN CALCIUM WHICH REQUIRES AN EXTENSIVE USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZER FOR FARMING. SMALLER PLOTS ARE FERTILIZED WITH ANIMAL DUNG AND HUMAN MANURE.

MINERALS

KOREA HAS NOT BEEN WELL ENDOWED WITH VALUABLE MINERAL DEPOSITS. THERE ARE SOME MINOR DEPOSITS OF INDUSTRIAL-GRADE ORES, BUT MOST HEAVY INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON IMPORTS-- BOTH FOR RAW MATERIALS AND ENERGY.

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

SUPERIMPOSED ON THIS RUGGED, SMALL LANDMASS ARE 60 TIMES MORE PEOPLE THAN IN THE ENTIRE STATE OF NEVADA. MOST OF THEM LIVE IN TINY VILLAGES OF 10 TO 40 HOUSES. ABOUT FIFTY PERCENT OF THE POPULATION IS CLASSIFIED AS RURAL. MANY OF THESE SMALL HAMLETS ARE OCCUPIED BY MEMBERS OF A SINGLE EXTENDED FAMILY--THEY'RE ALL RELATED. ACCESS TO THE VILLAGE IS USUALLY VIA A SMALL PATH OR NARROW UNPAVED ROAD. THESE PEOPLE MAKE A LIVING CULTIVATING RICE OR GARDEN PRODUCE ON THEIR TINY PLOTS. ABOUT HALF THE KOREAN LABOR FORCE IS ENGAGED IN FULL-TIME AGRICULTURE. THE NEW COMMUNITY MOVEMENT, A GOVERNMENT-SUBSIDIZED PROGRAM, HAS BEEN INTRODUCED TO UPGRADE THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN THESE VILLAGES. MATERIALS ARE PROVIDED TO IMPROVE THE STRUCTURE OF THE HOMES AND TO IMPROVE ACCESS ROADS. MANY NEW VILLAGES HAVE BEEN BUILT USING MORE MODERN MATERIALS-- TILE OR CORRUGATED STEEL AS OPPOSED TO BAMBOO AND THATCHING. THERE ARE ONLY THREE LARGE CITIES IN KOREA: SEOUL WITH A POPULATION OF 7 MILLION; PUSAN, 2 MILLION; AND TAEGU, 1 MILLION.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF INTERMEDIATE-SIZE CITIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, BUT THEY TEND TO REFLECT A MORE RURAL CHARACTER. THERE HAS BEEN A PRONOUNCED URBANWARD MIGRATION SINCE THE END OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT. IN 1955, ONLY 20 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION LIVED IN CITIES COMPARED

TO 50 PERCENT TODAY. THE URBAN POPULATION GROWTH RATE HAS BEEN ABOUT SEVEN PERCENT A YEAR, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE TREND WILL CONTINUE DESPITE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE SUCH MOVEMENT. THE "FLOCK TO THE CITIES", USUALLY BY A YOUNGER SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION, HAS IMPOSED TREMENDOUS PROBLEMS FOR KOREA. HOUSING CONSTRUCTION CANNOT KEEP PACE WITH THE RAPID INFLUX OF PEOPLE. LARGE APARTMENT COMPLEXES HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED IN THE MAJOR CITIES, BUT THERE IS STILL A SEVERE SHORTAGE. HOUSING IS EXPENSIVE AND USUALLY OUT OF REACH FOR MANY KOREAN FAMILIES. USUALLY A KOREAN HOMEOWNER MUST BORROW LARGE SUMS FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES TO COMPLETE HIS HOUSE. THE SELLING PRICE OF A NEW HOUSE MAY NOT INCLUDE SERVICES SUCH AS APPLIANCES, PLUMBING, FLOOR TILE.

ECONOMICS

KOREA HAS MADE REMARKABLE ECONOMIC PROGRESS SINCE THE END OF THE WAR. BUILDING VIRTUALLY FROM NOTHING--AFTER THE DEVASTATION OF WAR--THE NATION HAS DEVELOPED A Viable AND GROWING ECONOMY. LABOR IS ABUNDANT AND CHEAP, YET DILIGENT AND WITH HIGH EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS. THE AVERAGE MONTHLY SALARY FOR A LABORER IS ABOUT \$150, 95 PERCENT OF WHICH GOES TOWARDS BASIC NEEDS OF FOOD, CLOTHING, AND SHELTER. AN ASTOUNDING ECONOMIC GROWTH OF ABOUT TEN PERCENT A YEAR IS MOSTLY EXPORT ORIENTED. KOREA HAS A WELL-DEVELOPED INDUSTRIAL BASE OF HEAVY METALS, TEXTILES

AND SHIP BUILDING. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER GOODS SUCH AS MOTOR VEHICLES AND ELECTRONICS HAS GIVEN A TREMENDOUS BOOST TO THE ECONOMY. THE GROWING ECONOMY HAS ALLOWED KOREAN INVESTORS TO DIVERT MORE INVESTMENT TO INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS.

KOREA HAS A FAIRLY PROGRESSIVE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM. MOST LONG-DISTANCE SURFACE TRAVEL IS CONDUCTED BY RAIL. HOWEVER, WITH NEW ROAD CONSTRUCTION AND HIGHWAY DEVELOPMENT, THE AUTOMOBILE IS SHARING A LARGER PROPORTION OF THE TRANSPORTATION DEMAND. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF HIGHWAYS AND BIG CITY STREETS, MOST KOREAN ROADS ARE UNPAVED. POOR ROAD CONDITIONS MAKE MANY SMALL VILLAGES INACCESSIBLE AND THUS CUTS THEM OUT OF THE MAINSTREAM OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

KOREANS ARE A VERY PROUD AND INDUSTRIOUS PEOPLE WITH A POSITIVE PERCEPTION OF A PROSPEROUS FUTURE. YOU WILL FIND MANY DIFFERENCES FROM YOUR OWN IN THEIR LIFESTYLES, HOWEVER. THE ORIENTAL MIND DOES NOT FOLLOW THE SAME TRACK AS OUR WESTERN PERCEPTIONS. IT IS SOMETIMES VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO UNDERSTAND THEIR THINKING. IT IS QUITE ALIEN TO OUR OWN.

KOREANS HAVE A LONG AND RICH HISTORY WHICH CHARACTERIZES MUCH OF THEIR CULTURE. TRADITION PLAYS A MAJOR ROLE IN DAILY LIFESTYLES. THE MALE IS THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN HIS SOCIETY. A WOMAN'S TRADITIONAL ROLE IS TO TEND TO HOUSEHOLD DUTIES AND TO BEAR CHILDREN. STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE

LAW AND RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY IS AN UNQUESTIONABLE RULE OF LIFE. A POLICEMAN OR MEMBER OF THE MILITARY IS HELD IN THE HIGHEST ESTEEM BY EVERYONE. CHILDREN OBEY AND RESPECT THEIR PARENTS, AND THE ELDERLY ARE REVERED AS THE HONORED MEMBERS OF SOCIETY. TOTAL FIDELITY IS EXPECTED TO THE FAMILY, THE EMPLOYER, AND THE COUNTRY. SELFISHNESS IS AN UNACCEPTABLE SIN. HARD WORK IS A VIRTUE. WESTERNIZATION HAS INTRODUCED MANY CHANGES TO KOREAN LIFESTYLES. CHANGE IS MOST APPARENT IN LARGE CITIES WHERE WESTERN DRESS, WESTERN FOODS AND WESTERN ENTERTAINMENT ARE COMMONPLACE. CHANGE IS INEVITABLE, BUT SOME THINGS WILL NEVER CHANGE.

THE KOREAN IS IDEALIZED IN THE SYMBOLISM EXPRESSED IN THE KOREAN NATIONAL FLAG. COMPARED TO OUR OWN NATIONAL SYMBOL WHICH IS A STATEMENT OF OUR HERITAGE AND POLITICAL UNITY--THIRTEEN ORIGINAL COLONIES, STARS FOR THE UNITED 50 STATES--THE KOREAN FLAG IS A STARK CONTRAST. WE SEE A CIRCLE OF EVENLY BALANCED RED AND BLUE SECTIONS. THE CIRCLE REPRESENTS THE OPPOSING POWERS OF THE UNIVERSE--GOOD AND EVIL--JOY AND SADNESS--PROSPERITY AND POVERTY--IN PERFECT HARMONY. THESE ARE THE YANG--OR POSITIVE POWER--AND THE YIN--OR NEGATIVE POWER--EXPRESSING THE DUALISM OF THE COSMOS. THE THREE UNBROKEN LINES IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER REPRESENT HEAVEN; THE THREE MATCHED LINES IN THE LOWER RIGHT CORNER WITH A BROKEN CENTER LINE REPRESENT EARTH, AND THE BOTTOM LEFT CORNER IS FIRE; THE UPPER RIGHT CORNER IS WATER. TOGETHER, THESE SYMBOLIZE THE KOREAN'S

DESTINY IN A HARMONIOUS UNIVERSE. THIS CENTRAL THOUGHT-- WHICH WE DO NOT FULLY COMPREHEND--IS THREAD THROUGHOUT EVERYTHING THAT HE DOES. YOU WILL SEE IN SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS THAT THE ORIENTAL CONCERN FOR "SELF-IDENTIFICATION" IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM OURS.

I HOPE THAT THIS INTRODUCTORY BRIEFING HAS GIVEN YOU SOME UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLACE YOU WILL VISIT. THE FOLLOWING BRIEFINGS WILL EXPAND IN MORE DETAIL SOME OF THESE IDEAS. THERE WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY LATER FOR YOU TO ASK QUESTIONS.

ATTACHMENT 6

THE IMPACT OF CONFUCIANISM AND OTHER RELIGIONS

by

Captain Marius G. Sorenson

INTRODUCTION

Modern Korea is a country of contrast and diversity. This diversity is not only seen in the mix of skyscrapers and ox carts, but is equally evident in the beliefs of her people. As one walks through the streets of Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), he or she will see Catholic priests, Buddhist monks, Muslim followers, and numerous Confucian rites all on the same street. To be more specific, modern Korea is a country of 38 million people who believe in and practice many different religions. These different beliefs and the relative strength of their respective followers are shown on this chart.

STATUS OF RELIGIONS (1981)

Buddhism	48.80%	Ch'ondogyo	.030%
Protestantism	18.80%	Wonbulgyo	.030%
Confucianism	17.20%	Taejonggyo	.006%
Catholicism	.04%	Others	.070%

To talk about all these belief systems would take quite awhile and probably put you all to sleep, so I won't do that. Rather, I am going to paint a quick picture of how Korean beliefs and religious practices came into being as her nation developed and interacted with neighboring foreign nations.

SHAMANISM

Our picture begins with Korea's earliest inhabitants, primitive hunters and fishermen. They were bewildered by the way things around them behaved, so they gave all things life values. They implemented a nature-b-lief which held that powerful spirits lived in natural

forces and in all things animate and inanimate surrounding them. Thus, the hunter would perform a rite invoking approval of the totem spirit of the intended victim before killing the animal. The farmer wanting good harvests would hold ceremonies to the gods of the field and forest to seek their good blessings. As this belief in spirits (or Shamanism) grew, Shamans (third parties skilled in these matters) would be contracted to communicate with the spirit world on one's behalf to avert or cure sickness and bad luck and to assure a propitious passage from this world to the next.

By the first century B.C. -- the start of the Three Kingdoms era in Korean history -- various chieftains were regarded as "messengers of the Heavenly Emperor." Altars were built to them, and this practice led to the development of shrines throughout Korea. It was at this time our picture got more complex. Foreign belief systems began entering Korea, specifically Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Now these new belief systems are interesting systems, but what is equally interesting is that these new beliefs or religions did not clash with the local nature-spirits and rituals, for they did not proclaim exclusive possession of the truth. In fact, the Korean (being pragmatic and in search of harmony) quickly incorporated these new beliefs into his religious forms and systems.

TAOISM


The first of these new religions was Taoism. With its beginning in China, it soon crossed into Korea. In pursuit of its strongest teachings of blessings and longevity, Taoists worshipped a multiplicity of gods and taught the qualities of patience, simplicity, contentment, and harmony. Since Taoism freely borrowed from Confucianism and Buddhism, it failed to proliferate as an independent cult. However, it did permeate

all strata of Korean populace. In fact, if you ask a Korean what constitutes the ultimate blessing, he or she would reply "Longevity, happiness, health, wealth, and the begetting of children" -- all chief objectives of Taoism.

CONFUCIANISM

Accompanying Taoism into Korea came a second belief system - Confucianism. Like Taoism, it started in China around the sixth century B.C. with the Chinese sage and scholar, Confucius. This belief system, which many call a religion, is basically an ideal ethical-moral system governing all relationships within the family and relationships between the family and the state, thus keeping harmony on earth.

Confucianism entered Korea and our picture well before the Christian era. By the Three Kingdoms era, it had become a force of its own.



In fact, Koguryo (the northern most Kingdom), through Royal Decree made Confucianism the official belief system in 372 A.D. In 384 A.D. Paekche (the southwestern Kingdom) did the same and, finally, in 528 with the formal acceptance of Silla (the southeastern Kingdom), all of Korea adopted Confucianism. In fact, the Koreans adopted Confucianism so strictly that the Chinese themselves regarded Korean adherents as more virtuous than themselves.

As a result, Korea established and strictly adhered to the Confucian system of education, ceremonies, and civil administration. The Confucian values of filial piety, reverence for one's ancestors, loyalty of friend to friend, emphasis on decorum, male superiority, and life based on the family and seniority, became deeply engrained in Korean thoughts and actions.

True, the Japanese usurpation of power in 1910 rejected the Confucian system officially, but they did not destroy it. For today one sees Confucian influence everywhere.

(Confucian Memorial Service) There are about four and a half million formal adherents to Confucianism in Korea. Twice each year, solemn memorial services in honor of the great Chinese sage and his disciples are held at a shrine in Seoul, to the accompaniment of the traditional music orchestra.

Twice each year one can witness the solemn spring and autumn rites honoring Confucius at the Confucian college of Songgyungwan. Children over the age of seven are not allowed to sit together, the father-son relationship takes precedence over the husband-wife relationship, and marriages are arranged in accordance with birth dates to ensure harmony.

BUDDHISM

The third newcomer was Buddhism and it also entered Korea during the Three Kingdoms era. As you may already know, the Buddhism that entered Korea was a very different Buddhism than had sprung up in India. The original form of Buddhism was a highly esoteric philosophical formula for personal salvation through renunciation of worldly desires (thus avoiding rebirth in the endless cycle of reincarnations, a feature of Hinduism) bringing about absorption of the soul of the enlightened into Nirvana. But in its spread across Asia, Buddhism acquired local superstitions and absorbed other theological systems, producing an elaborate array of deities, saints, heavens, and hells. By 528 A.D. when Silla, the southern Kingdom, legally accepted Buddhism, this new religion had already spread like wild fire in the other two Kingdoms. By the sixth century Korea was exporting Buddhism to Japan. With the unification of Korea under the Silla Kingdom, Buddhism became the official state religion. This flowering of Buddhism continued with even more enthusiasm under the next era, the Koryo dynasty. By the 13th century, Korean Buddhism had fallen upon bad times. Its officials had become corrupt and identified with the pro-Mongol faction, a most undesirable connection due to the fact that the Mongols had invaded and were controlling Korea. As might be expected, when General Yi Song-gye gathered followers espousing a policy both anti-Mongol and anti-Buddhist, and overthrew the Mongols, his administration removed all Buddhist influence from government. In the 500 year dynasty that followed, Buddhist wealth and land holdings were seized, temples were destroyed and sacred objects were plundered. Consequently, Buddhist followers were forced to build their temples in remote mountainous locations where they could be fortified and guarded.

Today, Korean Buddhism is alive and well. In fact, since the Korean War it has experienced considerable revival among the youth.

Masonry Pagoda and Gilt Bronze Image of Buddha. A. 10-storied Pagoda at "Kyonchun-sa" Temple. This 14th century pagoda now stands in the grounds of the Kyongbok Palace in Seoul. B. Gilt Bronze Image of Seated Maitreya Bodhisattva. The seated gilt-bronze Buddha image is much older and is kept in the nearby Central National Museum.

Buddhist temples are scattered throughout the land, and one daily sees Buddhist monks in their gold robes, going about their daily duties.

MODERN RELIGIONS

Having mentioned these Oriental religions, you're probably wondering why western religions never got into the picture. The answer is - they did.

Christian Evangelistic Meeting. Christianity claims about four million members in Korea, of whom 800,000 are Catholics and the rest Protestants. Missionaries introduced modern education to Korea at the end of the last century. Evangelistic meetings are often held today with world-famous religious leaders such as Rev. Billy Graham presiding.

Remembering the earlier chart, one finds that approximately 19% of Korea's population are also practicing Catholics. Protestants and other modern religions, to include Islam, making our picture even more colorful.

CATHOLICISM

Catholicism entered Korea in the 17th century via returning tribute bearers from China. In 1785 the first priest entered, a Jesuit, Father Peter Grammont, by secretly crossing the border and baptizing and ordaining several clergy. By 1863 there were 12 Korean priests presiding over some 23,000 Catholic believers, and by 1887 the first Korean Bible was published.

PROTESTANTISM

Protestantism entered Korea a little later with Dr. Horace N. Allen establishing the first protestant missions in 1884. The Presbyterians and Methodists were the most successful in gaining converts and today are still the most numerous.

ANCIENT RELIGIONS

Having said all this about how Korea has taken in all these foreign belief systems, our picture of modern Korea is nearly done, but a small

area remains. To complete this small area, I must mention Korea's native religious beliefs. These ancient Korean religions are numerous - each having its own beliefs, rites, and doctrines - yet, their followers are few in number. One such religion is Taejonggyo, Korea's oldest religion. Its followers believe that some 4,000 years ago a tribune god, teacher, creator, and temple king took human form and descended to Korea's highest peak. While on earth, he started the Korean calendar (2333 B.C.) and gave the earliest Korean tribes their laws. He also established rituals for offering prayers of praise and propitiation to heaven as a means of perpetuating the faith. However, by the 15th century, practice of Taejonggyo had almost disappeared. In the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, this religion began to make a comeback, riding the wave of growing Korean nationalism and independence. Today there continues to be a growth of ancient Korean religions, but with certain modifications for recent social and cultural changes.

CONCLUSION

Having filled in the last part of our picture, we are now in a position to stand back and admire the modern-day Korean religious landscape. It is a complex picture with ancient beliefs and practices overlaid with foreign beliefs and these beliefs and practices further overlaid with modern Western religious beliefs.

In short, the Korean you will be meeting may be a Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or Buddhist. He or she will enthusiastically participate in the observance of traditional Confucian holidays and rites, and hold high the doctrines of loyalty, filial piety, righteousness, and good faith. He or she will also value patience, simplicity, contentment, and harmony (all Taoist ethics) while simultaneously practicing the Buddhist teachings of compassion and the Shamanist rites of

appeasing the spirits of the mountains, fields, and waters. Yes, you are truly embarking on an exciting adventure. You will be seeing first hand a nation of people not 200 or 400 years old, but almost 4,000 years old, and you will be able to just stand on the street and pick out special things from throughout this entire cultural-religious development. I wish I were going with you.

RECOMMENDED READINGS

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3. Geoffrey Parrinder, Introduction to Asian Religions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

ATTACHMENT 7

HISTORY OF THE HERMIT KINGDOM

BY

CAPT JAMES E. HENDERSON

I. THE BEGINNINGS OF KOREAN SOCIETY

ACCORDING TO LEGEND, KOREA WAS FOUNDED IN 2333 B.C. BY A MYTHICAL FIGURE WHO WAS BORN OF A UNION BETWEEN THE SON OF THE DIVINE CREATOR AND A FEMALE BEAR THAT HAD ACHIEVED HUMAN FORM. ALTHOUGH DISMISSED BY THE NORTH AS A FAIRY TALE, SOUTH KOREA REGARDS THE LEGEND AS AN IMPORTANT NATIONAL HERITAGE, AND IT HAS ADOPTED 2333 B.C. AS THE YEAR OF KOREA'S BIRTH.

THE ANCESTORS OF KOREANS PROBABLY MIGRATED OR INVADED FROM THE NORTH. THEY WERE TRIBAL PEOPLE WHO BELIEVED IN A TYPE OF RELIGION THAT CENTERED ON WORSHIP OF NATURE AND ANCESTRAL SPIRITS.

II. THE BASIS OF CIVILIZATION

DURING MOST OF ITS HISTORY, KOREA HAS BEEN INVADED, INFLUENCED, AND FOUGHT OVER BY ITS NEIGHBORS. CHOSEN (THE ANCIENT NAME OF KOREA - MEANING LAND OF THE MORNING CALM), IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C., WAS INVADED BY THE LEADER OF AN UNSUCCESSFUL REBELLION IN CHINA. HE OVERTHREW THE RULING FAMILY IN KOREA AND ESTABLISHED A CHINESE-TYPE GOVERNMENT AT P'YONGYANG, STILL TODAY THE CAPITAL OF NORTH KOREA. CHINESE RULE, WHICH LASTED UNTIL THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D., LEFT AN ENDURING CULTURAL IMPRINT ON KOREAN SOCIETY.

CHINESE RULE ENDED WHEN IT WAS CONQUERED BY THE KOGURYO, ONE OF THREE KOREAN TRIBAL KINGDOMS WHICH COMPETED FOR CONTROL OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA. KOGURYO, THE FIRST PURELY NATIVE KOREAN STATE,

WAS ORIGINALLY COMPOSED OF FIVE TRIBES WHO HAD MOVED TO AN AREA JUST NORTH OF THE YALU RIVER -- THE PRESENT NORTHERN BOUNDARY. THEY WERE A CULTURALLY ADVANCED, ARISTOCRATIC SOCIETY OF MOUNTED WARRIORS, WHO FREQUENTLY FOUGHT OFF INVADING TRIBES FROM THE NORTH.

THE ELIMINATION OF THE CHINESE FROM THE PENINSULA DID NOT DIMINISH CHINESE CULTURAL INFLUENCE. FROM THE MIDDLE OF THE FOURTH CENTURY A.D., KOGURYO MAINTAINED TRIBUTARY RELATIONS WITH WHICHEVER WAS THE CHIEF STATE IN NORTH CHINA. IT WAS THROUGH THESE RELATIONS THAT BUDDHISM WAS INTRODUCED TO KOREA IN 372. THE NEW RELIGION GRADUALLY CAME TO EXERT A GREAT INFLUENCE OVER THE WHOLE SOCIETY.

PAEKCHE, THE SECOND KINGDOM, LOCATED IN THE SOUTHWEST, WAS CUT OFF BY KOGURYO FROM LAND CONTACT WITH THE CHINESE. NOT MUCH IS KNOWN ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT AND CULTURE, BUT WE DO KNOW THAT PAEKCHE PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN TRANSMITTING BUDDHISM AND CHINESE CULTURE TO JAPAN.

SILLA WAS THE LEAST DEVELOPED OF THE THREE KINGDOMS PARTLY BECAUSE OF ITS ISOLATION FROM CHINESE INFLUENCE. MOREOVER, IT WAS CONTINUALLY HARASSED BY JAPANESE PIRATES, BY KOGURYO, AND BY ITS SOMETIME ALLY, PAEKCHE. SILLA ALLIED WITH CHINA AND WAS ABLE TO CONQUER BOTH PAEKCHE AND KOGURYO. IN 676 A.D., KOREA EMERGED AS A UNIFIED POLITICAL ENTITY UNDER THE SILLA KINGDOM, RECOGNIZED AS A TRIBUTARY OF CHINA BUT A SELF-GOVERNING STATE.

THE SILLA UNIFICATION PERIOD IS USUALLY DESCRIBED AS A GOLDEN AGE OF CULTURE. THE SILLA ARISTOCRATIC SOCIETY WAS MASKED OVER BY THE CHINESE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEM, LEAVING A STRONG SENSE OF HEREDITARY, ARISTOCRATIC PRIVILEGE. AS A RESULT, CENTRAL

AUTHORITY BEGAN TO WEAKEN AND IN 935 A.D. SILLA ITSELF WAS OVERTURNED BY THE DYNASTY OF KORYO -- FROM WHICH THE NAME KOREA WAS DERIVED.

THE KORYO DYNASTY LASTED FOR FOUR CENTURIES. THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES SAW THE FURTHER ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CHINESE POLITICAL PATTERN. RELATIVE PEACE PREVAILED UNTIL THE COLLAPSE OF THE CHINESE DYNASTY FORCED KORYO TO CONTEND WITH POWERFUL TRIBES FROM THE NORTH WITHOUT CHINESE HELP. THE LAST CENTURY AND A HALF WAS ESPECIALLY TURBULENT, PUNCTUATED BY WAVES OF MONGOL INVASIONS THAT LAID WASTE LARGE AREAS OF THE COUNTRY.

III. TOWARD MODERNIZATION

A. MONGOL CONQUEST

THE MONGOLS, WHO HAD ALREADY OVERRUN THE GREATER PART OF ASIA, ESTABLISHED A FIRM GRIP ON KOREA. THEY ANNEXED THE NORTHERN PART OF THE PENINSULA, AND BY REPEATED MARRIAGES OF MONGOL PRINCESSES TO KORYO KINGS THEY MADE THE ROYAL FAMILY VIRTUALLY A BRANCH OF THE MONGOL RULING HOUSE. THE FIRM HAND OF THE MONGOLS SERVED TO PROP UP THE KORYO DYNASTY, WHICH HAD COME TO RELY SO HEAVILY ON MONGOL POWER THAT IT DID NOT LONG SURVIVE THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE. IN 1390, A GROUP OF OFFICIALS ALLIED, WITH THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED MING DYNASTY OF CHINA, SUCCEEDED IN BREAKING THE ECONOMIC BACKBONE OF LEADING KORYO FAMILIES BY INSTITUTING A NEW LAND-HOLDING SYSTEM. THIS PRECIPITATED THE OVERTHROW OF KORYO BY THE YI DYNASTY IN 1392.

B. YI DYNASTY -- THE PERFECTED CHINESE PATTERN

THE YI DYNASTY, WHICH LASTED UNTIL 1910, IS REGARDED AS THE GOLDEN AGE OF CONFUCIANISM IN KOREA, AND CONFUCIAN POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IDEALS BECAME FIRMLY IMBEDDED IN THE COUNTRY. THE DYNASTY QUICKLY ESTABLISHED TRIBUTARY RELATIONS WITH THE MING, RECEIVING FROM IT THE ANCIENT NAME OF CHOSON. THE KOREANS ADOPTED CONFUCIANISM WITH SUCH ENTHUSIASM THAT THEIR VALUE SYSTEM AND SOCIAL PRACTICES BECAME TO BE REGARDED AS A MODEL CONFUCIAN SOCIETY. THE MOST NOTABLE INTELLECTUAL ACHIEVEMENT OF THE DYNASTY WAS THE INVENTION IN 1443 OF A KOREAN PHONETIC WRITING SYSTEM, KNOWN AS HAN'GUL.

DESPITE THE WHOLESALE ADOPTION OF THE CHINESE POLITICAL SYSTEM, KOREA SOCIETY RETAINED ITS CLEAR HEREDITARY CLASS DIVISIONS. CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATION CANDIDATES, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD ONLY COME FROM MEMBERS OF THE RULING CLASS. BY DOMINATING THE EXAMINATIONS, THESE FAMILIES WERE ABLE TO MONOPOLIZE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND HIGH GOVERNMENT OFFICE, AND THEY ALSO CAME TO OWN MOST OF THE LAND. BELOW THIS CLASS WAS A RELATIVELY SMALL CLASS OF "MIDDLE PEOPLE" WHO SERVED AS PETTY GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES AND PERFORMED THE VARIOUS SPECIALIST ROLES IN GOVERNMENT. THE BULK OF THE POPULATION WAS MADE UP OF COMMONERS, WHO PAID MOST OF THE TAXES. FINALLY, THE LOWEST CLASS WAS CALLED THE "BASE PEOPLE." THESE WERE GOVERNMENT OR PRIVATE SLAVES, WORKERS IN CERTAIN OCCUPATIONS SUCH AS BUTCHERS, ACTORS, AND KISAENG (FEMALE ENTERTAINERS COMPARABLE TO THE JAPANESE GEISHA).

FACTIONAL STRIFE DIVIDED THE DYNASTY'S LEADERSHIP AND DEMORALIZED ITS MILITARY FORCES, LEAVING KOREA DEFENSELESS AGAINST JAPANESE INVASIONS IN THE LATE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. INCIDENTALLY, THE WARS

AGAINST THE JAPANESE PRODUCED ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S MOST CELEBRATED NAVAL HEROES WHO INVENTED THE WORLD'S FIRST IRON-PLATED, TURTLE-SHAPED WARSHIP. FURTHER DEVASTATIONS WERE CAUSED BY MANCHU CHINESE OVERRUNNING THE COUNTRY IN THE 1600'S, AFTER WHICH KOREA BECAME A VASSAL STATE OF MANCHU CHINA AND ADOPTED A POLICY OF ISOLATION FROM THE NON-CHINESE WORLD. (FOR THIS REASON, IT IS KNOWN AS THE HERMIT KINGDOM).

DESPITE ITS POLICY OF ISOLATIONISM, KOREA WAS FATED BY GEOGRAPHY TO LIE AT THE FOCAL POINT WHERE THE THREE EMPIRES OF CHINA, JAPAN, AND RUSSIA MET AND CLASHED. THE RIGID POLICY OF SECLUSION WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL IT WAS ALMOST TOO LATE TO LEARN THE ART OF DIPLOMACY.

IN 1876, THE OPENING OF KOREA WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE JAPANESE, WHO WANTED TO DETACH KOREA FROM ITS TRADITIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. JAPAN FORCED KOREA TO SIGN A TREATY WHICH OPENED KOREAN PORTS TO JAPANESE SAILORS. MOREOVER THE TREATY ALLOWED JAPANESE NATIONALS TO BE EXEMPT FROM KOREAN LAWS. THIS TREATY ALSO THREATENED CHINESE SECURITY, AND SHE WAS NOW WILLING TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN KOREAN POLITICS. AFTER A MILITARY-LED REBELLION IN WHICH A JAPANESE OFFICER WAS KILLED, CHINESE TROOPS WERE STATIONED PERMANENTLY IN KOREA, AND KOREAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ALMOST COMPLETELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF CHINA.

DURING THE EARLY 1880'S THE MAIN THREAT TO KOREA SEEMED TO COME FROM RUSSIA. BUT AS TIME WENT ON, THE BASIC RIVALRY FOR THE DOMINATION OF KOREA DEVELOPED BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN. THE TREATY WITH JAPAN CAUSED THE WESTERN POWERS TO TAKE AN INTEREST ALSO. THE

U.S. TOOK THE INITIATIVE. ACTING UNDER CHINESE ADVICE, THE KOREANS SIGNED A TREATY WITH THE AMERICANS IN 1882 WITH THE HOPE OF COUNTER-BALANCING THE JAPANESE THREAT.

IN 1894, ANOTHER REBELLION AROSE IN KOREA. THIS TIME IT WAS A MOVEMENT THAT DEMANDED REFORM OF THE CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT LOCAL ADMINISTRATION UNDER WHICH THE PEOPLE WERE SUFFERING. THE REBELLION BROUGHT CHINESE AND JAPANESE INTERVENTION, WHICH THEN LED TO THE CHINESE-JAPANESE WAR. JAPAN'S DECISIVE VICTORY ESTABLISHED THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOREA FROM CHINA -- BUT NOT FROM JAPAN. IMMEDIATELY JAPAN ATTEMPTED TO SET THE KOREA GOVERNMENT ON THE PATH OF JAPANESE-TYPE MODERNIZATION.

AFTER JAPAN DEFEATED RUSSIA IN 1905, SHE MADE KOREA A PROTECTORATE. FIVE YEARS LATER JAPAN ANNEXED KOREA AS A COLONY. JAPAN DEVELOPED IN KOREA A GOOD NETWORK OF RAILROAD AND ROADS, AS WELL AS POSTAL SERVICES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND HYDROELECTRIC PLANTS. BUT KOREAN LIVING STANDARDS REMAINED VERY LOW. POLICE CONTROLS, BACKED BY THE ARMY, WERE WELL-DEVELOPED AGAINST ALL EXPRESSION OF NATIONALISM. EVEN KOREAN LANGUAGE WAS BANNED. KOREANS WERE EXPECTED TO TAKE JAPANESE SURNAMES, AND THE KOREAN LANGUAGE PRESS WAS ALMOST ELIMINATED.

IV. POST-WORLD WAR II KOREA

THE CAIRO CONFERENCE IN 1943 PUT FORTH THE AMERICAN IDEA OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND STATED THAT "IN DUE COURSE KOREA SHALL BECOME FREE AND INDEPENDENT." THE ALLIES WERE UNCERTAIN HOW TO BRING THAT ABOUT, SO THEY AGREED TO A INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP. SOVIET TROOPS ENTERED NORTH KOREA JUST BEFORE THE JAPANESE SURRENDER IN 1945, AND AMERICAN TROOPS ARRIVED A MONTH LATER. BY

ARRANGING TO TAKE JAPANESE SURRENDERS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE 38TH PARALLEL, THE TWO POWERS, AS IT TURNED OUT, CREATED TWO COUNTRIES.

IN THE NORTH THE SOVIET AIM TO CREATE A COMMUNIST STATE WAS ACHIEVED IN STAGES. IN THE SOUTH THE AMERICAN AIM TO FOSTER THE GROWTH OF AN INDEPENDENT, SELF-SOVERNING NATION WAS MORE COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT. IN 1945 THE AMERICANS ASSUMED THAT KOREA WOULD SOON BE UNIFIED. BUT THEIR HOPES OF PEACEFUL RECONSTRUCTION WERE FRUSTRATED AS THE TWO SUPER-POWERS MOVED TOWARD COLD-WAR CONFRONTATION.

THE U.S. PLACED THE PROBLEM BEFORE THE U.N., WHICH SET UP A COMMISSION ON KOREA TO AID KOREAN UNIFICATION AND TO OBSERVE KOREAN ELECTIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT. SYNGMAN RHEE'S PARTY WON THE ELECTION IN THE SOUTH IN THE SPRING OF 1948. HAVING EXCLUDED THE U.N. ELECTION COMMISSION, THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME HASTILY HELD ITS OWN ELECTIONS IN THE FALL OF 1948 AND PROCLAIMED ITSELF A DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC. WITHIN A YEAR SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES HAD BEEN LARGELY WITHDRAWN.

B. KOREAN WAR AND AFTER

JUNE 1950 NORTH KOREAN TROOPS ATTACKED THE SOUTH WITH THE HOPE OF UNIFYING THE COUNTRY BY FORCE. THE ATTACK WAS CONDEMNED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, (THE SOVIET UNION, HAVING BOYCOTTED THE COUNCIL FOR SIX MONTHS AS A PROTEST AGAINST THE PRESENCE OF TAIWAN, WAS NOT PRESENT TO CAST A VETO).

PRESIDENT TRUMAN COMMITTED U.S. FORCES TO DEFEND SOUTH KOREA AND AT ONCE SECURED THE SUPPORT OF THE U.N.

FOUR PHASE WAR

1. UNDER THE WELL-PREPARED SOVIET-ARMED NORTH KOREAN ASSAULT, THE OUTNUMBERED KOREAN-AMERICAN FORCES INITIALLY WERE FORCED BACK TO PROTECT AN AREA IN THE EXTREME SOUTHEAST.
2. GENERAL MacARTHUR DEMONSTRATED THE OFFENSIVE POWER OF MODERN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY WITH A MASSIVE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING AT INCHON--A GAMBLE THAT SUCCEEDED AND WAS SOON FOLLOWED BY THE RECOVERY OF SEOUL AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NORTH KOREAN INVASION.
3. WHEN U.N. FORCES CROSSED THE 38TH PARALLEL AND PUSHED TOWARD THE YALU, THE CHINESE BEGAN TO CROSS THE YALU INTO KOREA TO DEFEND CHINA'S INTERESTS IN THIS REGION ON THE FRONTIER OF ITS NORTHEAST INDUSTRIAL BASE. THE UNEXPECTED CHINESE FLANK ATTACKS FORCED THE U.S. FORCES INTO A COSTLY RETREAT -- ALL THE WAY SOUTH OF SEOUL. EVENTUALLY A STALEMATE WAS SUSTAINED ON ABOUT THE 38TH PARALLEL.
4. IN THE FOURTH PHASE, PEACE TALKS BEGAN IN 1951 AND DRAGGED ON AT PANMUNJON FOR TWO YEARS. AN ARMISTICE WAS FINALLY SIGNED JULY 27, 1953.

IN THE SOUTH, POST-WAR REHABILITATION BROUGHT POLICE REPRESSION, CORRUPTION, AND ELECTION RIGGING. RHEE WAS FORCED TO RESIGN IN 1960. IN 1961 A MILITARY JUNTA SEIZED POWER AND IN 1963 WAS ITSELF OVERTURNED BY THE ELECTION OF PARK CHUNG-HEE. PARK'S CIVIL GOVERNMENT WAS REVISED IN 1972 TO PERMIT HIS RULING INDEFINITELY AS A DICTATOR BACKED BY THE ARMY, POLICE, AND THE KOREAN CIA (KCIA). IN 1979, PARK HIMSELF WAS ASSASSINATED BY THE HEAD OF THE KCIA.

FOLLOWING A PERIOD OF CIVIL UNREST AND DECLARATION OF TOTAL

MARTIAL LAW, THE COUNTRY'S AFFAIRS WERE HANDLED BY A SPECIAL COMMITTEE, HEADED BY A GENERAL CHUN DOO HWAN. GENERAL CHUN RETIRED FROM THE MILITARY AND WAS ELECTED AS THE NEW PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC ON AUGUST 27, 1980.

ATTACHMENT 8

THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SETTING - REPUBLIC OF KOREA

This presentation on contemporary political issues in Korea will be divided into two sections; one concerned with domestic issues and the other with Korean foreign relations. No discussion of current domestic political issues would be complete without examining the administration of President Park Chung-hee, who seized power in a 1961 coup and remained in power until his assassination in October 1979. Park's presidency was authoritarian in nature, particularly after the initiation of martial law and the adoption of the Yushin Constitution, both in 1972. This constitution provided for strong executive powers, reduced the role of the legislature, and provided the legal justification to control political dissent. For example, there were no limits on the number of terms the President could serve, he and his cabinet were not responsible to the National Assembly and could bypass the legislative process by issuing decrees, and severe prison sentences were provided for those who voiced opposition to the President or his program.

Additionally, the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was created in 1961 and given extensive authority to deal with political dissent. The effectiveness of this organization in reducing at least overt political opposition in Korea is generally well established. Student groups, labor unions, and political organizations were infiltrated and largely controlled by the KCIA during Park's regime. Despite these authoritarian measures, or perhaps in part because of them, the Republic of Korea accomplished an economic miracle beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1970s. Sizeable increases in the gross national product and

per capita income occurred annually. Beyond the purely economic importances of these increases, this prosperity also had political significance. The vast majority of the Korean people were willing to accept Park's authoritarian measures as long as economic growth continued. In this fashion, the legitimacy of the government became closely tied to increasing economic development and improvement in the standard of living.

In October 1979, Park was assassinated by the director of the KCIA. The specific reasons for this assassination remain unclear; however, it appears the assassin was concerned by political corruption involving associates close to Park. In any event, a civilian government under the leadership of Choi Kyu-Hah succeeded Park and almost immediately had trouble governing the country. Political opposition to Park's policies, which had been fairly well controlled previously, became much more vocal after his death. The most serious events occurred in Kwangju Province in the southern portion of the country where primarily student-led demonstrations and riots occurred in May and June 1980. When it appeared that the Choi government was unable or unwilling to deal with these activities as some in the military desired, Choi was removed from office in a coup led by General Chun Doo Hwan, who was at that time Army Chief of Staff.

The riots in Kwangju were suppressed by a massive show of military force with several hundred people being either killed or arrested. Kim Dae-jung, a leading opposition figure during the Park period, was arrested, tried, and convicted of treason in the aftermath of these disturbances. Chun resigned from the military

and ran for President in an election held in February 1981. The constitution was amended to limit the President to one seven-year term of office so that currently Chun will have to give up the presidency in 1988.

In several respects, Chun's actions and goals appear similar to those of Park. The executive branch still dominates the legislature, opposition political parties are allowed, but their access to the media is limited. In addition, several key opposition leaders, such as Kim Dae-jung, have been incarcerated or banned from political activities which has reduced the effectiveness of the opposition. The government has continued the attempts to control students, intellectuals and labor groups by infiltrating them and maintaining an obvious presence on campuses, etc. The major tactic appears to be to keep these groups from gaining popular support which could prove to be a challenge to the Chun administration.

The government's legitimacy continues to be closely tied to economic growth as was the case with the Park regime. After an economic slump in 1980, the economy recovered in 1981 as the GNP rose by 7.1% and inflation was slowed somewhat. Government estimates are that growth of this magnitude will continue. Further, the administration has taken certain steps to provide more freedom of movement for Koreans. One such measure is the termination of the midnight to 0400 curfew, which had been in effect since 1945. All in all, the prospects for the Chun regime's staying in power for the foreseeable future seem good. Nonetheless, it should be remembered that the opposition which erupted in May and June 1980 could recur under the right circumstances.

The Republic of Korea's foreign relations are driven by strong security concerns to a greater degree than in most countries because of the North Korean invasion, which occurred in June 1950, and the continuing fears that such an invasion could be repeated. In no relationship is security more important than that between South Korea and the United States. The U.S. has a mutual defense treaty with Korea and has deployed approximately 40,000 military personnel there to support that treaty. During the Carter administration, U.S.-Korean relations deteriorated appreciably because of two major issues. The first of these was Carter's emphasis on human rights and his criticism of Park and his government for repressive actions. The Korean President and his administration viewed this type of pressure as a violation of Korean sovereignty and as naivete concerning the security threats perceived in South Korea. The second issue was the Carter plan to remove U.S. ground forces from Korea. These American troops are viewed as so important in deterring an attack from the North that any mention of reducing or removing them causes tremendous shock waves in the South.

The Reagan administration has attempted to restore Korean confidence in the United States by clearly stating that the troops will remain and by reducing the emphasis on human rights and stressing security concerns. It was no accident that President Chun was the second foreign dignitary received by President Reagan. This was a clear signal that this administration was changing the relationship between the two countries. Despite the Korean relief concerning U.S. policies, concern still remains that future American

administrations might once again change policies which could adversely affect South Korea.

Korean-Japanese relations continue to be influenced by historical factors as well as defense and trade issues. The Japanese occupation of Korea from 1909-1945 was a harsh one which many Koreans remember. Although Japan provided many infrastructural improvements including highway, railroad, bridge and port construction during the occupation which have assisted in recent Korean economic developments, most of the occupation programs and policies employed by the Japanese, such as the prohibition of the Korean language, have retarded efforts to improve relations between the countries. It still is true that one of the most offensive insults to a Korean is to be mistaken as a Japanese.

In addition to these historical problems, Korea and Japan disagree concerning Japanese defense spending, trade policies, and foreign aid. South Korea allocates approximately 6% of its GNP for defense, while Japan has consistently spent less than 1% of its GNP on defense. Koreans view their defense preparations as contributing to Japanese security as well and have demanded that Japan provide foreign aid to offset the disparity in defense expenditures. The Japanese have been reluctant to do so, at least to the extent the Koreans demand, and this remains an issue. Also, Japan has achieved a balance of trade surplus with South Korea of approximately \$20 billion since the 1960s. Korean negotiators have requested increased access to the Japanese market to reduce this imbalance, but this issue also remains unresolved.

The Republic of Korea does not have diplomatic relations with either the People's Republic of China or the Soviet Union. Because of both Chinese and Soviet support for North Korea, the chances of improved relations seem remote. Nonetheless, in light of the strong anti-Soviet sentiments in China, plus the Chinese desire to modernize its industrial capabilities, there is the possibility that future Chinese-South Korean relations could develop to the benefit of both. Korean officials were very happy when it was announced that Seoul would be the site of the 1988 Summer Olympics because this selection would represent at least tacit recognition of South Korea by China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries.

President Park initiated efforts in 1970 and 1972 to improve the relations between the two Koreas, but with the exception of the establishment of a hot line between the two capitals, little progress has been made. In early 1981, President Chun publicly stated he was willing to continue these efforts at reconciliation but the two sides remain far apart. Despite the common culture and language in both halves of the Korean peninsula, it seems unlikely that relations will improve significantly in the near future. Mutual suspicion and distrust are simply too strong at this time to allow for meaningful progress toward better relations or possible future reunification.

Suggested Reading

Ralph Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security.

John E. Endicott and William R. Heaton, The Politics of East Asia.

Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex.

Gregory Henderson, Richard N. Lebow, and John G. Stoessinger, Divided Nations in a Divided World.

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Far Eastern Economic Review - Asia Yearbook, 1979, 1980, 1981.

ATTACHMENT 9

Your Legal Status While in South Korea

by Captain William B. Hammill

When you travel as a tourist to a foreign country, whether it be Korea or anywhere else, you are subject to that country's laws while you are there. If you violate their laws, that country will arrest you, try you and punish you in accordance with their laws. Most American military personnel do not realize that when they are sent by our government to a foreign country, they are legally, absent an agreement to the contrary, just like the tourist. Only the country you are in can and will punish you for acts of misconduct.

For this reason, the United States attempts to secure with all countries in which we have troops an agreement defining our status under their laws. This is called a "Status of Forces Agreement" or SOFA.

We have a SOFA with Korea and although this agreement covers many different things, the area I will concentrate on is "jurisdiction"; that is, who will have the power to try and punish you for acts of misconduct. There are only three possibilities; either the United States or Korea or both of us.

Our agreement with Korea provides that for certain acts of misconduct, the United States will have the exclusive right to try and punish you. This occurs when your actions are an offense under our law, but not under their law. This is very rare and consists of those offenses which are primarily military in nature; such as, "Failure to Repair"; that is, you are late for work.

Korea will have the exclusive right to try you and to punish you when your actions are an offense under their law, but not under ours. This particular area can be a problem for Americans since conduct that would be legal in the United States might well be illegal in Korea. Thus, inadvertent violations can be a real possibility.

Fortunately, there are only two Korean laws that have historically caused difficulty for U.S. personnel. The "Korean National Security Law" makes illegal actions that might be construed as "praising the enemy." It would be best to avoid casual discussions of the North Koreans and other communist countries. If the subject should come up, they should be referred to with appropriate contempt. On the other side of the coin, there is a Korean "Insult Law" which makes punishable

defamatory comments regarding the South Korean government and its political leaders. Thus, it is advisable to neither compliment the North Koreans nor to criticize the South Koreans. Should you violate either of these laws, only South Korea would have authority to try you and to punish you, and the United States would have no basis for objection.

All of you, I am sure, are aware that all countries have laws against "black marketing". Korea is no exception and you should be aware of their customs laws. The basic rule is that everything you bring with you into the country and everything you might purchase at the Base Exchange must leave with you. If for any reason you cannot account for an item of your personal property, the Koreans will require that you remain in their country until the matter is fully settled and, at a minimum, that you pay a tax to them equal to 300% of the value of the missing item. Also, since you may have violated some USAF regulations, it is customary for the United States to also take some punitive action against you.

Finally, there is the third possibility, that both the United States and South Korea will have jurisdiction. This occurs when your actions are offenses under both our laws and their laws. This includes almost all of the crimes that you

are familiar with: murder, rape, arson, theft, bar-fights, etc. Now the only decision is which of the countries has the primary right to try and to punish you. Normally, if one country has the primary right and takes action, the other country will not act in the matter.

The United States will have the primary right in only two instances: the first is called "inter se"; this means that the case involves only Americans. For instance, let's assume that two Americans get into a fight in their American tent on the American portion of the base. This is a classic "inter se" case and the United States would have the primary right to try and to punish those two Americans. You should be aware, however, that two Americans smoking marijuana in their American tent on the American side of the base will normally not be considered "inter se", and therefore the Koreans will have the primary right.

The second time the United States has the primary right is when an offense occurs while you are in performance of your duties. For instance, assume that you are driving a U.S. Government vehicle on official business and that you negligently run over a Korean child. Although the crime of "negligent homicide" has occurred, the United States will have the primary

right to try and to punish you.

In all other cases, the Koreans will have the primary right to try and punish you. The United States and Korea have come to an additional agreement, however, which provides that Korea will in most cases waive the right to try you and will turn the matter over to the United States. There are, however, some notable exceptions. Those are: serious drug offenses (where punishments range from seven years to death depending on the specific offense); homicide or serious injury to a Korean National; rape and arson. In these cases, Korea will try you and punish you.

Even in those cases where the Koreans have agreed to waive jurisdiction, they have fifteen days in which to change their minds. It is normal for them not to give a decision until the fifteenth day. Consequently, the United States is obligated to hold you in country until those fifteen days expire.

Finally, I would like to offer you some advice that is a combination of both practical and legal information.

First, obey Korean police. They are not known for their tolerance of those that wish to argue.

Second, should you have occasion to meet a Korean female, promises to marry and promises to pay for services rendered are enforceable by law.

Third, related to the Korean female above, you should be aware that a new drug resistant strain of V.D. has appeared in Korea and Herpes Symplex, which is incurable, is endemic. Should you find yourself with such a problem your ability to return to the United States is in doubt at least until the disease is brought under control.

Fourth and last, only exchange dollars through your finance people. Although the exchange rate is better elsewhere, it is illegal and not worth the risk.

I perceive of the Korean legal system as being both reasonable and fair. Nevertheless, it would be best if you avoided any legal problems. If you think of yourself as a guest in their country and exercise a little common sense and self-control, you should not find yourself in any legal difficulty.

Thank you for your attention and best of luck on your deployment.

YOU AND KOREAN LAW

EXCLUSIVE UNITED STATES JURISDICTION

A violation of United States law, but
not a violation of Korean law.

1. Military offenses

EXCLUSIVE KOREAN JURISDICTION

A violation of Korean law, but not
violations of United States law.

1. Korean national security law
2. Korean insult law
3. Korean customs laws

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

A violation of both U.S. and
Korean law

Primary right - United States

1. "Inter-se"
2. Official Duty

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION

Primary Right - Korea

1. All other cases!

Waiver

Yes, but not

1. Drug offenses
2. Injury to Korean
3. Rape
4. Arson

Note: 15 day rule

OTHER PRECAUTIONS

1. Obey Korean police
2. Promises to marry and/or pay for services are enforceable
3. VD and Herpes
4. Exchanging of dollars

SUMMARY

1. For most offenses Korea will have the right to try you and punish you.
2. Generally, Korea will waive that right, but remember the 15 day rule!
3. Keep track of your personal property; avoid the black market.
4. A brief affair with a local female may unfortunately result in a lasting relationship.

ATTACHMENT 10

KOREAN WRITING

HAN'GUL (KOREAN LETTERS) IS AN EXCELLENT, PHONETIC SYSTEM FOR INDICATING THE KOREAN PRONUNCIATION OF CHINESE CHARACTERS AND ALSO FOR WRITING THE NATIVE LANGUAGE. DEVELOPED IN 1443, IT IS THE MOST SCIENTIFIC SYSTEM OF WRITING IN GENERAL USE IN ANY COUNTRY. FIRST USED ONLY FOR EXPLICATING CHINESE TEXTS AND FOR WRITING DOWN NATIVE SONGS AND POEMS, THE EDUCATED CLASSES DID NOT USE IT. ALL SERIOUS SCHOLARSHIP AND GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS WERE WRITTEN IN CHINESE. IT WAS NOT UNTIL AFTER KOREA REGAINED ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM JAPAN IN 1945 THAT HAN'GUL CAME INTO ITS OWN.

THE BASIC VOWELS ARE INDICATED BY VERTICAL OR HORIZONTAL STRAIGHT LINE, MODIFIED BY SHORT LINES ON EITHER SIDE (A SINGLE SHORT LINE FOR SIMPLE VOWELS AND TWO IF IT INCLUDES THE "Y" SOUND).

CONSONENTS ARE REPRESENTED BY ANGLED LINES, AND ASPIRATED CONSONENTS ARE SHOWN BY THE ADDITION OF AN EXTRA LINE TO THE CORRESPONDING UNASPIRATED FORM.

HAN'GUL IS AN ALPHABETIC SCRIPT AND A SYLLABARY COMBINED.

VOWEL PAIRS:	a	ya	SOME CONSONANT PAIRS:
ㅓ	eo	ㅕ	ㅕ k(g)
ㅗ	o	ㅛ	ㅛ t(d)
ㅜ	u	ㅕ	ㅕ p(b)
ㅡ	ü	ㅣ	ㅊ(j)

AE IS WRITTEN ㅐ (AI)

OTHER CONSONANTS:

ㅅ
ㄴ
ㅁ
ㅇ

THE SYMBOL "O" IS USED FOR A FINAL "NG" AND TO INDICATE THE ABSENCE OF AN INITIAL CONSONANT.

PUYO 부요

P'yong yang 풍양

Capt Henderson and I will provide you with a brief explanation and dialog of the most basic phrases. It is not our intention to make you fluent speakers of HanGul - but to acquaint you with the sounds of the language you will hear in Korea. Later, you may pick up a handout of some of the most basic Korean expressions, including those you will hear this morning.

SLIDE: GREETINGS

The universal greeting in Korea is HELLO, which is pronounced "Yo-bo-se-yo". This is an informal expression which you will hear everywhere. "Yo-bo-se-yo". Likewise, the phrase associated with our "see you later", an informal good-bye, is pronounced "To-man-nap-si-da". This is another phrase you will hear repeatedly!

More formal speech, especially between new acquaintances is somewhat more difficult. Yet, the first time you meet Koreans, this is invariably how they will greet you. Good morning/afternoon/evening is pronounced "An-yong-ha-sim-ni-ka", while goodbye is pronounced "An-yong-hi-ka-sip-si-yo". Koreans will speak rapidly, and you may have trouble understanding at first, but don't give up!!

Together, these phrases might sound like:

"Yo-bo-se-yo"

"An-yong-ha-sim-ni-ka"

"To-man-nap-si-da"

"An-yong-hi-ka-sip-se-yo"

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
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SLIDE - POLITE PHRASES

The Koreans are a very polite people, and their language reflects this characteristic. Therefore, you will hear a number of phrases that will indicate this. It is to your advantage to return this politeness.

Please and Thank-you are universal. In Korea, please is pronounced "Sip-se-yo" and thank-you is "Kam-sa-ham-ni-da". If you do any shopping at all, these phrases will be to your advantage. Please: "Sip-se-yo" and Thank-you: "Kam-sa-ham-ni-da".

Excuse me is pronounced "Sil-re-ham-ni-da" I am sorry is pronounced "Mi-an-ham-ni-da". In Korea, these phrases are not used interchangeably as they are in the U. S. Excuse me: "Sil-re-ham-ni-da" is used only as a dismissal from someone's presence; I am sorry: "Mi-an-ham-ni-da" is used more often, and means pardon me for a wrong I have committed. Most often, you will hear "Mi-an-ham-ni-da" rather than "Sil-re-ham-ni-da".

No is pronounced "An-i-o". It is used with just about any phrase in Korean speech., and appends to these phrases easily. For example, No Thank you sounds like "An-i-o, Kam-sa-ham-ni-da", and No, I am sorry sounds like "An-i-o, Mi-an-ham-ni-da".

Finally, You're welcome sounds like "Chon-man-ne-mal-sum-im-ni-da" and is used nearly as often as "Yo-bo-se-yo". It is a way of saying "I am indebted to you, though this meaning is very seldom taken literally.

What will Korean sound like to you when you finally get there? Here's an example:

An-yong-ha-sim-ni-ka

Yo-bo-se-yo

Pul-go-gi, sip-se-ye

An-i-o, Kam-sa-ham-ni-da

Co-pi, Kam-sa-ham-ni-da

Mi-an-ham-ni-da

Chon-man-ne-mal-sum-im-ni-da

To-man-nap-si-da

An-yong-hi-ka-sip-se-yo

Take some time to study the handouts available later, and try your hand at Korean conversation while you're there. You - and the Koreans - may be pleasantly surprised by your effort.

USEFUL KOREAN PHRASES

KOREAN

GREETINGS

Good morning	An-nyong ha-sim-ni-ka
Good afternoon	
Good evening	
Hello	Yo-bo-se-yo
My name is...	Na-ui i-ru-mun...im-ni-da
See you again	To man-nap-si-da
Good bye	An-nyong-hi ka-sip-si-yo
Please	Sip-si-yo
No, sir	Ani-o
Thank you, sir (ma'am)	Kam-sa ham-ni-da
You are welcome	Chon-man-ne mal-sum im-ni-da
Excuse me	Sil-re ham-ni-da
I am sorry	Mi-an ham-ni-da

SHOPPING

Do you have...?	... i is-sum-ni-ka?
How much does it cost?	01-ma im-ni-ka?
It is expensive.	Pis-sam ni-da.
Take me to the Chosun Hotel	Chosun Hotel ro kap-si-da
Stop here	Se-wo ju-sip-si-yo
What is this place called?	yo-gi-nun odi-im-ni-ka?
What is that?	Jo-go-sun mu-o-sim-ni-ka?
Where is...?	... un odi is-sum-ni-ka

AT THE RESTAURANT

It is very delicious	A-ju ma-si sum-ni-da
It is hot	Ma-ep sum-ni-da

I will have coffee	Coffee-rul chu-sip-si-yo
Give me a bottle of beer.	Maek-ju han-byong ju-sip-si-yo
Give me a glass of cold water	Na-eng-su han-jan ju-sip-si-yo
OTHERS	
Bathroom	Mok-yok-shil
Toilet	Hwa-jang-shil
Hot water	To-un-mul
Yes, sir (ma'am)	Ye
That is good (bad)	Jus-sum-ni-da (Nap-um-ni-da)
That is right (wrong)	Ol-sum-ni-da (Tul-lyot-sum-ni-da)
Can you speak English	Yong-o hal-su is-sum-ni-ka?
Just a moment, please	Jam-kan ki-da-ryo ju-sip-si-yo
I like you	Tang-si-nul joa ham-ni-da
Traditional Korean dinner	Han-jong-sik
Barbecued beef	Pulgogi
Broiled ribs	Kal bi
Coffee	Co-pi
Ticket	Pyo
Market	Si-chang

ATTACHMENT 11

The Korean Military Society

by Captain Kenneth O. Morse

The military establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) is a powerful and well respected sub-culture within modern Korean society. Power comes from the movement of military officers into the bureaucratic organization after training and service. Respect comes as a result of performance in the Korean War and Vietnam, and in service in civic action programs and local societal involvement.

Every Korean male must serve 2 and 1/2 years of active military service. There is universal conscription within Korea, and males register at their 18th birthday. Service must be completed between their 18th and 31st birthday. The service commitment is not completed with the fulfillment of this active duty commitment, as each active member is then retained in the Homeland Reserve Forces, a ready reserve component, for an additional three years. He then serves in the standby reserves as a local reservist until age 49. At the individual's choice, he may select other options, such as the Civilian Defense Corps or the local security forces rather than the standby reserve.

While on active duty, the Korean soldier is a well

respected member of society. He is called upon to support the government's policies, and readily espouses the values of "the land of the morning calm". As a member of the military establishment, the Korean soldier receives preferential treatment within the social structure, especially in rural areas. He is looked upon as the guardian of the homeland, and tries to maintain this societal image.

When asked about his country, the ROK soldier is proudly nationalistic. He is conservative in political viewpoint, as befits the national character. However, he is fiercely determined to maintain his country's integrity, despite some minor shortcomings, which he may admit over a drink. At the same time, he recognizes the U. S. as a major partner in his country's development and defense, and will be quick to defend U. S. policies, especially when they will benefit the ROK military directly.

In addition to being highly respected in society and nationalistic in outlook, the Korean soldier is well trained and well equipped. The military organization is broken down into a standing army, a naval and marine corps, and an air force. All are equipped primarily with equipment of U. S. design and manufacture, though in recent years, some indigenous production has taken place.

Organizationally, the Korean military is similar to that of the U. S. The President, as the Commander in Chief, and the Ministry of Defense (like our DoD), are the controlling civilian organizations of the military forces. While many of the senior civilian managers have military backgrounds, active military personnel scrupulously avoid political involvement and political activity during their active duty tenure.

The senior military organization is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is responsible for implementing policies made by the Ministry of Defense. Decisions are then passed down through the chain of command to the various services for implementation.

The Army is equipped with all the weapons of a modern field army. Tanks and artillery, helicopters and missiles, and the M-16, which is produced in Korea, are the standard units of equipment. However, older equipment is retained as well: the forward observer corps still use the O-1E bird-dog as a spotter/forward air control aircraft, and the H-19 Chicksaw is retained for transport purposes. The Army has approximately 520,000 men, most of whom are on active duty within 50 miles of the demilitarized zone. The ROK Army, in addition to its excellent reputation, is also relatively large, being the sixth largest in the world. Not only is

the Army relatively large and well equipped, but it also is very experienced. More than 30% of the officers and men served in Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, and earned a reputation as fierce and efficient fighters.

The naval and marine corps are relatively small organizations, totalling less than 50,000 men altogether. The naval forces are assigned the task of coastal patrol and defense, while the marine corps is an elite, well trained strike force to be used either in conjunction with the naval forces or as a separate organization under the direct command of the minister of defense. The navy has succeeded in launching its first indigenously produced patrol craft, which will be used to intercept and apprehend North Korean "skunk boats" along the eastern coast.

Periodically, the North will send high speed boats with teams of agents to infiltrate into the South, effectively flanking the ground forces deployed along the DMZ. These agents attempt to collect intelligence, conduct sabotage, and terrorize the population of the southern half of South Korea. The navy has been very effective in stopping this North Korean infiltrator activity, allowing few of these skunk boats to ever reach the ROK coast.

The ROK Air Force, your counterparts, are an elite



force within an elite military sub-society. They are well trained and well equipped with U. S. designed and produced equipment. However, as with other services, do not be surprised at the equipment contrast you may see: for example, the ROKAF still operates the Korean War vintage F-86 Sabre Jet and the WW II vintage C-46 and C-47 alongside their modern F-4E's and F-5E's.

ROK Air Force personnel are well trained as well as well educated. Most officers come from either the ROK Air Force Academy in Seoul or the voluntary Reserve Officers Training Corps at Korean universities. Certain selected enlisted personnel and non-college graduates are commissioned through an Officer Training School. All enlisted personnel have completed at least the equivalent of an eighth grade education - in which they must take at least two years of English. They will also have completed one or more technical training courses at Taejon, the only Air Force technical training center. All Air Force personnel, both officers and enlisted, are volunteers, and serve at least three years.



Within the ROKAF, there are definite class divisions, which are honored by all members (see Fig. 1). There is a distinct separation between field grade and company grade officers. There is a more pronounced distinction between

FIGURE 1
MILITARY RANKS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY



REPUBLIC OF KOREA AIR FORCE



officers and enlisted members. This distinction is maintained because there is little social contact between the differing groups - especially between officers and enlisted. Within the enlisted ranks, these separations are less apparent, but still exist. NCO's are strict, and are saluted by junior enlisted ranks. This helps to maintain the distinction between the "first termer" and the career NCO.

As a measure of respect for the Korean military, members enjoy an approximate 10 to 15% pay advantage over their civilian worker counterparts, and a greater differential over the rural farmer. The pay system is another way class distinctions are preserved within the enlisted force. To draw supplemental allowances for wife and family members, the individual must attain the rank of Sergeant. Thus, the "first termer" normally is single, while the NCO's are married.

In summary, the Korean military is a dedicated, nationalistic, well trained and experienced fighting force. The military is respected within society, and is dedicated to the defense of both the society and its government. The individual military member is proud of his country, his service, and his position. Within the military, class distinctions are maintained, as a means of retaining respect and

honor befitting the national character. The Korean military society is a well organized and structured sub-culture.

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- e. The Military Balance: 1981-1982. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1981.

ATTACHMENT 12

100

THE KOREAN MILITARY

There has been a long history in Korea of civilian control over the military. This tradition was established in part because of Confucian ideology which did not look favorably on the military, and also because of the fear of the political elite that a large military force might jeopardize the political order if not tightly controlled. Two events in the twentieth century have altered this traditional view of the military and military personnel. The first of these events was the Japanese invasion and subsequent occupation from 1909-1945. The Koreans simply did not have the military means to resist the Japanese and paid a tremendous price as a result. The second event was the North Korean invasion in June 1950 which initiated the Korean War and practically destroyed the Republic of Korea.

Security considerations dominate South Korean domestic and foreign policies. Geographical factors are largely responsible for these concerns. Seoul is both the economic and political capital of the country and located only approximately 30 miles from the 38th parallel which divides the two Koreas. In order to protect not only Seoul but the rest of the country too, the South Korean government has been willing to spend large sums to provide for the national defense. In 1981, \$4.4 billion was allocated for defense, which represents approximately 6% of the GNP or 34.4% of the national budget. These are substantial amounts and percentages, but the Koreans believe such expenditures are required.

As of 1981, the total South Korean military forces included 601,600 personnel. Of this number, 520,000 were in the army,

49,000 in the navy, and 32,600 in the air force. The reserve components of the services are 1,100,000 in the army, 60,000 in the navy, and 55,000 in the air force.

American military assistance programs and troops are deemed essential to maintain Korean security. This is a view widely held by political and military leaders in South Korea. The 40,000 U.S. Army soldiers are located in such areas that any North Korean invasion would involve them. This is the classic "trip wire" concept and would immediately involve the U.S. in any invasion from the North. Such early American involvement is critical in the South Korean view to deter the North Koreans from attacking and provides additional credibility to the mutual defense treaty. Although South Korean industry now provides approximately 90% of the country's defense materials, highly sophisticated aircraft such as the F-4s and F-16s, plus advanced avionics equipment, are supplied by the U.S. It becomes obvious from this discussion concerning the U.S. role in Korean defense why the Carter decision to withdraw the army forces caused such consternation in South Korea.

Suggested Reading

Henry Bienen, The Military and Modernization.

John Lovell and Eugene Kim, "The Military and Political Change in Asia," Pacific Affairs 40, Spring 1967.

Franklin B. Weinstein and Fuji Kamiya, The Security of Korea.
The International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1981-1982, and Strategic Survey 1980-1981.

ATTACHMENT 13

A CULTURE CAPSULE OF KOREA*

BY

LT COL WILLIAM A. MITCHELL

YOU NOW HAVE HEARD MANY THINGS ABOUT KOREA. YOU HAVE A FEEL FOR THE GENERAL SETTING OF KOREA. COL SAUNDERS POINTED OUT HOW THE KOREANS SURVIVE IN AN AREA HANDICAPPED BY MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN, FEW NATURAL RESOURCES, POOR SOILS, AND A LARGE POPULATION. CAPT SORENSEN DISCUSSED THE IMPACT OF RELIGION ON THE KOREAN PEOPLE. YOU SAW HOW THE KOREAN HAS A DIFFERENT OUTLOOK ON LIFE THAN WE DO, AS AMERICANS. CAPT HENDERSON PRESENTED A PICTURE OF KOREA'S LONG HISTORY. YOU HEARD ABOUT THE COMPLEX POLITICS AND STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF KOREA FROM MAJ BERRY. CAPT HAMMILL BROUGHT KOREAN LAW "TO LIFE" WITH HIS INFORMATIVE AND ENTERTAINING PRESENTATION. CAPT HENDERSON AND CAPT MORSE BRIEFLY EXPOSED YOU TO THE COMPLEX KOREAN LANGUAGE. AND, FINALLY, MAJ BERRY AND CAPT MORSE PROVIDED INSIGHT INTO THE KOREAN MILITARY, YOUR COUNTER-PART FOR THE TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISE.

YOU NOW HAVE A TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK WHICH PROVIDES A GENERAL "FEEL" FOR KOREA. YOU HAVE ONLY A BRIEF TIME TO ACHIEVE A SENSE OF RAPPORT WITH KOREA. BUT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DO A BETTER JOB AND BENEFIT MORE IF YOU KNOW SOME OF THE MORE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THEIR CULTURE. YOU'LL WORK MORE EFFECTIVELY IF YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THE KOREAN THOUGHT PATTERN IS DIFFERENT FROM OURS. I SAID DIFFERENT, NOT WORSE, OR BETTER THAN OURS. IN THE NEXT FEW MINUTES, I'LL HIGHLIGHT A FEW BASIC DIFFERENCES. BUT PLEASE KEEP IN MIND THAT I'M GENERALIZING ABOUT A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY THAT IS RAPIDLY CHANGING. KOREANS ARE WORKING HARD TOWARD SOLVING THEIR PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM RAPID MODERNIZATION.

"WHAT MAKES A KOREAN TICK?" "WHAT DOES HE REALLY THINK?" WE AS AMERICANS SOMETIMES THINK HE IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND. I SUGGEST THAT IF YOU LEARN ABOUT THEIR HISTORY, RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY, AND CULTURE, YOU WILL HAVE DIFFERENT AND MORE ACCURATE PERCEPTIONS. KOREANS ARE INDEED VERY HUMAN.

I'D LIKE TO MAKE A FEW GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT THE CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL.

- FIRST, KEEP IN MIND THAT THE KOREAN IS SECOND TO NONE IN ABILITY TO SURVIVE AND FACE HARDSHIPS.
- IN GENERAL, KOREANS ARE PATIENT, RESOURCEFUL AND CHEERFUL.
- WE TAKE PRIDE IN BEING FRANK AND OPEN. REMEMBER THE KOREAN ATTITUDE OF RESERVE WILL BYPASS THIS DIRECTNESS. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY MAY "BEAT AROUND THE BUSH."
- REMEMBER THAT KOREANS FREQUENTLY ANSWER "YES" TO QUESTIONS WHEN THEY REALLY MEAN NO. WE DO THIS IN AMERICA. WHAT ABOUT WHEN WE LEAVE A BORING PARTY AND TELL THE HOST "WE HAD A LOVELY TIME." KOREANS DON'T CALL A "SPADE A SPADE" BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF HURTING ONE'S FEELINGS.
- RITUALS OF COURTESY ARE VERY IMPORTANT. DON'T BYPASS HOSPITALITY.

- YOU ARE USE TO COOPERATING TOGETHER ON COMMITTEES IN A DEMOCRATIC FASHION. REMEMBER THE SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN KOREA IS VERTICAL AND AUTHORITARIAN.
- IN OUR SOCIETY, WE PROGRESS IN A CONTINUOUS CHRONOLOGICAL PATTERN. IN KOREA, TIME IS A WHEEL, REVOLVING IN A CIRCLE. TRY TO REMEMBER, LIFE IS A REFLECTION OF THE CYCLICAL PATTERN OF NATURE.
- PERHAPS NON-INDIVIDUALISM IS THE MOST BASIC ATTITUDE OF THE KOREAN. SELF COMES LAST! WE SOMETIMES FIND THIS DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT AS AMERICANS.
- KIBUN -- WE MUST ALWAYS REMEMBER THE IMPORTANCE OF KIBUN OR "SELFHOOD." KIBUN IS THE STATE OF YOUR INNER FEELINGS, YOUR PRESTIGE, YOUR AWARENESS OF BEING RECOGNIZED BY YOUR PEERS. KIBUN IS YOUR MORALE, YOUR FACE, YOUR SELF ESTEEM. IT'S NOT TRANSLATABLE INTO ENGLISH AND IT'S DIFFICULT FOR US TO APPRECIATE IT. BUT IT'S VERY IMPORTANT. WHEN KIBUN IS GOOD, YOU FEEL GREAT; WHEN IT'S BAD, YOU FEEL LIKE EATING DIRT.

- PROPER INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE VERY IMPORTANT IN KOREA. TO PUT YOUR OWN DESIRES FIRST IS CONSIDERED UNGOUTH AND WORTHY OF SCORN.
- PROTOCOL IS TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT TO KOREANS. ONE WHO DOES NOT OBSERVE THE BASIC RULES OF SOCIAL FORMALITY IS, IN FACT, NOT A "PERSON;" HE IS AN "UNPERSON." HE WASN'T BORNED, HE JUST HAPPENED! REMEMBER, AN UNPERSON IS SOMEWHERE OUTSIDE THE HUMAN GROUP, BETWEEN MAN AND APE. EXAMPLES OF "UNPERSONS" ARE PROSTITUTES, CRIMINALS, BUTCHERS, BEGGARS, AND PERHAPS FOREIGNERS.
- FOREIGNERS TO KOREA, WHO DO NOT KNOW KOREAN CUSTOMS, MANNERS OR LANGUAGE, MAY SEEM TO SOME KOREANS TO BE UNLEARNED, UNCULTURED, AND UNCIVILIZED.
- PEOPLE TRY TO REMAIN AT A LEVEL OF POLITE RELATIONSHIPS. BUT VIOLENCE IS POSSIBLE WHEN POLITE RELATIONSHIPS ARE STOPPED.
- SOCIETY IS CENTERED AROUND THE FAMILY UNIT. THE FAMILY PROVIDES ALL THE INNER COMFORTS OF LIFE, SUCH AS LOVE,

TRUST, OBEDIENCE AND GAIETY.

- REMEMBER THAT ALTHOUGH CHANGE IS OCCURRING, THE TRADITIONALISTS ARE CONSERVATIVE AND DO RESIST CHANGE.
- DEFERENCE TO ELDERS (MUST BE HONORED, PAMPERED AND PLEASED).
- NORMAL LIFE CYCLE ENDS AT 60. THERE IS AN INTERESTING SOCIAL EVENT ASSOCIATED WITH THIS EVENT.
- WOMEN -- ALMOST AN UNPERSON UNTIL SHE PRODUCES A SON. RESTRICTED ENVIRONMENT UNTIL BECOMING A MOTHER-IN-LAW.
- SCHOOLS ARE SECOND IN IMPORTANCE TO FAMILY LOYALTY. STUDENTS SUPPORT THEIR CLASSMATES. EMPHASIS ON ROTE MEMORIZATION.
- KOREANS ARE AMONG THE MOST POLITE PEOPLE IN THE WORLD WHEN RULES OF ETIQUETTE ARE FOLLOWED. ETIQUETTE IS PRACTICED IN THE POOREST OF HOMES.
- CEREMONY IS VERY IMPORTANT TO KOREANS. PROTOCOL, PROPER BOWS, ATTITUDES OF HUMILITY, ETC., MUST ALWAYS BE MAINTAINED.

- TOUCHING IS RARE, EXCEPT IN THE CITIES (CONSIDERED AN AFFRONT TO HIS PERSON). HANDSHAKING IS WESTERN AND STILL DIFFICULT FOR MANY TO ACCEPT. BOWING AT THE WAIST IS TRADITIONAL.
- CONCEPT OF TIME -- NOT VERY IMPORTANT TO KOREANS. PROMPTNESS IS NOT A VIRTUE!
- CALLING CARDS ARE VERY IMPORTANT TO KOREANS.
- PERSONAL NAMES ARE PART OF A KOREAN'S PERSONAL PROPERTY. GENERALLY, NAMES ARE NOT EXCHANGED IN A MEETING BUT TITLES AND CARDS ARE. DON'T EVER CALL OUT TO SOMEONE AS "HEY YOU," "HEY JACK," ETC.
- PRIVACY IS VERY IMPORTANT TO KOREANS. PEOPLE MAKE IMAGINARY WALLS AROUND THEM. FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU VISIT SOMEONE UNPREPARED TO RECEIVE YOU, EVEN THOUGH YOU REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENCE, YOU WAIT UNTIL THEY CHANGE FROM AN INFORMAL DRESS TO A MORE FORMAL ATTIRE. YOU, IN FACT, IGNORE THEM UNTIL THEY ARE PROPERLY

ATTIRED. THEY DO NOT EXIST UNTIL THEY ARE READY TO
SEE YOU.

- MOST PEOPLE REMOVE THEIR SHOES BEFORE ENTERING THEIR HOMES. MOST FLOORS ARE KEPT POLISHED AND SPOTLESS. ANY PLACE WHERE SHOES ARE WORN, FOR EXAMPLE IN PUBLIC BUILDINGS, THE FLOORS ARE CONSIDERED THE SAME AS STREETS. YOU MAY SEE PEOPLE SPIT OR THROW TRASH ON FLOORS WITHOUT HESITATION.
- KOREAN MANNERS ARE BASED ON MAKING THE GUEST FEEL COMFORTABLE.
- YOU EAT WITH CHOPSTICKS IN KOREA, BUT USUALLY A SPOON IS ALSO PROVIDED, ESPECIALLY TO FOREIGNERS. YOU WILL PROBABLY NOTICE THAT SOME KOREANS BELCH AFTER A MEAL AND ALSO USE TOOTHPICKS. THIS REFLECTS THAT ONE HAS EATEN WELL AND ENJOYED IT.
- IT IS VERY IMPOLITE TO TALK VERY MUCH WHILE EATING. THE CONCEPT OF A "BUSINESS LUNCH" IS VERY FOREIGN TO

THE KOREANS. KOREANS FEEL THAT TOO MUCH TALK BY
WESTERNERS AT MEALS INTRUDES IN PERSONAL AND PRIVATE
PLEASURE OF FILLING THEIR STOMACHS.

- MEN TRAVEL TOGETHER IN GROUPS, SOCIALIZE, AND ENJOY
THE COMPANY OF EACH OTHER. WOMEN DON'T HAVE THE SAME
PRIVILEGES AS MEN AND ARE FAR MORE RESTRICTED.

- KISAENG -- HOUSES OF TRAINED WOMEN WHO ENTERTAIN MEN.
THESE WOMEN PROVIDE SOCIALLY ACCEPTABLE PREMARITAL
AND EXTRAMARITAL RELATIONS WITH MEN.

- UNLIKE WESTERN SOCIETY, IT IS NOT NORMAL TO BE INVITED
INTO A KOREAN'S HOME. THERE ARE EXCEPTIONS IN THE
MILITARY, BUT CONSIDER IT A REAL HONOR TO BE INVITED
TO A HOME.

- THE KOREAN IS A PERSON WITH GREAT SELF-CONFIDENCE.
- MANY KOREANS ARE "WESTERNIZED" OR "MODERNIZED." THEY
SPEAK ENGLISH, UNDERSTAND AMERICANS, AND ARE TRULY
COSMOPOLITAN.

- TRADITIONALLY, KOREANS ARE AS ETHNOCENTRIC AS WE ARE, AND FEEL THE KOREAN WAY IS THE BEST WAY.
- WRITING ONE'S NAME IN RED INK SIGNIFIES DEATH.
- THE NUMBER 4 IS UNLUCKY.
- UNDER CONFUCIAN SYSTEM, THE MILITARY WAS RATED VERY LOW IN THE VERTICAL SCALE OF PRESTIGE. BUT TODAY THAT'S CHANGED, SINCE THE MILITARY HAS THE POWER.
- SOME KOREANS THINK TO STEAL IS CLEVER; TO GET CAUGHT IS VERY BAD LUCK, OR STUPIDITY.

AND FINALLY, I'D LIKE TO QUOTE SOME KOREAN SAYINGS. THEY SAY A LOT ABOUT THE PEOPLE.

- "THE SECRET OF HAPPINESS IS HEALTH, WEALTH, AND MANY SONS."
- "RIGHTEOUSNESS WILL FINALLY CONQUER."
- "FLOWERS WILL BLOOM AGAIN, BUT A MAN WILL NEVER REGAIN HIS YOUTH."
- "A RIGHTEOUS MAN NEVER GETS RICH."

- "IF IT IS NOT POLITE, DON'T SAY IT."

*MUCH OF MY CAPSULE IS FROM THE FOLLOWING SOURCES. I HIGHLY
RECOMMEND EACH ONE FOR A CLEAR PICTURE OF KOREAN PEOPLE.

1. PAUL S. CRANE, KOREAN PATTERNS (SEOUL, KOREA: HOLLYM CORPORATION, PUBLISHERS), ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, HANDBOOK SERIES #1, 2ND ED., 1968.
2. NENA VREELAND, ET AL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR SOUTH KOREA, DA PAMPHLET 550-41, (WASHINGTON, DC: AMERICAN UNIVERSITY FOREIGN AREA STUDIES), 2ND ED., 1975.
3. IN-HAH, JUNG, ED., THE FEEL OF KOREA: A SYMPOSIUM OF AMERICAN COMMENT, (SEOUL, KOREA: HOLLYM CORPORATION, PUBLISHERS), 2ND ED., 1966.
4. IN K. HWANG, THE KOREAN REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE 1880s, (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.: SCHENKMAN PUBLISHING COMPANY), 1978.

ATTACHMENT 14

Recommended Reading List

Paul S. Crane, Korean Patterns (Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation, Publishers), Royal Asiatic Society, Handbook Series #1, 2nd Ed., 1968.

Nena Vreeland, Et Al, Area Handbook for South Korea, DA Pamphlet 550-41, (Washington, DC: American University Foreign Area Studies), 2nd Ed., 1975.

In-Hah, Jung, Ed., The Feel of Korea: A Symposium of American Comment, (Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation, Publishers), 2nd Ed., 1966.

In K. Hwang, The Korean Reform Movement of the 1880s, (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Company), 1978.

Bortz, Patricia, South Korea, London Oxford Press, 1972.

Kalb, Albert, East Asia; China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam - Geography of a Cultural Region, 1972.

A Handbook of Korea (Seoul, Korea: Korean Overseas Information Service, Ministry of Culture and Information, 1979).

John B. Noss, Man's Religions, 6th Ed., (New York: Macmillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1980).

Geoffrey Parrinder, Introduction to Asian Religions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

Han, Woo-Keun, The History of Korea, Honolulu, Hawaii: The University Press of Hawaii, 1970.

Reischauer, Edwin O., and Fairbank, John K., East Asia: Tradition and Transformation; Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978.

Sonu, Harold W., Korea: A Political History in Modern Times, Sedul, 1970.

Suggested Journals for Reading

- "Korean Quarterly"
- "Korean Journal"
- "Asian Survey"
- "Korean Frontier"
- "Journal of Asian Studies"
- "Far Eastern Economic Review"

ATTACHMENT 15

BASIC FACTS ON KOREA

(U.S. Army Handbook)*

- South Korea is handicapped by mountainous terrain, a poverty of resources, and a large population. Few minerals, poor soil, deforestation (cutting and war).
- High percentage has traditionally engaged in agriculture.
- Today a shift from rural to urban in character and orientation.
- Population is widely dispersed.
- Large cities have developed where transportation routes intersect (such as Seoul and Pusan)
- Winters are long and cold; summers are short, hot and humid.
- Rising standard of living, increased levels of education, gradually declining population growth rate.
- One of the most densely populated in Asia.
- Koreans form a single ethnic group--with common physical characteristics, language, culture, and feeling of unity. They feel that they are one people (although there are regional variations, cultures and dialects.)
- Homogeneity is reinforced by the conscious effort of many migrants to urban areas to acquire city accents, gestures, and styles.
- Rural areas are characterized by earlier marriage and higher fertility rates than urban areas.
- 35,000 villages
- Migration (internal) 1960s-1970s
1960s - notable improvement in their material living conditions. Better housing, food, and clothing. Better health.

*Nena Vreeland, et al, Area Handbook for South Korea, DA Pamphlet 550-41, (Washington, DC: American University Foreign Area Studies), 2nd ed., 1975.

- but although life improved in the 60s and early 70s, the majority of Koreans experienced a life economically restricted with few comforts and no luxuries (varies within the country).
- Squatter settlements in cities!
- Disparity between rural and urban.
- Average diet -- high in starch, low in animal protein and vitamins.
- Rice is the basis of the diet -- symbol of good living "to have eaten rice is to have eaten well."
- Kimch'i -- a highly spiced dish made from combinations of vegetables, fruits, nuts, fish, red pepper, garlic, ginger -- eat with every meal.
- Sung'yong -- hot rice tea made from water and burned rice from the bottom of the cooking pot -- taken after all regular meals.
- Some coffee.
- Alcoholic beverages made from wheat and rice mash.
- Drinking mostly by men -- women should never become intoxicated.
- Ch'ima (traditional high-waisted, long pleated skirt).
- Western dress in cities.
- 1970s survey -- Seoul most polluted city in world. Coal gas - autos, industry, dust
- Poor health could be solved by establishing a proper relationship with the world of spirits.
- Some spirits, such as those of people who died away from home or by violence, were believed to cause serious diseases.
- Traditional medicine.
- Hanyak system of treatment -- herbs and acupuncture
- Tuberculosis - No. 1 disease. Also cholera, typhoid and VD. 80% of

population has some intestinal parasite (roundworm, hookworm, tapeworm).

- Traditional sports -- wrestling, archery, art of self defense, kite flying.
- Drinking for men - after hours - for centuries.
- During the 20th century, Koreans have seen their country become a prize in great power rivalries, undergone 36 years of exploitative colonial domination, suffer a disastrous civil war, and contend with a virtually continuous political upheaval.
- During this time, Korean social patterns have undergone changes concomitant with the transformation of a society that was feudalistic, sedentary, agrarian, and rural, into a society that was highly mobile, urbanizing rapidly, and in many other respects experiencing industrial revolution.
- Candy and wine.
- yot -- candy
- Pulkogi -- for guests, strips of beef charcoaled over the table with vegetables.
- Wine -- Takchu - light white wine, slightly stronger than beer
Yakchu - a stronger variety of Takchu
Soju - a strong spirit which burns the stomach
- Names -- Koreans have two names, family name placed first, then a name identifying the generation.
- Few family names cover the vast majority of Koreans. About 250 family names in Korea -- Kim, Lee, Pak, An, Chae, Cho, Chong, Ku, Ko, Im, O, No, Shin, Yu, Yun.
- Seal -- handcarved bearing their name.
- Birthdays -- 1st and 60th.
- One of the oldest nations in the world, Korea is rich in historic relics and cultural heritage.

- Koreans have developed music and fine arts of their own distinctive from China or Japan.
- Money -- Won
- Korea-U.S. Joint Communique of July 1, 1979.
- Ginseng -- medicinal all-purpose herb.
- They are a homogeneous race different from the Chinese and Japanese (lighter skin than Chinese and Japanese).
- Korean Language -- Tungusic branch of Ural-Altaic family. Korean grammar entirely different from Chinese. Korean is strictly phonetic in writing -- Chinese is not.
- Consists of stems plus endings/no gender.
- Adjectives have conjugations like verbs.
- Korean language is rich in sound -- 10 primary vowels, 14 consonants (symbolize) heaven, earth and man).
- Large vocabulary -- concrete things as well as moods and feelings.
Short on words pertaining to abstract reasoning and logical thinking.
- Very difficult to translate Korean into a foreign language word for word.
- Northern vs. Southern language -- Seoul, Korea is standard.
- White clothes stand for innocence and purity. Call themselves the "white-clad people."

ATTACHMENT 16

13957
MAR 13 1980

(South) Korea

department of state • august 1979

OFFICIAL NAME: Republic of Korea


PEOPLE

The Republic of Korea has a high population density, ranking with Japan and Taiwan in East Asia. Racially the Korean population is one of the most homogeneous in the world. Its origins are unclear, but the primary stock is believed to be Mongol-related Tungusic, with some Chinese mixture. Settlements are concentrated in the Seoul-Inchon area of the northwest and in the fertile plains in the south. The mountains and hill country are only sparsely inhabited. The largest concentrations of Korean residents abroad are in China (1.2 million),

Japan (600,000), and the United States and the Soviet Union with 350,000 each. The population of the Republic of Korea was about 37 million in 1978, compared with only about 17 million in North Korea.

Many older Koreans retain some knowledge of Japanese, a holdover from the Japanese colonial period of 1910-1945 (see HISTORY). Today English is universally taught at the secondary school level.

The traditional religions of Korea are Buddhism and Shamanism. Buddhism has declined in influence steadily from the heights it reached during the Koryo dynasty (935-1392



A.D.), but it is still an active religious force. Its adherents are estimated to

PROFILE

People

POPULATION: 37 million (1978 est.). **ANNUAL GROWTH RATE:** 1.7%. **ETHNIC GROUP:** Chinese. **RELIGIONS:** Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity. **LANGUAGE:** Korean. **EDUCATION:** Years compulsory—6. Percentage attendance—62.4 of population in age group (1975). **Literacy—Over 90%.** **HEALTH:** Infant mortality rate (1975)—38/1,000 (US=15/1,000). Life expectancy—68 yrs. **WORK FORCE (1977):** About 12.9 million. Agriculture—40%. Industry and commerce—22%. Services—36%. Government—NA.

Geography

AREA: 98,400 sq. km. (38,000 sq. mi.). **CITIES:** Capital—Seoul (pop. 7.8 million, 1978). **TERRAIN:** Rugged. **CLIMATE:** Continental.

Government

TYPE: Republic (power centralized in a strong executive). **DATE OF INDEPENDENCE:** August 15, 1948. **CONSTITUTION:** 1948 (revised 1962 and 1972).

BRANCHES: Executive—President (Chief of State). Legislative—Unicameral National Assembly. Judicial—Supreme Court, Constitutional Court.

SUBDIVISIONS: 9 Provinces, 2 special cities.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Democratic Republican Party (DRP) New Democratic Party (NDP). **SUFFRAGE:** Universal over 20.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET: \$7.3 billion (1978).

DEFENSE: 600,000-member armed forces.

FLAG: Divided circle of red (top) and blue (bottom) centered on a white field. A black bar design appears in each corner.

Economy

GNP: \$45.3 billion (1978 est.). **REAL GROWTH RATE:** 13% (1978 est.). **PER CAPITA INCOME:** \$1,225 (1978 est.). **AVG. RATE OF INFLATION LAST 5 YRS.:** Approx. 18%.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Coal, tungsten, graphite.

AGRICULTURE: Products—rice, barley, wheat. **Percentage of GNP:** 24.


INDUSTRY: Types—textiles and clothing, electronics, shipbuilding, steel, food processing, chemical fertilizers, plywood, chemicals. **Percentage of GNP:** 30.

TRADE (1978): **Exports—\$12.7 billion:** textiles and clothing, electrical machinery, plywood, footwear, ships, steel. **Imports—\$14.6 billion:** oil, ships, steel, wood, grains, organic chemicals, machinery. **Major Partners—Japan, US.**

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: 484 won=US\$1 (since Dec. 1974).

ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED: NA. **ECONOMIC AID SENT:** NA.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Asian and Pacific Council, Asian Development Bank, Asian Parliamentary Union, Asian People's Anti-Communist League, Colombo Plan, ESCAP, FAO, GATT, Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, IHB, IMO, IMF, INTELSAT, International Whaling Commission, Interpol, ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, World Anti-Communist League, nonmember of UN (official observer attends UN sessions).



include 16 percent of the population. Shamanism, a loosely organized, traditional animistic faith, is widely practiced. Confucianism continues to be the dominant cultural influence, but its adherents are now generally limited to the elderly.

About 4 million Koreans, or 11 percent, are Christian—the largest portion in any East Asian country except the Philippines—of whom about three-fourths are Protestant.

GEOGRAPHY

Korea is a mountainous peninsula, about 966 kilometers (600 mi.) long and 217 kilometers (135 mi.) wide, located in northeastern Asia and projecting southeast from China. Japan lies about 193 kilometers (120 mi.) to the east across the Sea of Japan. The northern and eastern sections of the peninsula are rugged and mountainous. Good harbors are found only on the western and southern coasts.

Seoul, the capital of the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.), is in the west-central portion of the peninsula, less than 48 kilometers (30 mi.) from the demilitarized zone separating North Korean military forces from those of the UN Command.

Seoul's climate is hot and humid in summer. July and August are normally the warmest months, with temperatures reaching 35°C (95°F). Rainfall is concentrated in summer during late June and July. Winters are cold and dry, with usually clear skies. The two longest seasons are spring and autumn.

HISTORY

First unified in the 7th century A.D., Korea was a semi-independent state associated with China until the late 19th century, when Japanese influence began to dominate. During this long period three major dynasties—Silla, Koryo, and Yi—waxed and waned, leaving a rich cultural heritage, the best known element of which is world-famous celadon pottery. The western name for the country (Korea) stems from the first significant Amer-

ican and European contact having occurred during the Koryo dynasty. Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910.

At the end of World War II, pursuant to an agreement among the Allies reached at Potsdam in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was divided at the 38th parallel for administrative convenience in accepting the surrender of Japanese forces on the peninsula. The north and south became Soviet and U.S. zones of military occupation, respectively. The division was intended, at least by the United States, to be temporary pending the organization of nationwide free elections. However, in 1946 and 1947, when the Soviet Government refused to permit free consultations with representatives of all groups of the Korean people for the purpose of establishing a national government, the United States and the Soviet Union failed to reach agreement on a unification formula.

Korean Conflict

In the face of adamant Communist refusal to permit UN-supervised elections in North Korea, the Republic of Korea was established south of the 38th parallel on August 15, 1948, under UN auspices. The Soviets, in turn, established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in September of the same year. The United States withdrew its military forces from Korea in 1949.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean armed forces launched an attack on the Republic of Korea across the 38th parallel. In response, the United Nations, in accordance with the terms of its charter, engaged in its first collective action through the establishment of the United Nations Command, to which 16 member nations sent troops and other assistance. At the request of the Secretary General, this international effort was led by the United States, which contributed the largest contingent. The conflict was prolonged by the entry on the North Korean side of Chinese Communist forces in October 1950, but an armistice to end the hostilities was finally signed by the North Koreans, Chinese,

and the UN Command on July 27, 1953.


The Armistice Agreement called for an early conference of the parties concerned to find a political solution to the problem of the division of Korea, a division left unchanged by the conflict. A conference was convened in Geneva in April 1954 with representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, North Korea, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and New Zealand attending. After 7 weeks of debate no agreement was reached and the conference ended inconclusively.

Post-War Developments

Syngman Rhee served as President of the Republic of Korea from its establishment in 1948 until April 1960, when university students, rioting in protest against irregularities in the Presidential election of that year, forced him to step down. A caretaker government was established, the Constitution was amended, and national elections were held in July 1960. The Democratic Party easily defeated Rhee's Liberals, and the new National Assembly named Chang Myon Prime Minister in August 1960. Chang's government was overthrown in May 1961 by a bloodless military coup led by then-Major General Park Chung Hee (Pak Chong-hui).

The military government remained in power for more than 2½ years, during which time executive and legislative functions of government were controlled by a Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, of which General Park was Chairman. In spring of 1962 Park became Acting President as well.

In December 1962 extensive amendments to the Constitution, approved by a national referendum, provided the basis for elections leading to the reestablishment of a civilian government. General Park retired from the army to stand for election and was



The National Museum Building in Seoul holds 72,000 treasures and relics.

Courtesy of the Korean Embassy

elected President in October 1963. Formal transition from military to civil rule and establishment of the Third Republic took place in December 1963, with the inauguration of Park and the convening of a new National Assembly. In May 1967 President Park was elected to a second term and, after a Constitutional amendment in 1969 to permit a third term, he was elected again in 1971. His principal opponent that year, Kim Tae Chung, polled 5.3 million votes against Park's 6.3 million.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE

In late 1972 the Constitution was amended again, in a referendum conducted under martial law, to

provide for a stronger Presidential system. Its new elements include indirect election of the President by a directly elected 2,500 member National Conference for Unification, Presidential nomination of one-third of the 231-seat National Assembly, and Presidential authority to issue emergency decrees restricting civil liberties when the national security is threatened or may be threatened. Beginning in January 1974, President Park announced a series of Emergency Measures under the latter power, the most important of which, EM-9 (from May 13, 1975), is a broadly written decree which bans the dissemination of false rumors, criticism of the Constitution or advocacy of its reform, and political demonstrations by students. An election in July

1978 returned President Park for a new 6-year term, and a new National Assembly was elected in December 1978. The elected two-thirds of the Assembly was divided into three parts: The ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) won 68 seats, the major opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) 61 seats, a minor party 3 seats, and independents 22 seats. Although it won fewer seats, the NDP was psychologically boosted when its candidates collectively received one percentage point more of the overall popular vote than did the DRP candidates. Subsequently, all of the independents, many of whom had contended unsuccessfully for party nomination before the election itself, joined one or the other of the major parties. As of September 1979, the

resulting lineup in the Assembly was 83 seats for the DRP and 70 for the NDP, plus the 77 government-nominated (*Yujong-hoe*) Members.

Supreme judicial authority is shared by the Constitutional Court (with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional issues) and a Supreme Court, consisting of a Chief Justice and 12 other justices. The Chief Justice is appointed to a 6-year term by the President with the consent of the National Assembly.

The Republic of Korea is divided into nine Provinces and two special cities, Seoul and Pusan. Governors and mayors are appointed by the President.

The human rights climate in Korea has improved significantly since late 1977, including a demonstrable relaxation of controls over the press and tolerance of statements by opposition leaders. Former Presidential candidate Kim Tae-chung, who had been imprisoned since March 1976 for violating EM-9 by publicly signing a declaration urging sweeping constitutional change, was released in December 1978. He has subsequently been allowed considerable latitude in political activity. Nonetheless the institutional machinery for curtailing political dissent remains in place, and in June 1979 an estimated 200 persons remained imprisoned as a result of court convictions for violation of EM-9.

Principal Government Officials

President—PARK Chung Hee

Prime Minister—CHOI Kyn Hah

Deputy Prime Minister, Chairman, Economic Planning Board—SHIN Hyon Hwack

Minister of Foreign Affairs—PARK Tong-jin

Minister of National Defense—RO Jae Hyun

Speaker of the National Assembly—PAEK Tu-chin

Ambassador to the U.S.—KIM Yong Shik

The Republic of Korea maintains an Embassy in the United States at 2320 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. (202) 483-7383).

ECONOMY

Korea's economic growth over the past 15 years has been spectacular. The country has advanced in a single generation from one of the poorest nations on Earth to the threshold of joining the fully industrialized countries. Korea has achieved this despite its population density, a paucity of natural resources, and the requirement to maintain one of the world's largest military establishments. Rapid growth has led to sporadic skilled labor shortages, but Korea's greatest asset remains its industrious, literate people.

The 1945 division of the Korean Peninsula created two distorted economic units. North Korea inherited the bulk of the peninsula's mineral and hydroelectric resources and most of the existing heavy industrial base built by the Japanese. South Korea was left with a large pool of unskilled labor and most of the peninsula's limited agricultural resources. While both the North and the South suffered from the Korean War's massive destruction, a large influx of refugees added to the economic woes of the South. South Korea began the postwar period with a per capita GNP far below that of the North.

Korea's successful program of industrial growth began in the early 1960's, when the Park government instituted sweeping economic reforms with heavy emphasis on exports and labor-intensive light industries. The government also introduced indicative economic planning, strengthened financial institutions, and instituted a currency reform.

From 1963 to 1978, real GNP rose at an annual rate of nearly 10 percent, with average real growth of over 11 percent for 1973-78. While Korea's national output was rising throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the population growth rate declined to the current 1.6 percent annually, resulting in a more than twenty fold increase in per capita GNP in those two decades. Per capita GNP, which reached \$100 for the first time in 1963, will surpass \$1,500 in 1979. Per capita GNP surpassed that of North Korea in 1976

for the first time and has subsequently moved far ahead.

In 1977, for the first time, Korea achieved self-sufficiency in rice, but a shortfall in production and increased demand required further imports of this principal food grain in 1979. Korea's meager mineral resources include anthracite coal, tungsten, and some iron ore. No known onshore petroleum resources exist, and offshore exploration has been limited to date. Korea and Japan have jointly authorized several international oil companies to begin exploration in 1979, southeast of Cheju Island. Energy remains a continuing concern for Korea's economic planners, and Korea has embarked on an ambitious program to generate electricity from nuclear power. The first nuclear power plant went into operation in 1978 and four more are under construction.

A continuing military threat from the North and decreasing levels of foreign assistance require the Republic of Korea to spend an increasingly large share of its output on national defense. As a percentage of GNP, Korea's outlay on defense has risen from 4 percent in the 1960's to 5.6 percent in 1978. In the face of the North Korean military buildup, Seoul plans to double the dollar value of its defense spending during the period 1977-1981, while increasing the share of GNP devoted to defense to 6 percent. Consequently, this will have a greater impact on the civilian economy.

Korea's chronic balance-of-payments problem has been overcome by its successes in international trade, and its foreign exchange reserves topped \$5 billion early in 1979. Nevertheless, Korea's planned trade deficit and continuing industrialization must still be financed to a large extent by external resources. The Republic of Korea has an excellent international credit rating, and it will continue to borrow heavily in international commercial financial markets and from international financial institutions. Substantial foreign aid and investment remain important to sustain the economy, help maintain the armed forces, and support continued

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industrial and social development.

The U.S.-Korean economic relationship has evolved from one where the United States was the principal provider of economic assistance into the current, more equal partnership based on mutual advantage. When the 1980's begin, Korea will rank among the United States' top 10 trading partners. Already it is the fifth largest overseas customer for U.S. agricultural products, purchasing over \$1 billion annually, and U.S. aircraft and nuclear power industries view it as one of the most attractive overseas markets. Overall, the United States purchases approximately 32 percent of Korea's exports and supplies about 22 percent of its

imports. In total trade with Korea, the United States ranks second (\$7.1 billion in 1978) only to Japan (\$8.6 billion, 1978).

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The United States

U.S.-Korea relations are returning to their traditional closeness after a difficult period from 1976 to 1978 when the relationship was severely troubled by allegations of illegal lobbying activities in the United States by Korean nationals, misperceptions of the intent and impact of our plans gradually to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from Korea, and concern over human rights issues in

Korea. In addition to the important economic relationship already described, security relations between the two nations are pivotal. The security relationship was formalized in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, and the United States has frequently reaffirmed its security commitment to the Republic of Korea. In the light of changed conditions in Northeast Asia and Korea's dramatic economic growth, a decision was made in 1977 that U.S. ground combat forces could be withdrawn from Korea over a 4-to 5-year period without threatening the security of the Republic of Korea or the Northeast Asia region. Units of the U.S. Air Force, communications, and logistics personnel will not be withdrawn, and the United States will continue to work closely with the Korean Government to help meet its defense equipment requirements. With regard to the latter, Congress has authorized the transfer of certain equipment from departing U.S. forces to R.O.K. forces.

In July 1979 President Carter announced that, beyond the 3,600 troops already withdrawn, further withdrawals of combat elements of the U.S. 2nd Division would be held in abeyance, with the timing and pace of further withdrawals to be re-examined in 1981. The review to be conducted at that time will pay special attention to the restoration of a satisfactory North-South military balance, and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the Peninsula. Revised intelligence estimates of North Korean military strength were a key factor in this decision.

Japan

Following the ratification in 1965 of a treaty normalizing relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, the two nations have developed an extensive relationship, central to which is mutually beneficial economic activity, particularly trade and Japanese direct investment in Korea. A degree of historically based mutual antipathy remains, but it does not prevent the two nations from dealing pragmatically with issues of common concern.

North Korea

In mid-1971 the Republic of Korea proposed direct talks between the Red Cross associations of the North and South aimed at reunifying families divided by the Korean conflict. In September 1972 Red Cross delegations from the two sides met successively in Pyongyang and Seoul, the first such interchange in over 20 years.

A separate avenue of communication was opened when the South Korean Government began secret discussions early in 1972 with high North Korean officials. These talks culminated in a joint announcement on July 4 in which both parties committed themselves to work for the ultimate reunification of the Korean Peninsula by peaceful means and agreed to establish a joint coordinating committee to examine the associated problems.

The South-North Coordinating Committee, as well as representatives of the Red Cross societies of North Korea and the Republic of Korea, met regularly in the second half of 1972. However, in 1973 the talks foundered and did not produce any significant results.

The Republic of Korea again took the initiative to establish contact with the North in January 1979 when President Park announced his government's willingness to meet with the North Korean Government at any level to explore ways of reducing tensions on the peninsula. The North responded quickly and favorably, and several preliminary sessions were held at Panmunjom within the Demilitarized Zone. It rapidly became apparent, however, that the North was not prepared to meet in a government-to-government format, preferring instead



A potter making traditional Korean porcelain.

Courtesy of the Korean Embassy

to send representatives of various elements of North Korean society. The resulting impasse led to another hiatus in North-South contacts.

On July 1, 1979, President Park and President Carter jointly proposed to North Korea that the three governments meet in a tripartite framework to discuss all pending issues and seek to reduce tensions on the Peninsula. This proposal has been initially rejected by North Korea, but the offer to engage in dialogue remains open and it is hoped that such discussions will yet become possible. In response to the North Korean effort to talk separately with the United States about the Korean armistice, we have pointed out that we would be willing to join any discussion between the representatives of North and South Korea, but that the essential criterion

for progress in Korean issues is that both Korean governments participate fully in any talks.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—William H. Gleysteen, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Mission—John C. Monjo
Counselor for Economic Affairs—
Melvin H. Levine
Counselor for Political Affairs—
William Clark, Jr.
Counselor for Public Affairs—
Maurice E. Lee
Counselor for Administrative Affairs—
Paul Sadler
Consul General—Louis P. Goetz
Coordinator for Commercial Affairs—
Thomas C. Stave

The U.S. Embassy in Korea is located at 82 Sejong-no, Chung-gu, Seoul (tel. 72-2601 through 2619).

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ATTACHMENT 17



background notes

[North] Korea



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

July 1980



Official Name: Democratic People's Republic of Korea

PROFILE

In most cases the figures used here are estimates based on incomplete data and projections.

People

POPULATION (Jan. 1980 est.): 19 million. **ANNUAL GROWTH RATE**: 3.2%. **ETHNIC GROUPS**: Racially homogeneous. **RELIGION**: Religious activities essentially nonexistent since 1945. **LANGUAGE**: Korean. **EDUCATION**: Years compulsory—11. Attendance—95% (est.). Literacy—95% (est.). **WORK FORCE** (6.1 million): Agriculture—18%. Other—52%.

Geography

AREA: 121,730 sq. km. (47,000 sq. mi.). **CITIES**: Capital—Pyongyang. Other cities—Hamhung, Chongjin. **TERRAIN**: Numerous ranges of moderately high and partially forested mountains and hills separated by deep, narrow valleys and small cultivated plains. **CLIMATE**: Warm and sunny summers, cold winters.

Government

TYPE: Communist state, one-leader rule. **INDEPENDENCE**: September 9, 1948. **CONSTITUTION**: 1948, revised 1972.

BRANCHES: *Executive*—President (Chief of State); Premier (Head of Government). *Legislative*—Supreme People's Assembly. *Judicial*—Supreme Court, Provincial, city, county, and military courts (subordinate to Supreme People's Assembly).

SUBDIVISIONS: 9 Provinces, 1 municipality, 3 special urban districts.

POLITICAL PARTIES: Korean Workers (Communist) Party. **SUFFRAGE**: Universal at age 17.

FLAG: Two blue horizontal stripes, top and bottom; two white narrow stripes; and a wide red center band on which appears a red star in a white circle.

Economy

GNP (1978 est.): \$10.4 billion. **ANNUAL GROWTH RATE** (1978 est.): 7.2%. **PER CAPITA INCOME** (1978, in 1975 US dollars): \$570.

NATURAL RESOURCES: Coal, metallic ores, iron, zinc, lead, gold, silver, tungsten, molybdenum, hydroelectric power.


AGRICULTURE: *Products*—rice, corn, potatoes, fruits, vegetables, tobacco. *1978 gross weight*—6 million metric tons.

INDUSTRY: *Types*—mining, steel, cement, textiles, petrochemicals, machines.

TRADE (1978): *Exports*—\$965 million: machine tools, semirefined metals, chemicals. *Imports*—\$900 million: machinery and equipment, petroleum, foodstuffs, coking coal. *Partners*—USSR, China, Japan.

OFFICIAL EXCHANGE RATE: *Commercial*—0.86 won=US\$1. *Noncommercial*—1.86 won=US\$1.

MEMBERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IPU, IRCS, ITU, UN (observer status), UNCTAD, UNESCO, WHO, WIPO, WMO, nonaligned movement.



PEOPLE

The Korean people are racially one of the most homogeneous in the world, comprising no racial or linguistic minorities. Their racial origins are obscure, but the primary stock is believed to be Tungusic, related to the Mongols with some Chinese mixture. Many ethnic Koreans reside abroad, primarily in Japan, Manchuria, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Between 1925 and 1940 the Japanese colonial administration of Korea pushed industrial development in northern Korea. Large numbers of people from the agricultural southern provinces were attracted northward for work. This trend was reversed after 1945 when more than 2 million refugees fled to the south when the peninsula was divided into the Soviet and U.S. military areas of administration. Refugees continued to migrate to the south after the establishment of the Republic of Korea and during the Korean conflict.

While variations in accent exist, the Korean language is virtually identical in all parts of the peninsula. A phonetic, alphabetic writing system, first developed in the 15th century, has become the exclusive written language in North Korea. (South Koreans, who call the system *hangul*, continue to use Chinese characters along with *hangul* in their writing.) North Korea calls the system *chosonum*, and has eliminated the use of Chinese characters in writing.

The traditional religions of Korea were Buddhism and Shamanism. Between the 14th and the 16th centuries, Confucianism gradually displaced Buddhism and came to dominate Korean life. Christian missionaries began to arrive in Korea in the 19th century, founding a number of educational institutions and hospitals throughout Korea. Major centers of missionary activity included Seoul and Pyongyang. Although religious groups nominally exist in North Korea, the preponderance of evidence indicates that these groups are facades operated for foreign policy purposes and that all forms of religious observance are actively discouraged by the North Korean regime.

GEOGRAPHY

North Korea, officially known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.), is located on the Korean Peninsula in northeastern Asia. The peninsula separates the Yellow Sea from the Sea of Japan. North Korea

shares common borders with the People's Republic of China (along the Yalu and Tumen Rivers) and with the Soviet Union (along the Tumen River). The Soviet Union and China both have ready access to North Korea by rail and sea. North Korea is bordered on the south by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), which was established by the Korean Military Armistice as the line of separation of the belligerent sides at the close of the Korean war. On either side of the MDL is the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). To the south of the DMZ is the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.), also known as South Korea. Both Korean Governments hold that the MDL is *not* a border, but a temporary administrative line dividing Korea.

North Korea's terrain consists of numerous ranges of moderately high and partially forested mountains and hills separated by deep, narrow valleys and small cultivated plains. The most rugged areas are the mountainous north and east coasts. The climate is warm and sunny during summer and cold in winter. July and August are normally the warmest months with temperatures averaging 30°C (about 85°F) at Pyongyang. Rainfall is concentrated in the summer months; the rainy season usually occurs in June and July. January is the coldest month, when temperatures often drop below -20°C (-40°F). Snowfall is generally light, but snow cover may persist for long periods.

HISTORY

Korea was first populated by a Tungusic branch of the Ural-Altaic family, which migrated to the peninsula from the northwestern regions of Asia. Some of these people also populated sections of Manchuria, and a facial and physical resemblance still exists between Koreans and Manchurians (both are, for example, taller than most other Orientals). In prehistoric times, Korea was known as Chosun and was a single entity, but in the first century A.D. the peninsula was divided into three kingdoms. In A.D. 668 the peninsula was reunified under the Silla kingdom, which was followed in A.D. 918 by the Koryo dynasty (from which the Western name for Korea derives). The Yi dynasty, which supplanted the Koryo line in 1392, lasted until Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

During most of its history Korea has been invaded, influenced, and fought over by its larger neighbors. The Japanese invaded in 1592, and the Manchu-dynasty Chinese came to Korea in 1637. After a history of bifurcation

from abroad, Korea adopted a strict closed-door policy which earned it the nickname of "The Hermit Kingdom."

Late in the 19th century, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian interests converged in Korea. After defeating the Chinese and Russian Empires, Japan established dominance in Korea, annexing it in 1910. The Japanese colonial period was characterized by firm rule and concerted effort to supplant Korean culture with Japanese.

After Japan capitulated to the Allies to end World War II in 1945, the United States and the U.S.S.R. effected the temporary administrative division of the Korean Peninsula at the 38th parallel, the sole purpose of which, in the United States' view, was to accept the surrender of the Japanese forces stationed in Korea. This decision was taken at the Yalta meeting in February 1945. Those Japanese forces north of the parallel were to surrender to the U.S.S.R., while those in the south were to surrender to the United States. It was the clear intention of the United States to restore to Korea its integrity and independence. After the Japanese surrender, however, the Soviet Union treated the 38th parallel as an international frontier.

U.N. Attempts at Reunification

Between 1945 and 1947 the Soviet Union rejected numerous U.S. efforts to negotiate the creation of a unified and independent Korea in which all political elements could participate freely. Convinced of the futility of further direct negotiations with the U.S.S.R., but not wishing to let the inability of the two powers to reach agreement further delay the Korean people's rightful claims to independence, the United States brought the question of Korean independence and reunification before the U.N. General Assembly on September 17, 1947.

On November 14, 1947, the General Assembly adopted, over the opposition of the Soviet Union, a resolution to the effect that elected representatives of the Korean people should establish conditions of unification and determine their own form of government. The U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was established to facilitate these representative elections. When the commission sought to carry out its mandate by observing elections and consulting with the people, the authorities in the north refused to permit the members to enter their area. Consequently, U.N.-observed elections were held in May 1948 only in the area

south of the 38th parallel. On August 15, 1948, that area became, under U.N. auspices, the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.). During September 1948, the Soviets established the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (D.P.R.K.) in the part of the peninsula north of the 38th parallel.

On December 12, 1948, the General Assembly replaced the temporary commission with the U.N. Commission on Korea and declared the R.O.K. a lawful government and the only such government in Korea. U.S. forces were withdrawn in June 1949, leaving behind only the 500 officers and men of the U.S. Military Advisory Group.

The U.N. Commission on Korea was dissolved in 1950, and its functions were assumed in October of that year by the U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). North Korea, however, refused to cooperate with UNCURK.

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having declined to recognize either the competence or the authority of the United Nations in the Korean question. In 1973 UNCURK was dissolved after having functioned only in South Korea.

Korean Conflict

The Korean conflict began on June 25, 1950, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel to invade the Republic of Korea. The invasion was reported the same day by the U.N. Commission on Korea to the Secretary General. Later that day the Security Council adopted a resolution "noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea" and calling on all members "to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." All such assistance was to be

made available to a "unified command under the United States." In the ensuing collective defense action, the only one ever mounted by the United Nations, 16 U.N. member nations contributed troops, and additional member nations furnished medical or other assistance. Fifty-three of the 59 U.N. member nations approved the Security Council action. The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland voted against it. When U.N. forces succeeded in pushing North Korean troops back to the northern parts of the peninsula toward the Yalu River border with China, North Korean forces were joined by about 390,000 "Chinese people's volunteers," who were in reality regular forces of the Chinese People's Army.

Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but hostilities were not terminated until July 27, 1953, when an armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom. This document continues in force since a peace treaty has not yet been negotiated. The principal agency established to supervise implementation of the truce terms contained in the armistice agreement is the Military Armistice Commission. It is composed of 10 members, 5 appointed by each side. Signatories were North Korea, the Chinese people's volunteers, and the U.N. Command (represented by the United States). Neither the United States nor the Republic of Korea is a signatory of the armistice per se, but both adhere to it through the U.N. Command (UNC).

The armistice agreement called for an early conference of the parties concerned to find a political solution to the problem of Korea's division which armed conflict had left unchanged. The conference was convened at Geneva in April 1954 with representatives of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Australia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and New Zealand attending. After 7 weeks of debate, no agreement could be reached and the conference ended inconclusively.

Throughout the postwar period, both Korean Governments repeatedly affirmed their desire for reunification of the Korean Peninsula, but no direct communications or any other progress took place between the two governments or their citizens until 1971, except through the Military Armistice Commission.

North Korea's Reunification Policy

Since early in the Korean conflict, North Korea has publicly maintained that its prime policy goal is reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Many observers believe that the only form of reunification in which North Korea is interested would have all of Korea under the domination and control of Pyongyang. North Korea has pursued its goal of reunification by military measures and negotiations.

Military Measures

North Korea's recognition of its lack of preparedness to launch a military attack of "liberation" when political turmoil wracked the Republic of Korea in the early 1960s seems to have had lasting effects on North Korean policy. In the late 1960s, North Korea perpetrated a number of violent acts along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and in the Republic of Korea. These acts were directed at U.S. and R.O.K. military forces and at R.O.K. Government authorities. These efforts included infiltration by a 31-agent team which attempted to assassinate the R.O.K. President, seizure of the U.S.S. *Pueblo* and imprisonment and torture of its crew for 11 months, and the shooting down of an unarmed U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft. These acts were apparently intended to instigate popular insurrection in the Republic of Korea against its government and to weaken the U.S. defense commitment. The overall effect was in fact the reverse, and anti-Communist feeling and political unity in the Republic of Korea were strengthened by Pyongyang's campaign.

Apparently recognizing this hard-line approach as counterproductive and taking its cue from the thaw in relations in the early 1970s among the major powers, the North Korean regime attempted to appear more reasonable. Infiltration from the North dropped sharply early in 1970 and virtually ceased after talks began between the North Korean and R.O.K. Red Cross societies in the summer of 1971. When Pyongyang curtailed its sabotage program, however, it apparently decided to embark on a long-term major conventional military buildup. The extent of the buildup did not become evident to the outside world until the late 1970s; today North Korea, with a population of 14 million, maintains the fifth largest army in the world.

The extent of the North Korean military expansion and the resultant disparity of military forces on the peninsula in favor of the North caused

the U.S. Government to decide in mid-1979 to halt planned withdrawals of U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea. The situation will be reviewed again in 1981 in light of the relative military balance on the peninsula at that time as well as any success in efforts to reduce basic underlying tensions on the peninsula.

In addition to greatly expanding its conventional military forces, North Korea has continued intermittent infiltration and sabotage actions against the South. Beginning in 1974, R.O.K. and UNC forces have discovered several military tunnels dug by North Korea deep under the DMZ. This tunneling effort is continuing.

Negotiating Efforts

In August 1971, North Korea and the Republic of Korea agreed to hold talks through their respective Red Cross societies with the stated aim of reuniting the many Korean families separated during the Korean conflict. Following a secret meeting on July 4, 1972, North Korea and the Republic of Korea announced an agreement to work toward national reunification through peaceful means and to end the atmosphere of mutual hostility that had formerly prevailed. Although visits of officials were exchanged and regular communications channels established through a North-South Coordinating Committee and the Red Cross, no real progress was made. The contacts quickly bogged down and were finally broken off by the North. The breakdown in the talks appears to have arisen from differing goals for the talks, with Pyongyang urging immediate steps toward reunification and Seoul seeking progress primarily in tension-reduction and reestablishment of linkages, with reunification a more distant goal.

Efforts at dialogue continued sporadically in ensuing years but always failed as a result of the two sides' conflicting goals.

The Republic of Korea again took the initiative to establish contact with the North in January 1979 in announcing willingness to meet with the North Korean Government at any level to explore ways of reducing tensions on the peninsula. The North responded quickly, and several preliminary sessions were held at Panmunjom within the DMZ. It rapidly became apparent, however, that North Korea was not prepared to meet in a direct government-to-government format, preferring instead to send representatives of various elements of North Ko-

rean society. The resulting impasse led to another hiatus in North-South contacts.

On July 1, 1979, President Park and President Carter jointly proposed to North Korea that the three governments meet in a tripartite framework to discuss all pending issues and seek to reduce tensions on the peninsula. This proposal was initially rejected by North Korea, but the offer to engage in dialogue remains open. In response to the North Korean effort to talk separately with the United States about the Korean armistice, we have pointed out that we would be willing to join any discussion between the representatives of North and South Korea, but that the essential criterion for progress in Korean issues is that both Korean Governments participate fully in any talks.

After the death of R.O.K. President Park in October 1979, North Korea initiated efforts to reestablish contacts with South Korea. In so doing, it has taken an important step which had seemed reluctant to take during earlier North-South contacts and has agreed to direct government-to-government contacts.

Representatives of South and North Korea began holding a series of working-level meetings in early 1980 to arrange for a conference of the two Prime Ministers, the step which both sides have agreed should be the initial one in the process of reconciliation. The process is still too recent for fair determination as to whether North Korea is indeed interested in genuine exchange, cooperation, and reduction of tensions or if this is just another attempt by North Korea to insert itself into R.O.K. domestic politics.

The United States has consistently supported the propositions that direct government-to-government talks between the authorities of South and North Korea are necessary to resolve the issues on the Korean Peninsula, and that concrete steps to promote greater understanding and reduce tension are needed to pave the way for any reunification of the Korean nation. The United States stands prepared to participate in such talks, alone or in conjunction with other concerned states, if so desired by the two Korean Governments and provided that both North and South Korea are full and equal participants in any such dialogue.

GOVERNMENT

North Korea has a strongly centralized Socialist government under complete control of the Korean Workers' (Communist) Party, dominated by one man. A few minor parties are allowed to

exist in name only to present a facade of representative government.

In December 1972 the Fifth Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) promulgated a new constitution replacing that of 1948. The 1972 constitution creates the position of President of the D.P.R.K. and a high-level government agency, the Central People's Committee (CPC). In theory, the SPA, North Korea's legislature, is the highest organ of state power. The constitution states that members are elected every 4 years. In the past usually only two meetings were held each year, each lasting a few days. A Standing Committee of 19 members elected by the SPA performs legislative functions when the Assembly is not in session. In reality the Assembly serves only to ratify decisions made in other Communist Party and government bodies. The constitution designates the Central People's Committee as the government's top policy-making body. Headed by the President of the D.P.R.K., who also nominates the other 24 CPC committee members, the CPC makes high-level policy decisions and supervises the Cabinet known as the State Administration Council. The council is headed by the Premier and is the dominant administrative and executive branch of government. The judiciary is subordinate to the Supreme People's Assembly. The SPA's Standing Committee appoints judges to the state's highest court for 4 year terms concurrent with that of the Assembly.

Politically, North Korea is divided into nine Provinces, four municipalities (Pyongyang, Hamhung, Chongjin, and Naju), and the urban special district of Kaesong. Korea also appears to have nine military defense districts.

Little is known about the actual lines of power and authority in the North Korean Government in contrast with the elaborate formal structure set forth in the constitution. It is clear, however, that 69 year old Kim Il-song, North Korea's ruler since the government's establishment in 1948, is the chief government and Communist Party official. Kim and a group of long-time associates, all ranking members of the country's Communist Party (the Korean Labor Party or KLP), dominate the government and economy through an elaborate party structure as well as government and military bureaucracies. This group of officials holds top positions in both government and party structures. Kim Il-song is personally involved and active in every aspect of his country's government and economy and has become the object of an inten-

sive and far-reaching personality cult, probably unequalled in the rest of today's world. President Kim Il-song's son, Kim Chong-il, is reputedly being groomed to follow his father in the presidency.

Principal D.P.R.K. Officials

President—Kim Il-song

Vice Presidents—

Kim Il
Kang Yang-uk
Pak Song-chol

Premier—Yi Chong-ok

Vice Premiers—

Kye Ung-tae
Ho Tam
Chong Chun-ki
Kang Song-san
Kong Chin-tae
Kim Tu-yong

Foreign Minister—Ho Tam

Armed Forces Minister—O Chin-U

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Labor Party—Kim Il-song

ECONOMY

When the Korean Peninsula was divided in 1945, it resulted in an unnatural division of natural and human resources which economically disadvantaged the North and South to some extent. By most economic measures, North Korea was left better off after partition in terms of both industry and natural resources, but it had only one-third of the work force. In 1945 approximately 65% of Korea's heavy industry was in the North, but only 31% of light industry, 37% of agriculture, and 18% of the peninsula's total commerce. Since that time the D.P.R.K.'s Soviet-type economy has concentrated its labor force (estimated at 6.1 million) and natural resources in an effort to accomplish rapid economic development. The regime has been assisted in these efforts by large amounts of aid from other Communist countries, notably the Soviet Union and China. This aid was particularly effective in the years immediately following the Korean war, when the economy experienced a high rate of growth.

After reaching a peak in 1960, the economic growth rate declined and the economy has not recovered its former momentum. In October 1967 the regime's ambitious 7-year plan (1961-67) was extended for 3 years in the interest of strengthening "national defense capabilities." A 6-year plan for 1971-76 was launched in November 1970, but it required an additional year for completion.

During the early 1970s, North Korea, probably noting the more rapid economic development of the Republic of Korea, attempted a large-scale modernization program through the importation of Western technology, principally in the heavy industrial sectors of the economy. By the end of 1976, the D.P.R.K.'s hard-currency debt had reached \$1.4 billion, about six times the average annual hard-currency exports. It also owed at least another \$1 billion to Communist creditors. Unable to finance its debt through exports, the D.P.R.K. became the first Communist country to default on its loans from free market countries.

Largely because of these debt problems but also because of a prolonged drought, North Korea's industrial growth slowed in 1976, and Pyongyang fell short of its 6-year plan (1971-76) industrial targets. In 1976, for the first time, the North's per capita GNP fell below that of the South, and by the end of 1979 per capita GNP in the D.P.R.K. was only about one-third of that in the Republic of Korea. The causes for this relatively poor performance are complex, but major contributing factors include the disproportionately large percentage of GNP (over 20%) the North devotes to the military and its excessive reliance on self-sufficiency, eschewing the benefits of international trade.

In 1979, North Korea showed some signs of improving its international financing reputation by reaching a debt repayment agreement with Japan, its major creditor. Recent directives from the leadership and signs of changes in the foreign trade structure of the government indicate growing concern over balance-of-payments problems and possibly an awareness of the disadvantages of economic isolation. However, as long as the D.P.R.K. budget continues to favor the military and military-related industries, other sectors of the economy will continue to be shortchanged, and the economy as a whole will suffer.

North Korean statements on the current plan claim great success, but outside observers believe that much of their economy continues to stagnate.

Approximately 40% of the population lives on the land, but agriculture, forestry, and fishing constitute only 24% of total GNP. The main crops are rice, barley, and corn, but North Korea is self-sufficient only in the first two. Although agricultural production has improved, rationing of foodstuffs continues and shortages of corn, wheat, and dairy products exist. The collectiviza-

zation of agriculture was completed in 1958, but individual households are permitted to cultivate small, private vegetable plots and to keep a few animals and poultry.

Although North Korea enjoys the greater share of the peninsula's natural resources, it must still import petroleum and coking coal. It generates electricity from domestic coal production and hydroelectric facilities, many of which date from the Japanese occupation.

Reliable figures are not available for GNP, per capita income, or trade. Per capita GNP is estimated to be about \$600.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In the years after 1945 the Soviet Union supplied the economic and military aid which enabled the North Koreans to mount their invasion of the Republic of Korea in 1950. Soviet aid and influence continued at a high level during the Korean war; after hostilities ended, it was in large part responsible for rebuilding the North Korean economy. However, the assistance of Chinese "volunteers" during the war, and the presence of these troops in the country until 1958, provided Beijing with opportunities for increasing its influence. In 1961, Pyongyang concluded formal mutual security (defense) treaties with Moscow and Beijing which continue in force today. In 1962 North Korea increasingly began to favor China's militant political line as the Sino-Soviet dispute sharpened.

North Korean-Soviet relations reached a low point in 1964. Since that time relations have improved somewhat although ideological differences remain. Relations with China underwent some stress in 1967, following Chinese Red Guard propaganda attacks on Kim Il-sung, but improved substantially in 1970, following exchanges of high-level visitors between the two countries.

North Korea maintains a militarily independent stance in its foreign policy in accordance with its doctrine of *juche*, or self-reliance. Recent events, such as China's rapprochement with the United States, the Soviet-backed Vietnamese

invasion of Kampuchea, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, have created strains in North Korea's relationship with China and the Soviet Union.

China in particular, however, has made strong efforts to maintain good relations with the D.P.R.K. Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng's first foreign visit was to Pyongyang in May 1978, and a number of high-level Chinese visitors, including Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in September 1978, have since visited the D.P.R.K.

While Pyongyang's ties to Beijing have been closer recently, both China and the Soviet Union have continued to supply military as well as economic aid to North Korea.

North Korea's foreign relations remain heavily oriented toward the Communist states. Pyongyang is seeking, however, to enlarge its representation abroad wherever possible and has had increasing success, particularly since China was admitted to the United Nations in late 1971. The D.P.R.K. has put increasing emphasis on its relationship with the Third World and aspires to a leadership role in the nonaligned movement. At the meeting of the nonaligned movement in Havana in August 1979, North Korea was elected a member of the *nonaligned coordinating bureau*. As of April 1980, the D.P.R.K. had diplomatic relations with 99 countries. (The Republic of Korea was recognized by 111 states.)

In its foreign policy North Korea continues to assert that it is the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula (a title awarded some years ago by the United Nations to South Korea). Although it has pragmatically acceded to the recognition of both Koreas by some Third World countries, the D.P.R.K. continues to take every opportunity to urge other countries to break relations with Seoul. Pyongyang has successfully pressed all Communist states to avoid relations with South Korea and has been particularly sensitive to any contacts with Seoul by China or the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Republic of Korea is willingly prepared to see an expansion of contacts with North Korea by its major allies, including the United States, if this proceeds in a balanced fashion and North Korea's principal allies are prepared to expand contacts with South Korea. The

United States has made known its willingness to participate in a balanced and reciprocal expansion of trade and contacts in the region, but progress has thus far been blocked by the adamant North Korean stance.

U.S.-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS

The United States maintains no representation of any kind in North Korea and conducts no trade with North Korea. Financial and commercial transactions by persons or firms subject to U.S. jurisdiction are prohibited under 50 U.S.C. app. #5(b) and 31 CFR ##500.201-500.204 except under license from the Secretary of the Treasury.

The United States welcomes and supports the initiation of talks between the Government of the D.P.R.K. and the Government of the Republic of Korea, viewing these talks as a means for reducing tension not only in Korea but also throughout Asia. However, the United States continues to maintain a policy of firm support for South Korean security and a posture of alertness against the possibility of renewed hostility from the North. The United States and the Republic of Korea have reaffirmed their adherence to the U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and have agreed to continue the modernization of the R.O.K. defense forces to meet any renewed aggression from North Korea. ■

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
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
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
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
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
OTHER ARMY RANKS



OTHER AIR FORCE RANKS



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ATTACHMENT 20

American Forces in Foreign Cultures

By Captain Donald M. Bishop, U.S. Air Force

U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, Vol. 104,
April 1978, pp. 42-50.



"To See Ourselves As Others See Us"

"To foreigners, there is no distinction between American 'on-duty' and 'off-duty' conduct. Good behavior and patience must be the marks of Americans at all times. This requires a standard of discipline higher than the one enforced stateside, but the behavior of U.S. military members overseas is so visible and so important that the highest standard must be enforced."

Since World War II, millions of American servicemen have been stationed in foreign nations. For the most part, the United States has carefully looked out for their equipment and provision, physical condition, medical well-being, and legal status. The political, logistical, financial, environmental, and gold flow impact of our overseas troops is scrutinized at the highest level. They are well trained in their military skills. The thorough attention to these areas, however, stands in contrast to a serious lack of concern for the *cultural* aspects of our deployments abroad. How do Americans react to a foreign people? What influence do they have on foreign societies? Do the special conditions of service abroad influence the planning and conduct of operations?

More than a decade ago, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Yamashita noted, ". . . there seems to be a lack of interest in these ideas and the rejection of them as being 'Cloud Nine Stuff' and hardly applicable in the training of individuals going overseas. . . ."¹ Thirteen years and one war later, it is clear that the cultural impact of our military forces is no less important than other factors merely because it is intangible. Indeed, the lack of concern *tangibly* erodes the effectiveness of our forces. It can also frustrate the attainment of our foreign policy goals. This article, then, examines the cultural dimension of our overseas presence and proposes ways to make American servicemen more effective in this role.

American Servicemen Abroad—A Positive View: The significant presence of the American military overseas has been a major aspect of the modern interaction of the West with the non-Western world. Two countries which illustrate the positive impact of American servicemen are Japan and Morocco.

Even as the diplomats and generals of the defeated Empire of Japan were signing the unconditional surrender on board the USS *Missouri* (BB-63) in September 1945, the first American occupation troops were spreading through the island nation to take control of Japanese society. The occupation, headed by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, lasted from 1945 to 1952—seven years in which the United States was free to shape Japanese society as it wished. Calling the occupation a "revolution," one writer has stated that the period of American effort ". . . created the face of Japan as we know it today. . . ."²

Possibly as important as the laws that the American occupation headquarters framed for the Japanese people was the immense cultural contact that oc-

curred between the Japanese people and American troops. Before the occupation, most Japanese had had no contact with any foreigners. After the war:

". . . the presence of hundreds of thousands of Americans, who could be observed, studied, and weighed in the balance as representatives of the new democratic ideas, had widely ramifying effects that deserve a great deal more attention in any account of postwar change in Japan. The demonstration effect was undoubtedly a considerable one in consumption, styles of living, and inter-personal relations as well. . . . Japanese newspapers were extremely attentive to small incidents about American soldiers that would not strike us as particularly noteworthy: the giving of seats on busses and subways to women, the ease of relations between men and women, the informality of enlisted men before their officers. What the Japanese saw—or thought they saw—in the behavior of the Americans around them provided much food for thought."³

In contrast to Japan, the North African country of Morocco had had extensive contact with Westerners before World War II in the form of French and Spanish colonial rulers. Operation Torch in November 1942, however, brought to Morocco a new group of foreigners—American servicemen. Between 1942 and 1963, when the last large group of Americans withdrew, a million American servicemen and dependents had served in the kingdom. The Moroccans looked upon the Americans as Westerners untainted by colonialism. American sailors and airmen won friends by responding with medical and reconstruction aid in earthquake and flood disasters. There were occasional frictions, but the positive impact of the American presence was summed up by King Mohammed V, "From the wheels of chance come many strange combinations. Your military detachments have been cast in a day-to-day role of contact with various segments of my people. They have imparted to us some of their ways . . . and I hope that they in turn have learned something from us and from our way of life."⁴

In assessing the results of Moroccan contact with Americans, the king mentioned such technological and material contributions as the introduction of forestry, soil conservation, and the scientific breeding of cattle. Americans also demonstrated their values, in democracy and in "compassion." Princess Aisha, the president of the Moroccan national welfare service, said of the latter quality: "You [Americans] never asked how much it would cost [to provide earthquake relief] at Agadir, neither in money nor in effort. I saw your soldiers there work until they liter-

¹For footnotes, please turn to page 50

ally dropped from exhaustion and they never asked if it was dangerous—only if they perhaps can save one more."⁵

Other examples of the influence of American servicemen abroad are numerous. In general, we can say that the American military presence has been positive when Americans have measured up to our own ideals of honesty, fair play, justice, and magnanimity. In turn, our own country has been influenced by the thousands of servicemen—and thousands of foreign "war brides"—who have returned to the United States after assignments abroad.

The Other Side of the Coin—Negative Impact: The American military presence overseas has had its negative effects as well. In most nations where our troops have been stationed they form the largest group of Americans. The very presence of many Americans in a nation has disruptive effects. One author has argued that the large numbers of Americans—military, civilian, and military dependents—had more influence on Japan than General MacArthur's reforms because they brought with them American mass culture with its social disorganization, juvenile delinquency, theft, violence, and sexual assaults.⁶ A certain amount of social disruption in foreign countries has resulted from the numbers of illegitimate children whose fathers have been American servicemen.⁷ One observer has noted that Americans in Thailand imparted their own racial prejudices on the Thai people.⁸ And many foreign intellectuals now worry about the need to curb the Americanization of their societies caused by the presence of American servicemen. Though it is obviously wrong to attribute all these changes in foreign societies to the American military influence alone, American military people—who, after all, only reflect the good and the bad in our own society—must accept some responsibility for the development of negative images of the United States abroad.

One more aspect of the negative American military image overseas deserves mention. In almost every country where American servicemen have been stationed, but especially in Asia, a coordinate "camp town" or "vill" has become associated with each American base. Unscrupulous local businessmen seek to profit from a serviceman's loneliness and from the lack of recreational outlets on base by offering alcohol to forget and "companionship" to make the time go faster—all for a price. In the camp towns are the primary purveyors of hallucinogens and narcotics to our servicemen. The price for all this, however, is monetary and moral.

Camp towns have a corrosive effect on mission per-

formance, health, discipline, and our foreign relations with the host country. Alcoholism and the resulting loss of work time and efficiency are common problems for overseas commanders. The high rate of venereal disease in other countries, for instance, regularly astounds newly arrived commanders, doctors, and news reporters. Drunk and disorderly behavior, assaults, and other disciplinary problems concern commanders on every remote base. Such American behavior can severely antagonize people of the host nation. Incidents between Filipinos and Americans on or outside our bases, for instance, have long embittered Philippine-American relations. More than 20 years ago, one Philippine statesman noted:

"The American bases now became regular news beats. As a result incidents which otherwise would have been ignored became hot news. They not only became front page materials but some of them inspired sizzling and biting speeches on the floors of the [Philippine] House and Senate. Sensationalism also came in. The trivial was exaggerated and the false foisted as truth, especially when their effect was to fan anti-Americanism and narrow nationalism. . . . The recurring controversies involving the bases inevitably widened into a more general criticism of American politics."⁹

Factors Which Affect American Servicemen Abroad: A number of related factors erode the positive impact of the American presence abroad. These are our ignorance of foreign cultures and societies, ethnocentrism, and our own domestic prejudices. These are aggravated by two sources of stress—culture shock and family separation.

Ignorance: Americans in general are known for their preoccupation with domestic affairs and relative lack of interest in the affairs of foreign nations.¹⁰ An English missionary once described American ignorance as encountered at one of our Korean bases in these words:

"An hour and a half away by jeep is one of the larger U.S. bases. It is well outside my parish, but I am the nearest foreign priest, so I have been guineapigging there during the chaplain's absence. Here in a vast and bleak site is a small and purely American town, with that air of insecurity that belongs to nonpermanent military establishments. In spite of large numbers of Korean employees and prostitutes, nothing about it suggests Korea. Yet it is an important feature of this piece of countryside and has created a Korean village on its doorstep that lives off its moral and physical refuse.

"To the Americans who entertain me after mass

I am a novel curiosity, someone from the other side of the barbed wire: in fact a visitor from Korea. I am plied with questions about Korea on every subject from politics through marriage customs to diet. I am asked to check stories about Korea, and fantastic some of them are. It is still hard to blame anyone. The language barrier seems unsurpassable.

"The only Koreans the American soldier knows are the pathetic waitresses, the cocky young men with a smattering of bad American who work in the place, and the Cypriots outside the gate. He cannot understand why the 'first name' of so many Koreans should be Lee, as though they were all anti-Yankee. The girls go by Japanese nicknames like 'Skoshi' and 'Josan.'

"What does the Korean countryman know of the American? Perhaps even less. He knows that Americans are wealthy and that they bring prostitutes and dope dealers in their wake, quite apart from various other rackets and opportunities. (At least there is no ill feeling.) To the man with a foot in both worlds the situation is tragic, because it does justice to neither."¹¹


Ignorance of foreign cultures cannot be overlooked by commanders and leaders, for ignorance too often

its customs, and its people. Instead of trying to understand local conditions through an honest analysis of the historical circumstances which created them, it becomes satisfying to talk as if the difficulties were more or less created by the local people for your personal discomfort.

Ethnocentrism: Historians explain that nationalism—certainly one of the most powerful intellectual forces in the modern world—was originally a humane concept based on the brotherhood of those who shared a common land, language, and heritage. It became, however, an intolerant belief in the superiority of one's own country over others. Similarly, in the 19th century, Europe's previous awe of such civilizations as India and China gave way to a feeling that Western nations were somehow ordained to rule lower, less advanced cultures—"lesser breeds without the law." This superiority has come to be termed "ethnocentrism"—the emotional attitude that one's own ethnic group, nation, or culture is superior to all others.

Signs of the ethnocentrism that debilitates the effectiveness of American forces overseas are the nicknames we give to foreigners—"gooks," "zipperheads," "squints," "Mo's" (Mohammedans), "slopes," etc. The inquiry by General William R. Peers on the investigations surrounding the massacre of Vietnamese civilians at My Lai (Son My) addressed this issue of name-calling and whether it signified any "widespread subliminal classification of Vietnamese as subhuman." Though the investigation rejected such a sweeping conclusion because the members of Task Force Barker held varying opinions of the Vietnamese, the report concluded: ". . . it is considered likely that the unfavorable attitude of some of the men of TF Barker toward the Vietnamese was a contributing factor in the events of Son My."¹²

The opposite of ethnocentrism—an attitude of respect and appreciation for foreign cultures—is not merely a softhearted, peacetime affair. It has specific meaning in combat. The marines fighting in the I Corps region of Vietnam found it necessary to adopt a special "personal response" program for officers and noncommissioned officers to help their troops understand and interact with the Vietnamese people. The *Unit Leader's Personal Response Handbook* emphasized that the attitude of each Marine was "a vital part of the war." A positive attitude could influence the training of Vietnamese troops, the amount of work performed by civilians in support of the war effort, the flow of intelligence to American units, and the desertion of Viet Cong soldiers. This handbook mentioned the problems Americans had in dealing with the Vietnamese by noting: "It is a war for people.



turns to hostility. In a strange society people feel frustrated and anxious, and they often react to this frustration in a predictable way. The first step is to reject the environment which causes the discomfort and to begin to think "the ways of Korea are bad because they make me feel bad." From that point, it is easy to become aggressive, to band together with other Americans, and to criticize the host country,

But people are funny. If I think you are looking down at me, talking down to me, pegging me as thick-headed, I really don't care much about you or what you are saying. On the other hand, if I feel that you do care about my welfare, I'll follow you anywhere regardless of risk."¹³ Thus, marines in combat were urged to work to encourage understanding and positive attitudes toward the Vietnamese.

A specific example of a misunderstanding that hampered the war effort was the lack of energy which Americans commonly perceived in the Vietnamese. The Marine handbook cautioned:

"REMEMBER THAT CULTURAL DIFFERENCES MAY BEWILDER BOTH VIETNAMESE AND AMERICANS

"Reason: Americans have a dynamic concept of life filled with needs and desires requiring satisfaction; while many Vietnamese think of the world, its social order and man's place as essentially 'pre-ordained.' American culture is often conceived as active, material, and logical, while that of the Vietnamese is primarily passive, spiritual and mystical. The abundant American vitality created by these concepts, and by such factors as health and diet, sometimes seems to overwhelm the Vietnamese who by their religious and ethical backgrounds, and because of diet, climate and disease, are less exuberant and extroverted. Unless these cultural differences are remembered, American vitality can be mistaken for egotism and arrogance, even as Vietnamese passivity can be wrongly interpreted as lethargy and indolence. Awareness of these differences does not require the surrender or compromise of ideals and principles, but it can help develop attitudes of patience and understanding that supersede the differences."¹⁴

One could argue that an insufficient regard for the Vietnamese was an important factor leading to the failure of U.S. arms and policy in South Vietnam.

Prejudice: An unfortunate aspect of the American character which influences us in foreign societies is our historic prejudice against minorities—ethnic, religious, or racial. Our domestic prejudices can influence our behavior overseas. Given, for instance, a misunderstanding with a foreigner (who is usually shorter, darker, and "exotic"), domestic prejudice makes it easy to characterize all foreigners as inferiors. This can become vicious. At least one observer has linked American racial prejudice at home to our ethnocentrism abroad by noting a parallel between the way Americans use the word "gook" to describe Orientals and the use of "nigger" to describe blacks.¹⁵

Another way in which our domestic prejudices influence our behavior overseas is more subtle. In many cases, acceptance of foreigners requires conscious acts of understanding and compassion. To the degree that social conditions in the United States have denied these humane gifts to groups of our youth, they may fail to approach foreigners with understanding or empathy, two qualities which facilitate effective interaction.

Ignorance, ethnocentrism, and prejudice, then, work to frustrate the American potential for good in foreign societies. Compounding the effect of all three are two special sources of stress for servicemen overseas—culture shock and family separation.

Culture Shock: One expert states that ". . . direct exposure to an alien society usually produces a disturbing feeling of disorientation and helplessness that is called 'culture shock.'"¹⁶ According to another writer, culture shock is the ". . . reaction of an individual when he is faced with the removal or distortion of many of the familiar cues he had encountered at home and the substitution for them of other cues that are strange."¹⁷ Americans encounter countless novel cues in overseas areas. Some of these are curious and others comic; some present real dangers. All, however, are frustrating. Perhaps one example can illustrate the problem.

American drivers blow their horns to signal "Danger imminent; look around and get out of the way!" The message an Asian driver gives the same way is, "I see you; don't make any sudden moves and you'll be all right." How many American military drivers have injured foreign pedestrians through their ignorance of the two different cultural meanings of the same signal? How much frustration on both sides has resulted from the difference in cultural cues?

Cultural differences cause the reactions we call "culture shock."¹⁸ The reactions include:

► **Anxiety and fear:** Anything unknown is frightening, and many people abroad thus seek to isolate themselves from their source of fear—the foreign society. As a result of their inability to handle the new situations and new cues, they show several related symptoms: refusal to try foreign foods, excessive fear that "all those thieves outside the gate are out to get me," an excessive concern for sanitation, a fear of physical contact with foreigners ("they're crawling with fungi"), and hypochondria.

► **Prejudice and generalizing:** Lack of real knowledge about the foreign society, compounded by a few bad experiences, can often lead to hostility and mental generalizations about the people of the host country. "Arabs are thieves." "Filipinos are just dumb!"

► **Regression:** In this reaction the foreigner abroad

begins to glorify excessively everything at home. The most common symptom of this regression on American bases is frequent long conversations where everything American is compared with counterparts in the host nation and pronounced superior—American music, food, cars, government, justice, customs, culture, and women—with no attempt to appreciate the good aspects of other lands or ways of life.



► **Neurotic behavior:** One writer notes that "individuals experiencing culture shock or cultural fatigue may actually exhibit behavior that borders on the neurotic. They may appear irrational and seem to have changed personalities."¹⁰ These odd behavior patterns include excessive loss of temper, an absentminded approach to life, depression, or a feeling of persecution by local officials.

► **Actual Illness:** A number of writers have proposed that the common diarrhea that affects travelers worldwide (known in its military form as "Ho Chi Minh's revenge" and by a number of other colorful nicknames) has psychological roots in culture shock as well as biological causes. Mental breakdowns and illness also occur overseas.

This catalog of symptoms of culture shock has very real meaning overseas. One American military wife described some of the unhappy behavior she had observed among American military people.

"The image of the Ugly American lives on in Europe. It is kept going by the Americans who drink too much, the ones who swear loudly in public places, those who demand service in a business establishment and demand also that the business be conducted in English by the 'foreigner' when in fact it is the American who is the foreigner. It is carried on by the American serviceman in The Netherlands who was afraid to allow his child to drink Dutch milk, when in fact the milk sold in the commissary was processed in a Dutch-operated dairy and the milk came from Dutch cows!"

"The very coarse manners of some of my fellow Americans help our image along the wrong path. I can still feel the blood rushing to my face when I recall seeing an American woman chasing the Dutch mailman down the street, screaming and swearing at him because the letter he had put in her mailbox was not her family's. It happened again in an Italian campsite when another American spoke loudly and negatively about Italian food and Italian people. Did he think that all the Italians present were as deaf to English as he was to Italian?"²⁰

Psychological Stresses of Family Separation: The American servicemen overseas who are unable to take their families with them to a remote station face a difficult period in their lives. Every problem faced by an individual or a family seems magnified for the officer or serviceman abroad. Every financial difficulty becomes aggravated by distance. Every family problem seems unsolvable from across the Atlantic or the Pacific. Every doubt can become a gnawing suspicion of infidelity.

In the United States, many mutually supporting social groups—the family, the church, fellow workers—aid individuals in coping with everyday strains by helping them find constructive, moral solutions to their problems. At remote stations abroad, most of these supports are absent. For many individuals, an isolated tour can become a tragedy without the help and guidance of trusted friends or family in coping with the special stresses of an overseas assignment. This lack of support is especially important for an individual deciding whether or not to make the camp town the center of his life abroad.

The stresses of family separation and the strains of adjustment to culture shock push many individuals into a pattern of adjustment that can alter or ruin their lives. Alcoholism is one such pattern; the regular patronage of prostitutes is another. Two Navy doctors have noted that "Getting high is one way of dealing with depression or disappointment." Servicemen . . . under stress may turn to drugs to find a release for their tensions and a respite from their fears."²¹

What Can be Done? Given the problems people have in adjusting to strange environments, considering the importance that good relations between American forces and host country nationals have for our foreign policy, and viewing the potential for human disaster that can occur if these problems are not mitigated, I believe the armed services must take aggressive measures to ease the strains of service

abroad. The responsibility is at once personal—*involving the efforts of individual commanders, officers, and supervisors—and corporate—requiring command emphasis and official policies.* A personal checklist would include the following:

► *Study the culture of the host country; learn some of its language.* A serviceman who goes abroad without having made a specific effort to become aware of the history, culture, and way of life of the host country can hardly expect to interact successfully with its people or cope with its society. Conversely, study can do much to prevent the ignorance, ethnocentrism, and prejudice that surely will defeat any effort at understanding the foreign culture.

Learning even a little of the host nation's language can do much to improve the situation. A few emergency phrases can ease the fear of traveling and sightseeing. Meeting an American who knows even a few polite words pleases foreigners; the same expressions open doors of friendship. Every military installation overseas offers a brief course in foreign-language conversation. Take it.

► *Get off base and meet the people.* The opportunities for an American to get to know foreigners are numerous. Local base employees and American foreign missionaries are generally pleased to help servicemen discover a society. One of the benefits of America's position as a world power is that English is widely studied. With a little effort you can come to know local businessmen and teachers who speak your language. Many Americans find teaching conversational English to high school and college students in foreign countries to be a rewarding experience.

► *Realize that culture shock will affect you and your personnel.* If you know the symptoms of culture shock, you can recognize and better cope with them. More important, you can help your people.

► *Set the example of proper behavior.* Never lose your temper with foreigners. Do not allow a racial slur or joke to be told in your presence without tactfully indicating your disapproval. Don't frequent "the vill." Remember that a superior who winks at any unseemly behavior by his subordinates tacitly condones the act.

► *Hold to a high standard of courtesy and behavior at all times in dealing with foreigners, be they bar girls or government officials.* They will respect you for it.

► *Remember that to foreigners there is no distinction between American "on-duty" and "off-duty" conduct.* Good behavior and patience must be the marks of Americans at all times. This requires a standard of discipline higher than the one enforced stateside, but the behavior of American military members overseas is so visible and so important that the higher standard

must be enforced.

► *Lead, don't follow.* Present your men and women, your associates, and your commander with an example of proper behavior. Not all of them will follow it. But enlisted people, especially young first-termers, in some ways do model themselves after the behavior of their superiors. Officers do respect their contemporaries who adhere to a strict standard of duty. Your personal influence may have only the most modest effect on our foreign relations, but every positive effort will have a value.

Armed Forces Initiatives: The efforts of individuals, however, cannot begin to resolve the problems of Americans overseas unless the armed forces support their actions with policies which directly confront the situation. Such policies might include:

► *Prepare meaningful orientation materials which address practical problems.* The current series of pamphlets which provide an introduction to foreign nations for U.S. military personnel and their families now provide little information of real value in adjusting to a foreign culture. The pamphlets seem to reflect a fear of offending the host nation by even discussing the difficulties that will surely be encountered by Americans in a different culture. Such a view is shortsighted, and our allies would applaud a candid approach which ultimately improved relations. Effective orientation materials—similar, perhaps, to the Marine Corps personal response handbook—should deal with everyday problems and the gripes of enlisted people, officers, dependents, and civil service employees, on and off duty.²²

► *Introductory briefings for new personnel should be positive.* "In-country briefings" have a kind of notoriety in the service. Chaplains, medics, and security police vie to relate the hazards of going off base, and their general tone is fear motivation. Surely these briefings could become more positive. Air Force Major Robert Bartanowicz has commented:

"The only thing I notice to be missing in all the briefings I've had in sixteen years in the force is any sense of balance or realism. Yes, some airmen will contract venereal disease, and others will be the victims of assault and robbery. But these things can be approached in a more realistic light. Why not brief on the positive aspects of the overseas area and explain the problems—that Americans are sometimes guilty of violating foreign customs because they don't know better, that single troops frequent local dives instead of going to the USO or Red Cross to meet other young people."²³

Introductory briefings should always include someone to speak as a representative of the host

nation—perhaps an English-speaking foreign officer, a base civilian employee, or a local civic official. These people could officially welcome the new Americans and answer their many questions with authority.

► *Language training.* Each overseas base should have one American designated on the manning document to speak the host country's language. Currently the operating units—wings, support squadrons, bases—depend entirely on hired local national interpreters to communicate with foreigners. The Air Force, for instance, has concentrated its linguists in the Office of Special Investigations, the Security Service, intelligence, advisory groups, and very high headquarters. The units with the most people—and the most problems—do without Americans trained in the language.



The shortcomings of local interpreters are several. They must cope with the problem of divided loyalty. They may color or distort the message they are bound to interpret because they must operate within the confines of their own culture. Furthermore, in time of war or local disorder they may become suddenly unavailable. On the other hand, an American

trained in the language can become a more trusted intermediary for base personnel, an advisor to the civilian personnel office in its dealings with foreign employees, and a valued staff officer who can provide culturally informed inputs to command decisions.

► *American-culture training programs should be developed for foreign civilian employees.* Foreign employees working at American installations overseas have their own problems of adjustment to "strange" American behavior.²⁴ This is no doubt responsible for the common petty disputes with maids, snack bar employees, and workers which contribute to hostility and misunderstanding. Much could be remedied by introducing our employees to American culture with a formal training program.

► *A broad approach—medical, moral, recreational, psychological, and cultural—in dealing with camp towns is necessary.* The problems of servicemen who seek to release their tensions in the environment of the "vill" are too complex to be handled by any single base agency—the medics, for instance. The services should encourage commanders to attempt innovative approaches which combine the efforts of several base agencies.

► *Attempt active policies of base-host friendship.* Many commanders seem satisfied to "manage" community relations instead of actively promoting friendship. If a commander can control the venereal disease rate, keep the assaults confined to the geographic limits of the "vill," and make a well-publicized orphanage trip each month, all seems well.²⁵ This low-profile policy may keep the incident rate down, but such a policy minimizes opportunities for genuine, constructive relationships. The "benign neglect" also allows hostility among the troops to grow. "Management" of the thorny problems of prostitution, venereal disease, assaults, race relations off base, and drug abuse often absorbs the full energies of local "friendship councils"—the "vill" committee—in reaction to the tough problems engendered by camp towns. Activities and programs to develop understanding and friendship occupy a small part of their time.

► *The principles of equal opportunity and treatment should be applied to our relationships with foreigners as well as to our conduct with other Americans.* We require that commanders and supervisors deal fairly and equitably with all Americans regardless of race, color, or creed; our standard is fair and just treatment. The same must apply to foreign nationals in countries where we are stationed, for good relations may affect our foreign relations or the effectiveness of an alliance. Discrimination and hostile attitudes toward foreign nationals are just as reprehensible as

similar attitudes toward fellow Americans.

It must become a standard of command to take aggressive, positive action to acquaint people with the responsibilities incumbent upon our forces serving overseas. Commanders and supervisors must set the example and actively promote harmonious international relationships—both personal and official. I believe that in overseas areas, required comments by rating officials on performance reports concerning equal opportunity and treatment efforts should also reflect the ratee's attitudes and actions toward foreign nationals.

Merely because American commanders have in the

past devoted scant attention to the cultural impact of our forces abroad does not mean the issues are irrelevant, or the solutions impractical. Sufficient attention by concerned, innovative leaders in all the services can overcome these deficiencies.



Captain Bishop earned an Air Force ROTC commission from Trinity College (Hartford, Connecticut) in 1968. He served in an air base defense squadron at Phu Cat, Vietnam, and has been assigned as a public affairs officer in Alabama and Korea. Since earning a master's degree in military history and Middle Eastern affairs from Ohio State University in 1974, he has been assigned to the Air Force Academy's department of history.

¹K. Stanley Yamashita, "Response of U.S. Personnel to Local Customs in Stability Operations," in *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 527-7-1, April 1976, Vol. 1, p. 283.

²Walt Sheldon, *The Honorable Conqueror: The Occupation of Japan 1945-1952* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), p. ix.

³Herbert Passin, *The Legacy of the Occupation—Japan*, Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute (New York: Columbia University, 1968), p. 21.

⁴Quoted in Leon Borden Blair, *Western Window in the Arab World* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970), p. 298.

⁵Ibid., p. 299.

⁶William L. Neumann, *America Encounters Japan* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 298.

⁷See, for example, Rev. Sv. J. Moen, *The Amerasians: A Study and Research on Interracial Children in Korea* (Seoul: Taewon Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 22-27.

⁸Stuart Loory, *Defeated: Inside America's Military Machine* (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 228, quoting Ann Darling, "Bangkok: Wash the War Away on R&R," *Overseas Weekly* (Pacific Edition), 11 December 1971.

⁹Emilio Aguirado with Vicente Albano Pacis, *A Second Look At America* (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1957), pp. 210-211.

¹⁰In this regard, Premier Suleyman Demirel of Turkey recently recalled his first visits to the United States and noted: "I met Americans from every walk of life. I was impressed by the simplicity and straightforwardness of their manners and their friendliness to foreigners. I noticed, however, their lack of knowledge of actual conditions in other parts of the world, which I found understandable in view of the much more advanced state of their technical civilization and the vastness of the country, which in many ways formed a world apart. These latter characteristics were to develop later into a handicap in the conduct of their policies as a leading power in the world." "Message to America," *Time*, 22 November 1976, p. 44.

¹¹Richard Rutt, *Korean Words and Days: Notes from the Diary of a Country Priest* (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1964), pp. 78-79.

¹²Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Incident, Vol. 1, *The Report of the Investigation* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 8-3, 8-4.

¹³Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *Unit Leader's Personal Re-*

sponse Handbook, NAVMC 2616, 12 October 1967 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. vii-viii, xi.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 266-267.

¹⁵Robert J. Lifton, "The 'Gook Syndrome' and 'Numbness Warfare,'" *Saturday Review*, December 1972, p. 68.

¹⁶Philip K. Bock, editor, *Culture Shock: A Reader in Modern Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. ix.

¹⁷Joyce Hardin, *Sojourners: Women with a Mission* (Inchon: Korea Consolidated Corporation, 1973), p. 47.

¹⁸This discussion of culture shock relies largely on an analysis of two studies: Joyce Hardin, *Sojourners*, pp. 45-68, and Harlan Cleveland, Gerald J. Mangone, and John C. Adams, *The Overseas Americans* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1960), pp. 26-45.

¹⁹Hardin, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁰Elaine M. Heim, "Getting Along Overseas," *The Times Magazine* (Army Times Publishing Company), 10 September 1973, p. 4.

²¹Herbert T. Woolley and Lee H. Beecher, "Drug Abuse: Out in the Open," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, November 1971, p. 20.

²²Three examples of effective materials are Paul C. Crane, *Korean Patterns* (Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1967), Royal Asiatic Society, Korean Branch, Handbook no. 1; Marilyn C. Hinckley, "Building Rapport with the Vietnamese," in *The Art and Science of Psychological Operations: Case Studies of Military Application*, Vol. 1, pp. 287-299; *112 Gripes About the French* (Fontenay-aux-Roses, Seine, France: Imprimeries Bellenand, n.d. [1946?]).

²³Memo, Culture adjustment file, in the possession of the author: For the futility of using fear motivation to prevent venereal disease, see Whitney P. Thomas, "A Matter of Involvement," *Proceedings*, April 1971, pp. 104-105.

²⁴A survey of 51 Thai employees of the USOM conducted by a Navy officer elicited a very informative list of irritants. See "The Thai Counsels Foreigners," in Robert L. Mole, "A Critical Evaluation of the Inter-relationships between the Value Systems and Practices of the People of Thailand," (Research Project, American University, Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, July 1968), Appendix B, pp. 128-133.

²⁵For the shortcomings of "candy handouts" and orphanage assistance as the sole ingredients of a community relations program, see *Unit Leader's Personal Response Handbook*, pp. 29-33, 262-264, and the comments of Colonel Malcolm S. Bounds in his "Military Civic Action," *Air University Review*, May-June 1969, p. 68.

ATTACHMENT 21

2
111900Z DEC 01
FM 152 TNG CANNON TAF (AN6) RENO NV//ACB//

TO USAFA COLORADO SPRINGS CO//DPSOG//
DI

UNCLAS //FOR LTC MITCHELL//

✓ SUBJ: AUTHORITY TO CITE FUNDS

AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO CITE THIS STATION'S FUNDS IN AN AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED \$5 500 FOR TRAN AND \$500 FOR PD FOR 7 OFFICERS TO PERFORM TDY

AT RENO NV 5 THRU 7 FEB 02 PURPOSE OF TDY IS KOREAN CULTURAL AWARENESS BRIEFING CONTRACT QUARTERS WILL BE PROVIDED TWO RENTAL CARS WILL BE PROVIDED OA NUMBER IS 02-04 FUND SITE IS 0123040 DDC 4187 44004 52024P 400 400 00 0412901 IN POINT OF CONTACT IS CPT ALLEN HAMMOND AV: 036-0339

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DATA



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

OFFICE OF INSTRUCTION FOR GEOGRAPHY

USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO 80840

23 February 1982

Colonel Wayne Adams
Commander, 152 TRGp
Cannon IAP
Reno, Nevada 89502

Dear Colonel Adams

I and members of the Academy team enjoyed our visit with the 152 Tactical Recon Grp earlier this month. We appreciate the hospitality of your organization and particularly the assistance by Lt Vaughn Hanchett.

I am enclosing a copy of our orders. The trip cost \$2226 for air fare and \$762.65 for per diem and car rentals. The total bill of \$2988.65 equates to about \$12-\$13 for each person receiving the program. Your accounting people probably need this information.

We wish you and your unit outstanding success during your deployment to Korea. We are pleased to have been of service.

Sincerely

William A. Mitchell
WILLIAM A. MITCHELL, Lt Colonel, USAF
Tenure Associate Professor
Office of Instruction for Geography

1 Atch
TDY Orders

Cy to: NGB/XOT (Lt Col Butler)
Lt Hanchett

DFSOG *✓* DFL *✓* DFPS *✓* DFE *✓* DFH *✓* DFSSB *✓* DFSSPA *✓* DEF *✓* MACFPT *✓* DAES IN TURN
 (THIS FORM IS SUBJECT TO THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974. USE BLANKET PAs. AFFIRM II.)

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16. REMARKS (Use this space for special requirements, leave, superior or 1st-class accommodations, excess baggage, registration fees, etc.) (Prior to travel overseas comply with the Foreign Clearance Guide for passport, immunization, and clearance requirements. Attach receipts showing cost of all lodgings used during the period of this claim. Submit Travel Voucher within 5 working days after completion of travel.) ITEMS 2, 3 & 5: BERRY, WILLIAM E. JR. 280381878 MAJ DFPS; HAMMILL, WILLIAM B., 570687434, CAPT, DFL; HENDERSON, JAMES E., 421542289, CAPT, DFH; MORSE, KENNETH O., 040361115, CAPT, DFE; SORENSEN, MARIUS G., 504486454, CAPT, DFPS. TDY SHRED: 03; AUTH: AFR 36-20 AND 152 TRG MSG 111900Z DEC 81. FUNDING: 5723840 552 41F7 44804 52624F 408 409 05 S412901 1K. HIRE OF SPECIAL CONVEYANCE FOR USE WITHIN AREA OF TDY AUTHORIZED AS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT. JUSTIFICATION FOR DETERMINING THE SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION IN THIS ORDER IS MAINTAINED IN USAFA/DFSOG. CONCURRENCE HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE INDIVIDUAL DEPT HEADS. COMMERCIAL AIR IS DIRECTED BECAUSE OF LIMITED TRAVEL WINDOW. TRAVELERS MUST CHECK WITH A TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFFICE, IF ONE IS ACCESSIBLE, WHEN COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION IS REQUIRED.																																											
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DO 1610 REPLACES AF FORM 826, JUN 76, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

U.S. G.P.O. 1979-632-693/127

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